MahaThuriya NEWS, VIEWS & OPINIONS BY YE KYAW SWA No 7 - Wednesday, December 21, 2011
This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/News,Views&Opinions
Wednesday, December 21, 2011 NO 7
Collector’s Items
Clinton Arrives in Myanmar to Assess Pace of Change - By STEVEN LEE MYERS (nytimes)
Hillary Clinton and Aung San Suu Kyi agree agenda - AP Friday 02 December 2011
Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma - By Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State
Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma – By Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State
Burma's Democracy Leader Aung San Suu Kyi Video Testimony to the U.S. Congress - Wednesday, June 22, 2011
The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula - Kurt M. Campbell (September 16, 2010)
General Assembly - Situation of human rights in Myanmar
TOM LANTOS BLOCK BURMESE JADE (JUNTA’S ANTI-DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS) ACT OF 2008
Japan's foreign minister Koichiro Gemba to visit Myanmar - Published on Dec 13, 2011 TOKYO (AFP)
Clinton's Myanmar trip 'won't hurt ties - China Daily - 14 December 2011
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Clinton Arrives in Myanmar to Assess Pace of Change
Saul Loeb/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton with Deputy Foreign Minister Myo Myint of Myanmar, left, after her arrival in Naypyidaw on Wednesday.
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
Published: November 30, 2011
NAYPYIDAW, Myanmar — Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived here on Wednesday to measure the depth of the political and economic opening the country‘s new government has unexpectedly begun.
After years of abysmal relations between the United States and Myanmar, the Obama administration has promised to respond to progress — Mrs. Clinton‘s trip being the most significant reward so far — even as it presses for more significant steps to end the country‘s repressive rule and international isolation.
Those include freeing hundreds more political prisoners, an end to often violent repression of democracy advocates and ethnic groups, and clarification of the country‘s illicit cooperation with North Korea on developing ballistic missiles and, possibly, nuclear technologies.
Mrs. Clinton, speaking in Busan, South Korea, before flying here, said that the United States hoped that initial steps toward what President Obama has called flickers of progress would ―be ignited into a movement for change that will benefit the people of the country.‖
―I‘m looking to determine for myself and on behalf of our government what is the intention of the current government with respect to continuing reforms, both political and economic,‖ she said.
Mrs. Clinton is scheduled to meet the country‘s new president, U Thein Sein, on Thursday here, and her aides said the two would discuss the possibility of additional reciprocal steps both countries could make to ease decades of hostility.
―We expect this to be a very thorough review of not only the steps that they have taken and what we expect to see in the future, but the things that the United States is prepared to do in response not only to these preliminary steps, but what might be possible if the process of reform and openness continues,‖ a senior administration official said.
Mrs. Clinton‘s visit is the first by a secretary of state since John Foster Dulles visited in 1955, and only the second ever. An improved relationship with Myanmar, still known as Burma by the opposition and the United States, could reshape American diplomacy in the region at a time when the Obama administration seeks to shift its geopolitical focus toward Asia, in part to manage the political and economic dominance of China.
What additional steps, if any, the administration is willing to consider remains to be seen. Lifting the broad range of American sanctions imposed on trade with Myanmar is not yet on the agenda; that would require Congressional approval that would be likely only after far more sweeping reforms here.
Mrs. Clinton could announce smaller steps, though, like returning an ambassador or supporting aid and international financing for the tentative economic reforms that have taken root.
Administration officials said Mrs. Clinton first wanted to see whether Mr. Thein Sein‘s government was prepared to take his own steps. Officials remain wary, disappointed that the government has not freed more of the 1,600 political prisoners still being held and that Mr. Thein Sein recently denied the existence of any of them. The senior administration official also noted that the administration‘s initial efforts to engage Myanmar‘s leaders in 2009 were ―abysmal failures.‖
Another issue of particular concern for the United States is Myanmar‘s cooperation with North Korea, and American officials have pressed the government to agree to more vigorous inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Officials said the administration had hoped Myanmar would agree to that step ahead of the meeting of Southeast Asian Nations in Indonesia earlier this month, when President Obama announced Mrs. Clinton‘s visit.
Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, welcomed Mrs. Clinton‘s trip but said resolving any questions about illicit nuclear research were fundamental to improved relations. ―An early goal of the tentative U.S. re-engagement with Burma should be full disclosure of the extent and intent of the developing Burmese nuclear program,‖ Mr. Lugar said in a statement this week.
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(Page 2 of 2)
Mrs. Clinton‘s aides said that Myanmar‘s government had accommodated the demands of her delegation — which included dozens of officials, security guards and journalists — and imposed no restrictions of her activities. There were logistical challenges that dictated her schedule, including the fact the capital‘s airport here was not equipped to handle a landing at night.
In addition to her meetings with government leaders and members of parliament here on Thursday, Mrs. Clinton will travel to Yangon and meet the Nobel Prize-winning opposition leader, Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, at the house where she spent years under arrest as a symbol of quiet but determined resistance to military dictatorship. She plans to also meet with representatives of Myanmar‘s long-repressed ethnic minority groups and leaders of nongovernmental organizations.
The decision to send Mrs. Clinton was debated among the White House, the State Department and members of Congress, many of whom remained critical. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, the Republican chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Mrs. Clinton‘s trip sent ―the wrong signal.‖
―Secretary Clinton‘s visit represents a monumental overture to an outlaw regime whose D.N.A. remains fundamentally brutal,‖ Ms. Ros-Lehtinen said in statement Tuesday.
The changes under Mr. Thein Sein over the last eight months have included relaxing restrictions on the news media, politics and business, but not relinquishing the military‘s ultimate authority.
Administration officials acknowledge that they do not fully understand how the government makes its decisions and whether the changes are merely superficial or the beginnings of an opening similar to Mikhail S. Gorbachev‘s perestroika in the Soviet Union.
The senior administration official said that Mr. Thein Sein, a former general and prime minister, appeared far more open and well-traveled than his predecessor as president, Than Shwe.
―He spent an enormous amount of time traveling outside the country in meetings, interacting with others,‖ the official said. ―And so it‘s entirely possible that he had a chance to get a much better sense of what was going on in Southeast Asia, how far behind his country was falling, and what was necessary to take steps to at least address some of the challenges that they were facing going forward.‖
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/world/asia/clinton-arrives-in-myanmar-to-assess-reforms.html?_r=1&ref=global-home (p 1)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/world/asia/clinton-arrives-in-myanmar-to-assess-reforms.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=global-home (p 2)
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Hillary Clinton and Aung San Suu Kyi agree agenda
AP Friday 02 December 2011
Two of the world's most recognised women leaders pledged to work together to bring democracy to Burma.
After meeting with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the second time in two days, Aung San Suu Kyi said: "If we move forward together I am confident there will be no turning back on the road to democracy."
But, she added: "We are not on that road yet."
Saying she very much appreciated US engagement with the government of Burma, Ms Suu Kyi called for the release of all political prisoners and the end to ethnic hostilities.
Mrs Clinton thanked Ms Suu Kyi for "steadfast and very clear leadership" and said the US wanted to work both with the pro-democracy activist as well as the government to improve conditions in Burma.
"You have been an inspiration but I know that you feel you are standing for all the people of your country who deserve the same rights and freedoms as people everywhere," Mrs Clinton told Ms Suu Kyi.
"The people have been courageous and strong in the face of great difficulty over too many years. We want to see this country take its rightful place in the world."
Ms Suu Kyi has welcomed Mrs Clinton's visit and tentatively embraced reforms enacted by Burma's new civilian government.
She thanked her and President Barack Obama for their "careful and calibrated" engagement that has seen the US take some modest steps to improve ties.
"We are happy with the way in which the United States is engaging with us," she said.
"It is through engagement that we hope to promote the process of democratisation. Because of this engagement, I think our way ahead will be clearer and we will be able to trust that the process of democratisation will go forward."
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hillary-clinton-and-aung-san-suu-kyi-agree-agenda-6271146.html
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Home » Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton » Secretary's Remarks » 2011 Secretary Clinton's Remarks » Remarks by Secretary Clinton: December 2011 » Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma
Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma
Press Availability
Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State
Nay Pyi Taw, Burma
December 1, 2011
SECRETARY CLINTON: Good afternoon, and – mingalaba, is that how you say it? Yeah? How?
QUESTION: Mingalaba.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Mingalaba. Thank you.
Let me start by saying that I want to emphasize that while I may be the first United States Secretary of State to visit in over a half century, our two nations are far from strangers. We‘ve had a long history together, from the earliest American missionaries to generations of traders and merchants to the shared sacrifices of World War Two. The United States was among the first to recognize this country‘s independence, and we have welcomed the many contributions of Burmese Americans to our own culture and prosperity. And Americans from all walks of life are following closely the events here.
So I come with a great deal of interest and awareness of what is happening. And on behalf of my country and President Obama, I came to assess whether the time is right for a new chapter in our shared history. Today, I met with President Thein Sein, his foreign minister, other senior ministers, and the speakers and members of parliament in both houses. We had candid, productive conversations about the steps taken so far, and the path ahead for reform.
Tomorrow, I will be meeting with ethnic minority groups and civil society. I will be meeting tonight and tomorrow with Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the political opposition.
President Thein Sein has taken the first steps toward a long-awaited opening. His government has eased some restrictions on the media and civil society, opened a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, rewritten election and labor laws, and released 200 prisoners of conscience. The president told me he seeks to build on these steps, and I assured him that these reforms have our support. I also told him that while the measures already taken may be unprecedented and certainly welcome, they are just a beginning. It is encouraging that political prisoners have been released, but over a thousand are still not free. Let me say publicly what I said privately earlier today. No person in any country should be detained for exercising universal freedoms of expression, assembly, and conscience.
It is also encouraging that Aung San Suu Kyi is now free to take part in the political process. But that, too, will not be sufficient unless all political parties can open offices throughout the country and compete in free, fair, and credible elections. We welcome initial steps from the government to reduce ethnic tensions and hostilities. But as long as terrible violence continues in some of the world‘s longest-running internal conflicts, it will be difficult to begin a new chapter.
This country‘s diversity, its dozens of ethnic groups and languages, its shrines, pagodas, mosques, and churches should be a source of strength in the 21st century. And I urged the president to allow international humanitarian groups, human rights monitors and journalists access to conflict zones.
National reconciliation remains a defining challenge, and more needs to be done to address the root causes of conflict and to advance an inclusive dialogue that will finally bring peace to all of the people. We discussed these and many other challenges ahead, including the need to combat illegal trafficking in persons, weapons, and drugs. And I was very frank in stating that better relations with the United States will only be possible if the entire government respects the international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons. We look to the government to fully implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and we support the government‘s stated determination to sever military ties with North Korea.
In each of my meetings, leaders assured me that progress would continue and broaden. And as it does, the United States will actively support those, both inside and outside of government, who genuinely seek reform. For decades, the choices of this country‘s leaders kept it apart from the global economy and the community of nations. Today, the United States is prepared to respond to reforms with measured steps to lessen the isolation and to help improve the lives of its citizens. That includes an invitation to join neighboring countries as an observer in the Lower Mekong Initiative. We have agreed to IMF and World Bank assessment missions to begin studying the needs on the ground for development, particularly in rural areas, and poverty reduction.
We discussed loosening restrictions on UNDP health and microfinance programs, pursuing education and training efforts, and resuming joint counter-narcotics missions. And just as the search for missing Americans once helped us repair relations with Vietnam, today we spoke about a new joint effort to recover the remains of hundreds of Americans lost here during World War II during the building of the Burma Road.
These are beginning steps, and we are prepared to go even further if reforms maintain momentum. In that spirit, we are discussing what it will take to upgrade diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors. Over time, this could become an important channel to air concerns, monitor and support progress, and build trust on both sides.
The last time an American Secretary of State came to Burma, it was John Foster Dulles, and this country was considered the jewel of Asia, a center of higher learning and the rice bowl of the region. In the last half century, other countries have raced ahead and turned East Asia into one of the world‘s great centers of dynamic growth and opportunity. So the most consequential question facing this country, both leaders and citizens, is not your relationship with the United States or with any other nation. It is whether leaders will let their people live up to their God-given potential and claim their place at the heart of the 21st century, a Pacific century.
There is no guarantee how that question will be answered. If the question is not answered in a positive way, then once again, the people could be left behind. But if it is answered in a positive way, I think the potential is unlimited.
I‘m told there is an old Burmese proverb which says, ―When it rains, collect water.‖ Well, we don‘t know yet if the path to democracy is irreversible, as one of the leaders told me today, if the opening of the economy will be considered a positive and moved quickly to achieve. So the question is not for me to answer. The question is for all of you, particularly leaders, to answer. But we owe it to nearly 60 million people who seek freedom, dignity, and opportunity to do all we can to make sure that question is answered positively.
President Obama spoke of flickers of progress. Well, we know from history that flickers can die out. They can even be stamped out. Or they can be ignited. It will be up to the leaders and the people to fan those flickers of progress into flames of freedom that light the path toward a better future. That and nothing less is what it will take for us to turn a solitary visit into a lasting partnership. As I told President Thein Sein earlier today, the United States is prepared to walk the path of reform with you if you choose to keep moving in that direction. And there‘s no doubt that direction is the right one for the people.
I‘ll be happy to take some questions.
MS. NULAND: We have time for four questions today. I guess the first one is The New York Times, Steve Myers.
QUESTION: Thanks, Toria. Madam Secretary, thank you. Sorry. Thank you, Madam Secretary. The – Aung San Suu Kyi yesterday said that she personally trusted the president but wasn‘t sure about the views of others in the government. After your meetings today, do you share that view?
And in your discussions today, did you talk about a timetable for some of the reciprocal steps from both countries that you would like to see? Is this a matter of months or years? Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Steve, we had a very substantive, serious, and candid, long discussion, both in the formal setting and then over lunch, between myself and President Thein Sein. He laid out a comprehensive vision of reform, reconciliation, and economic development for his country, including specifics such as the release of political prisoners, an inclusive political process, and free, fair, and credible bi-elections, a rigorous peace and reconciliation process to bring to an end some of the longest-standing conflicts anywhere in the world, and strong assurances regarding his country‘s compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and their nonproliferation commitments with respect to North Korea.
I made it clear that he and those who support that vision which he laid out for me, both inside and outside of government, will have our support as they continue to make progress, and that the United States is willing to match actions with actions. We want to be a partner in this reform process, starting with the steps that I laid out today. I also told him that, based on my experience and my observation, I am well aware that he has people in his government who are very supportive of this reform agenda, and he has people who are worried about it or opposed to it, and he has people in the middle who are sitting on the fence, trying to make up their minds. What I hope is that our strong commitment, coupled with the willingness of the international community – particularly multinational organizations from the UN to the IMF to the World Bank and others – expressing our strong support for this path. And what it will mean in terms of delivering concrete benefits will give him extra support in the internal debates that are underway.
So I certainly believe that we now have a clear sense of what he is trying to achieve and how best we can support him. And let me add that, in my meetings with the foreign minister and the speakers of both the upper and the lower house, I heard the same things about the issues that had to be addressed in order for reform to continue. I wasn‘t given specific dates, but I was certainly assured that actions would be taken on a regular and ongoing basis.
MS. NULAND: Next question, from Shwe Gin Maru (ph) of Myanmar Times.
QUESTION: Thank you, Madam. I would like to know, do you think (inaudible) reaching with the new Government of Myanmar, and (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I thought that today was an excellent opportunity for me to both listen to officials in the government describe what their intentions are and the actions that they are planning to take and for them to hear from me on behalf of the United States how much we support this path of reform, how we expect to see additional steps taken on political prisoners, on peace and reconciliation, on the bi-elections, on the enforcement of the laws that have been passed, which are quite encouraging but need to be implemented. And I will certainly emphasize that if what I heard today is followed through on by the government, that meets the concerns that we have as to whether or not this is a serious and sincere effort. And we hope that it is.
MS. NULAND: Next question, Keith Johnson, Wall Street Journal.
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, thank you. China‘s response to your visit and the U.S. reengagement in general has been one of concern. And in fact, they‘ve spoken openly about a competition between the U.S. and China for inputs in Myanmar. Their state media just today warned that they will not accept their interests being stamped on here. And I wondered, just briefly, two things. Do you fear that U.S. reengagement could cause any sort of backlash with Beijing? And more broadly, countries like Myanmar in the region, what can the U.S. do to assuage countries like that? They‘re sort of caught between these two titans of the new Pacific century.
SECRETARY CLINTON: That‘s an important question, and it‘s one that I addressed in all of my discussions. Our engagement here is rooted in our longstanding interest in seeking positive change. We have, as I said at the very beginning, a long history that has many positive aspects to it. But we have been dismayed by some of the actions of the past decades, and we are encouraged to see the changes that are taking place.
This is an interest that spans decades, that cuts across every political divide in the United States, because it‘s a country that has both fascinated and worried Americans for many years. And we are not about opposing any other country; we‘re about supporting this country. And we actually consult regularly with China about our engagements in the Asia Pacific region, including how we see events unfolding here. And we welcome – as I specifically told the president and the two speakers, we welcome positive, constructive relations between China and her neighbors. We think that‘s in China‘s interest as well as the neighborhood‘s interest. We think that being friends with one doesn‘t mean not being friends with others. So from our perspective, we are not viewing this in light of any competition with China. We‘re viewing this on its merits as an opportunity for us to reengage here. And we think that that is a very open possibility. And that‘s why I‘m here to assess it for myself.
MS. NULAND: And the last question today, Fine Kin Zin Lay (ph) from The Voice.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) asking two questions. One question is: Do you see any probability for release all political prisoners? And the second question is: Did you discuss about sanctions with the president? Are there any probability to ease sanction, or never? Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: We discussed both of those issues at some length because, obviously, they are important subjects in our renewed dialogue.
With respect to political prisoners, we believe that any political prisoner anywhere should be released. One political prisoner is one too many, in our view. And we‘re concerned about the continued detention of more than a thousand prisoners of conscience here. We welcome the release of the 200 political prisoners in October, and we have consistently called for and encouraged the release of all political prisoners. I did so again. And I made it clear that was an issue that would have to be resolved before we could take some of the steps that we would be willing to take because the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners is a key test of the government‘s commitment to human rights and democracy and internal national reconciliation.
So we‘re aware of the process that is followed and the constitutional provision that gives authority to the president. We know that for the release in October, the parliament agreed to support that. So I discussed it with the president and both speakers, and we are certainly hopeful that we will see such release of all prisoners in the near future.
With regard to sanctions, we‘re in the early stages of our dialogue. And I want to state for the record that my visit today is the result of over two years of work on our behalf. We‘ve had at least 20 high-level visits. We have Assistant Secretary Campbell, our former representative Scott Marciel. We‘ve had a very active engagement by our chargé, and then we filled the position that the Congress created for a permanent special representative with Ambassador Derek Mitchell.
So for more than two years, ever since I asked that we do a review of our Burma policy in 2009, we have been reaching out, we‘ve been trying to gather information, because we wanted to see change for
the benefit of all of the people. And so we have been working toward this, and the reason that we were finally able to reach the decision that the president announced for me to visit is because of the steps that the government has taken.
We know more needs to be done, however, and we think that we have to wait to make sure that this commitment is real. So we‘re not only talking to senior members of the government, but we‘re talking to civil society members, we‘re talking to members of the political opposition, we‘re talking to representatives of ethnic minorities, because we want to be sure that we have as full a picture as possible.
So we‘re not at the point yet that we can consider lifting sanctions that we have in place because of our ongoing concerns about policies that have to be reversed. But any steps that the government takes will be carefully considered and will be, as I said, matched because we want to see political and economic reform take hold. And I told the leadership that we will certainly consider the easing and elimination of sanctions as we go forward in this process together. And it has to be not theoretical or rhetorical. It has to be very real, on the ground, that can be evaluated. But we are open to that, and we are going to pursue many different avenues to demonstrate our continuing support for this path of reform.
MS. NULAND: Thank you very much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thanks, everyone. Thank you all very much. Wonderful to have a chance to talk to you.
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http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/177994.htm
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Home » Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton » Secretary's Remarks » 2011 Secretary Clinton's Remarks » Remarks by Secretary Clinton: December 2011 » Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma
Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma
Press Availability
Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State
Rangoon, Burma
December 2, 2011
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, let me begin by saying that as the first American Secretary of State to visit here in over 50 years, I am delighted to have a chance to reflect on my visit and what we would like to see going forward. Now, before I arrived, I was well aware that Americans have long known this country as a place of both beauty and tragedy. Our imaginations have been seized by golden pagodas, saffron-clad monks, but also by the very difficult lives and dignified struggles that the people have endured, which have tugged at our conscience. I came here because we believe that the new reforms raise prospects of change, and we wanted to test that for ourselves.
Yesterday in Nay Pyi Taw, I had the opportunity to meet with senior government officials, including the president, the foreign minister, other key ministers, and leading members of parliament. In our discussions, I encouraged them to continue moving along the path of reform, and that is a path that would require releasing all political prisoners; halting hostilities in ethnic areas and seeking a true political settlement; broadening the space for political and civic activity; fully implementing legislation protecting universal freedoms of assembly, speech, and association. And I carried those thoughts forward in my meetings here today.
I was very pleased that finally, last evening, I had the honor to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and to convey the well wishes and support of the American people who admire her deeply. We have been inspired by her fearlessness in the face of intimidation and her serenity through decades of isolation, but most of all, through her devotion to her country and to the freedom and dignity of all of her fellow citizens. This morning, she told me she is encouraged by the attitude of the new government, which has allowed the opportunity, finally, for the National League for Democracy, her party, to reregister and then participate in the political process. She is, as she has announced, determined to reenter the political arena. We share her eagerness to see all political parties allowed to open offices throughout the country, to enfranchise every citizen and to ensure that the upcoming elections are free, fair, and credible in the eyes of the people.
Now, I think it‘s fair to say that although Aung San Suu Kyi is no longer under house arrest, more than her – more than 1,000 of her fellow citizens remain imprisoned because of their political beliefs and actions, and millions more continue to be denied their universal rights. We agreed that an important test of the government-stated commitment to reform and change will be the unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience.
We also discussed national reconciliation, which remains a defining challenge, as it has been since independence. There can be no true peace or justice until it is shared by everyone in every part of this beautiful, diverse country. And while there has been some progress in political and social matters, particularly here in Rangoon, terrible violence continues elsewhere, especially in some of the ethnic nationality areas, which, in addition to the continuing conflicts, suffer from unacceptably high rates of poverty, disease, and illiteracy, and from the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, which I raised directly with the government yesterday.
Now, when you look at the diversity of this country, it is a very great strength. The followers of Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, other religions over a hundred different ethnic groups with their own distinct languages and cultures makes for a rich culture that really is in keeping with what we‘re seeing in the 21st century. And therefore, we want to call again for everyone to be given the rights to which they are entitled. I also had the opportunity to meet with representatives of some of the ethnic nationalities as well as civil society. They spoke eloquently of the challenges they face, but also the opportunities that they see. They also very much welcomed American engagement and said that they hoped it could continue in some very specific ways.
This afternoon, I‘m pleased to announce we will take a number of steps to demonstrate our commitment to the people. These are in addition to the more formal government-to-government actions that I announced yesterday in Nay Pyi Taw. First, we will increase assistance to civil society organizations that provide microcredit lending, healthcare, and other critical needs throughout the country, particularly in the ethnic nationality areas. Second, we will launch a people-to-people exchange program that will include a substantial English language teaching initiative in partnership with ASEAN and the East-West Center. Third, we will work with partners here on the ground to provide assistance to citizens who suffer from the worst consequences of internal conflict, especially land mine victims. Fourth, we will be supporting the work of American universities and foundations to increase academic exchanges and collaboration on health, governance, and other matters.
Now, as I said yesterday, and I will repeat today, we are prepared to go further if the reforms maintain momentum. But history teaches us to be cautious. We know that there have been serious setbacks and grave disappointments over the last decades. And we want to see a sustainable reform effort that
produces real results on behalf of the democratization and the economic opening of Burma. So I will once again reiterate to the leaders that the United States is prepared to walk this path of reform with you if you choose to keep moving in that direction. Reformers both inside and outside of the government will have our support, and it will increase as we see actions taken that will further the hopes and aspirations of the people for a better future. So I am cautiously hopeful, and certainly, on behalf of the American people, very committed to helping this country, which deserves to play a very important role in the Asia Pacific, have a chance to do so.
So with that, I will take your questions.
MODERATOR: We have time for two today. First one is from AFP, Shaun Tandon.
QUESTION: Thank you, Madam Secretary. Just to follow up on a couple of points that you made in your remarks, you mentioned Aung San Suu Kyi entering the political process. You have, of course, been in the political arena yourself. What sort of insights have you given to her? And also, on the issue of national reconciliation, not so long ago, you said that there is a need for a UN-backed Commission of Inquiry to try to have accountability in Burma/Myanmar. With the changes that you‘re seeing, is this effectively on the backburner, or does the United States still (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: I don't know if you could hear Shaun‘s question because about halfway through, his microphone cut out. But he asked me about Aung San Suu Kyi‘s decision to enter the political arena, or I should say reenter the political arena, and what I‘m – my think about, and also whether the United States still supports a Commission of Inquiry.
Well, first, with respect to her decision, which is, of course, hers and hers alone, I think that she has been advocating for a political process that was open and inclusive, and believes that now that the opportunity presents itself, she needs to participate. I understand completely why she would decide to do so on behalf of herself, on behalf of her party, but most importantly on behalf of democracy throughout her country. We talked last night about the ups and downs and the slings and arrows of political participation anywhere in the world, and the challenges that a new democracy or a new democratic process particularly will face because the rules are being written as you engage. But I‘m very supportive of the decision that she feels was right for her, right to pursue. I think she‘d be an excellent member of the new parliament.
I was impressed, in meeting with members of both the upper and the lower house yesterday, how eager they are to have exchanges and understand their responsibilities as parliamentary members. And I know that Aung San Suu Kyi, who‘s read deeply and fought long and hard about what it takes to really establish democracy in a sustainable way, would be an excellent addition to their deliberations.
With regard to the Commission of Inquiry, we always and consistently support accountability for human rights violations, and we are looking for ways to support the changes that are underway here because we hope that there will be an internal mechanism accountability. For example, the establishment of a human rights commission is an important first step, and the government has taken that first step. We encouraged the government to draw on international expertise to ensure the impartiality and the credibility of their own human rights commission.
But there are different decisions that we‘ll confront, both the government and the opposition, because they can look to different forms of accountability in different places that have undergone transitions, some even from military government to an open democratic one. So we are going to support the principle of accountability, and the appropriate mechanism to ensure justice and accountability will considered – will be considered, but I think it‘s important to try to give the new government and the opposition a chance to demonstrate they have their own approach toward achieving that.
MODERATOR: And last question from Than Zaw Tun from Eleven Media
QUESTION: Hello. Secretary Clinton, (inaudible) Myanmar. During your trip to Myanmar, you have met president of Burma and speaker of (inaudible) for Aung San Suu Kyi. After meeting with them, is there any chance to the (inaudible) of Myanmar in (inaudible)?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, thank you, and it‘s wonderful to be asked a question by a member of the media from here.
What we have outlined for the government are a series of actions we would like to see taken, and what I have said in my private meetings and publicly is that we will match action for action. And if there is enough progress, obviously, we will be considering lifting sanctions. But as I said before, we‘re still at the very early stages of this dialogue and engagement that I‘ve worked hard to establish over the past two years, and it couldn‘t have come to fruition if the government hadn‘t begun to take the steps that it is taking.
So although we‘ve seen encouraging signs of progress, we are, frankly, testing this commitment. We want to know that it‘s real and sustainable, because it‘s going to take more than a few leaders, even at the top levels of government. It‘s going to take a real change in attitude and approach throughout the government and the bureaucracy. So we will continue to talk to senior government officials, to members of civil society, opposition leaders, as I‘ve done over the last two years. And we‘ll be constantly doing that to get a readout from them as to what they see happening.
But I was very clear with the government that if we see enough progress, we would be prepared to begin to lift sanctions. But right now, we‘re not ready to discuss that because we obviously are only starting our engagement, and we want to see all political prisoners released, we want to see a serious effort at peace and reconciliation, we want to see dates set for the election, and then we will be very open to matching those actions with our own. And it was interesting, in our meetings with a lot of the people that I‘ve talked with – and not just our meetings over the last two days but our meetings that many of our high officials have had over the last two years – there is a recognition that lifting sanctions would benefit the economy, but there needs to be some economic reforms along with the political reforms so that the benefits would actually flow to a broad-based group of people and not just to a very few.
So there‘s work ahead. As some of you may have heard Aung San Suu Kyi say when we were together at her house, she supports the World Bank coming in and coming up with an assessment of what could be done to assist in the economic reform and development aid and so much else. So I‘m very committed to do everything I can to support what is going on here, but we have to see the rhetoric translate into concrete steps.
Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much.
PRN: 2011/T56-07
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178103.htm
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Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Burma's Democracy Leader Aung San Suu Kyi Video Testimony to the U.S. Congress
Nobel Peace Prize winner and democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been detained for 15 years by Burma's ruling military junta, testified before a Congressional committee via videotape Wednesday on the recent sham elections and current conditions in the Southeast Asia nation. U.S. Rep. Don Manzullo (R-IL), who chaired the hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, arranged for Ms. Suu Kyi's first-ever Congressional testimony and posted it on his YouTube site for all to see. Transcript below taken from U.S. Campaign for Burma's website:
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing on Burma: ―Piercing Burma’s Veil of Secrecy: The Truth Behind the Sham Election and the Difficult Road Ahead‖ June 22, 2011 12:30 PM, Rayburn House Office Building Room 2172 Transcript of Video Message from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi General Secretary, National League for Democracy, Rangoon, Burma
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Any statement made before a committee of the United States Congress must start with a few words, however brief; of appreciation for all that you and your colleagues have done for the cause of democracy in Burma over the last two decades. We are very appreciative and we believe that you will continue to do whatever you can to help us in the future as well. I understand that the purpose of this committee is to find out what has really been happening in Burma since the elections of November 2010. To, as I understand it, pierce the veil of secrecy and to find out the truth of the situation in Burma. I’m sure you will be receiving a lot of information from very many different sources that will enable you to assess the situation correctly.
What I would like to urge is that you look at what is happening in Burma in the light of the UN Human Rights Council Resolution—the recent one, which came out in March. This resolution covers all the needs of Burma today, all the political needs, let me say, of Burma today. The requests, the urgings, the demands of this resolution are very much in line with what we in Burma think is needed to start Burma along the genuine process of democratization. So, if you were to consider the resolution very very closely, and then if you were to look at the present situation in Burma, you would have a very good idea of how far we are along the path to democracy, if we have started on that path at all. The resolution includes such very important issues as political prisoners, freedom of association and information, independence of the judiciary, and the right of Professor Quintana, the United Nations Human Rights Rapporteur, to visit Burma whenever he thinks it is necessary. It also includes the need for an inclusive political process in Burma, that we may have the kind of situation where there can be a negotiated settlement leading to national reconciliation. All these that the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution has called for are essential if Burma is to enjoy constitutional liberalism and democratic institutions. It is going to be a long road; it already has been a long road and a difficult one, and no doubt the road ahead will have its difficulties as well. But, we are confident that with the help and support of those who share our values, those like you who are true friends because true friends are those who share your values and understand why you hold on to these values in spite of all the difficulties that you have to face. With the help and support of true friends, I’m sure we will be able to tread the path of democracy, not easily and perhaps not as quickly as we would like, but surely and steadily. This is why I would like to request you to do whatever you can to ensure that the requests and demands of the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution are met as broadly, as sincerely, and as quickly as possible by the present government of Burma. The resolution among other things calls for the independence of the judiciary, I mentioned this earlier. This is one of the most important needs in our country today, because without an independent judiciary we cannot have the rule of law, and without the rule of law none of our people can be secure and there can be no true progress towards democracy. Then, the case of political prisoners - why are they still in prison if this government is really intent on making good progress towards democracy? If it is sincere in its claims that it
wishes to bring democracy into Burma, there is no need for any prisoners of conscious to exist in this country. Surely, democracy means that we all have the right to our own beliefs, that we all have the right to try to live in accordance with our conscience. Because of that, the case of prisoners of consciences is crucial in deciding whether or not the present government is sincere about its democratic aspirations. Professor Quintana has spoken of the need for a commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Burma. I support his call for such a commission, making it quite clear that a commission of inquiry is not a tribunal. It is simply a commission of inquiry to find out what human rights violations have taken place and what we can do to ensure that such violations do not take place in the future. I would appreciate everything that is done to help Professor Quintana in his work. Because, unless we respect the work of the Human Rights Rapporteur, I do not think we will be able to make much progress towards the implementation of the resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Council. I’ve never made a statement before a committee of the United States Congress, so I’m not quite sure how to go about it. I would simply like to use this occasion to request that you do whatever you can to help us implement the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution, because that will open up the real road to democracy for all of us. And I would also like to take the opportunity to repeat once again how much we appreciate all that you have done, and that what you have done for us has meant a great deal. And I know that you will continue to study the situation and to review what has been done in the past and to inquire into what should be done in the future. Sometimes we all have to guess at what is necessary because Burma is not an open society. But, I think because we truly believe in democratic values and we are all sincere in our respect for human rights and constitutional liberalism, our guesses will not be far wrong. So, I would like to ask you to continue with your work with confidence in what you are doing, and with confidence and the fact that your work is much appreciated. Thank you. Aung San Suu Kyi
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Statement of
Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Submitted to the
Senate Armed Services Committee
September 16, 2010
The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to
appear before you today to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and our
alliances in Northeast Asia. I want to thank the Committee for its continued leadership role on
Asia-Pacific issues and commend it for understanding the importance of the Asia-Pacific for
American national interests.
The Obama administration entered office with a deep appreciation of the strategic importance of
the Asia-Pacific to U.S. national interests. America's future is intimately tied to that of the Asia-
Pacific, and our economic and strategic interests in the region are among the most important in
the world. The region is home to almost one-third of the Earth‘s population and accounts for
almost one-third of global GDP. Strong coordination between the U.S. and key Asian economies
was instrumental for the global economic recovery. Currently, more than 60 percent of our
exports go to the Asia-Pacific. American and Asian companies are among the most dynamic in
the world, and our economies are growing increasingly interdependent. The region is also home
to critical strategic chokepoints for global commerce, emerging power centers that will have
profound implications for U.S. and international interests, and a foundation for American power
projection in the greater Asia-Pacific.
In recognition of our deep and abiding interests in the region, we are working hard to ensure our
alliances in the Asia-Pacific are among our strongest and most active. Our alliances have
underwritten peace and security for over 50 years and provided a context for economic
prosperity that in many ways has enabled the ―Asian economic miracle.‖ This year we are
celebrating the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance and also commemorating the 60th
anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea
have evolved from strategic bulwarks against Soviet expansionism to truly global partnerships.
The Obama administration is committed to developing and enhancing each and every one of our
strategic alliances in the Asia-Pacific.
Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in Asia. The May 2006
agreement on defense transformation and realignment will enhance deterrence while creating a
more sustainable military presence in the region. We are working with Japan to create a more
2
durable and forward-looking vision for the alliance that not only enhances our mutual defense
capabilities, but also develops Japan‘s role as a global leader on issues such as climate change
and development assistance. As we mark the 50th anniversary of the alliance, we will continue
to work closely with Japan to develop and maximize our joint capabilities as alliance partners.
Together with our Asia-Pacific allies, we are working to respond to both traditional and nontraditional
security challenges ranging from proliferation to climate change, as well as developing more robust regional architecture that will help enhance regional capacities to both deal with problems and seize opportunities for greater integration and stability. The emergence of transnational challenges necessitates that the United States work with other partners to find solutions. We will continue to work with our traditional allies on these issues, while enhancing relationships with countries like China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. I would like to take the opportunity to emphasize the bilateral, regional and global dimensions of our engagement with the Republic of Korea.
Peninsular, Regional, and Global Dimensions:
United States leadership is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean
Peninsula. Recognizing this fact, the Administration has undertaken steady and broad
engagement throughout the region, with a particular focus on broadening our alliances with
Japan and South Korea. In November of last year, President Obama visited Japan and South
Korea (in addition to China and Singapore) and has subsequently had many bilateral meetings
with his Japanese counterpart and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Secretary Clinton
has visited the region five times since taking office, with her initial journey as Secretary of State
to the Asia-Pacific, and her first visit to Japan. Secretary Clinton has enjoyed a strong working
relationship with Foreign Minister Okada and continues to underscore the central importance of
the U.S.-Japan alliance to American engagement and strategic interests in the region. Most
recently, Secretary Clinton attended a historic ―2+2 meeting‖ with Secretary Gates and their
counterparts in Seoul, underscoring and charting a forward looking vision for the U.S.-ROK
alliance. President Obama will travel to Seoul this November for the G-20 Summit and will
attend the APEC Summit in Yokohama, Japan.
We are working closely with the Republic of Korea to achieve a partnership that is truly global
and comprehensive in nature. President Obama and President Lee Myung-bak have charted a
forward-looking agenda for the alliance, outlined by the June 16, 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision
Statement. The U.S.-ROK alliance continues to evolve rapidly and has provided a solid
foundation for security in the Asia-Pacific region for more than half a century. This security has
helped make possible economic and political development in the ROK that was unimaginable at
the end of the Korean War. Today Korea is a vibrant democracy with the fourteenth largest
economy in the world and is our seventh largest trading partner. Our economic ties continue to
serve as a strong foundation for the U.S.-ROK partnership. This is why President Obama
underscored his support the United States-Korea free trade agreement by undertaking to resolve
outstanding issues by the time he visits Seoul in November. Its successful implementation will
benefit both economies, create jobs, and bolster the enduring strength of this strategic partnership
in an important and rapidly growing region. It can also contribute to the strengthening of our
overall bilateral alliance. In November of this year, Korea will host the next G-20 Summit in
Seoul, a first for a non-G-8 nation and a first for an Asian country.
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The U.S. and ROK are also working closely to modernize our defense alliance, which remains a
key element of our overall bilateral relationship. We are working closely to adjust our force
posture and presence to be better positioned to respond to current and future security challenges.
We are moving towards a posture and presence that reflects a relationship of equals and that
ensures a forward-stationed deployment of 28,500 American troops in South Korea. We recently
moved the date of Wartime Operational Control transfer from 2012 to 2015 in order to
strengthen the transition plan. This change will allow us to more closely synchronize the ROK
lead of the combined defense with other ongoing alliance transformation efforts. In addition to
military cooperation, our broader bilateral relationship outside the military realm also contributes
to and enhances the security of the Korean Peninsula.
The closeness of our alliance with the Republic of Korea is also demonstrated by the existence of
a series of institutional consultative mechanisms, including the Security Consultative Meeting,
the Military Consultative Meeting, and the Security Policy Initiative. These mechanisms bring
together high-level officials to discuss critical issues of mutual concern. Secretary Gates will
meet with his counterpart on October 8 at the next Security Consultative Meeting in Washington,
DC. We also have regular and increasingly broad trilateral dialogue with the Koreans and
Japanese. The last formal Defense Trilateral Talks were held on September 13 in Washington.
As the ROK has grown and prospered, we have seen a convergence of interests between our two
countries throughout the world. The ROK continues to be an increasingly active partner in
global affairs, and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region.
For example, the ROK is currently deploying a destroyer to the Combined Maritime Forces‘
counter-piracy operation Combined Task Force 151, and a Korean Admiral currently holds the
rotating command of this task force. Separately, the Koreans will chair the fall plenary meeting
of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in New York. Korea is deploying a
Provincial Reconstruction Team to Parwan Province in Afghanistan, and the Korean government
quickly deployed peacekeepers to Haiti in the wake of the terrible earthquake there this past
January. Korea is also involved in peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, and they also deploy
military observers and staff officers to a host of other UN peacekeeping missions. The ROK has
also pledged $200 million towards development in Pakistan. The ROK, along with Japan,
recently took steps to implement additional sanctions against Iran, similar in scope to the
excellent measures adopted by the EU, joining a growing global consensus and strengthening our
efforts to send a unified message to Iran that it should uphold its nuclear nonproliferation
obligations and negotiate seriously on its nuclear program.
Korea made the leap from aid recipient to aid donor in a very short time span, and we are looking
for opportunities to work together on development issues going forward. The ROK is an
exemplar of development and has much to teach the developing world. In less than thirty years
after the end of the U.S. Peace Corps program in Korea, thousands of idealistic young Koreans
have volunteered for similar missions in the developing world.
North Korea:
South Korea‘s successful and positive role as a regional power is in stark contrast with North
Korea. North Korea poses the most immediate risks to both South Korea and the stability of East
Asia. North Korea‘s unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea naval ship Cheonan on March
4
26, 2010, claimed the lives of 46 South Korean sailors. This attack gave the international
community yet another reminder of the unpredictable and enduring threat posed by North Korea.
The United States has responded to a number of provocative actions by the DPRK --
diplomatically, militarily, and economically. Let there be no doubt about U.S. conviction here.
In the case of the Cheonan sinking, the United States worked closely with member states in the
UN to craft a strong response. As a result, on July 9, the UN Security Council issued a
Presidential Statement condemning the attack on the Cheonan and demonstrating the Council‘s
unity in confronting threats to international peace and security.
The United States and the ROK have also coordinated closely on a series of combined military
exercises to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression. These defensive exercises are
designed to send a clear message to North Korea that the United States and ROK are committed
to enhancing their combined defensive capabilities. The first exercise, Invincible Spirit, a
combined maritime and air readiness exercise, occurred from July 25-28 in the Sea of Japan. On
August 16-26, the Combined Forces Command completed the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian
exercise, which focused on ensuring our readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against the
full range of provocations on the Korean Peninsula both now and in the future. The United
States and ROK will continue to routinely conduct joint military exercises to enhance
interoperability and increase our ability to respond to threats to peace. These steps enhance
security on the peninsula by sending a clear message of our capabilities and determination.
In addition, the United States has taken additional steps through the adoption of new sanctions
targeting DPRK proliferation and illicit activities. By adopting these new measures, the United
States is sending a signal to the DPRK that its provocative actions, including its announced test
of a nuclear device, missile launches, and the sinking of the Cheonan, are not without costs. On
August 30, President Obama signed an Executive Order implementing new country-specific
sanctions against the DPRK. The Executive Order directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to target for sanctions individuals and entities that
support the Government of North Korea through arms sales and illicit economic activities,
including money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and
narcotics trafficking. The new Executive Order supplements existing U.S. sanctions targeting
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and those who support them and
strengthens our enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. The additional
sanctions are not directed at the North Korean people, who have suffered too long, nor are these
measures targeted at those who provide legitimate humanitarian relief to the people of North
Korea. These sanctions target only the North Korean military and leaders.
As Secretary Clinton has said, ―From the beginning of the Obama Administration, we have made
clear that there is a path open to the DPRK to achieve the security and international respect it
seeks . . . . If North Korea chooses that path, sanctions will be lifted, energy and other economic
assistance will be provided, its relations with the United States will be normalized, and the
current armistice on the peninsula will be replaced by a permanent peace agreement. But as long
as it makes a different choice – if it continues its defiance, provocations, and belligerence – it
will continue to suffer the consequences.‖
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Way Ahead:
The Republic of Korea is a key partner and contributor to regional and global peace and stability.
The Obama Administration is unwavering in its resolve to uphold its treaty commitments to
defend its allies. We highly value our broad relationships with the ROK and Japan and are
deepening our security relationships with both countries as well as with our other partners in the
region to ensure peace and stability on the peninsula. The U.S. position on the DPRK has
remained constant: we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons power. The United
States has underscored numerous times that North Korea can only achieve the security and
international respect it seeks by ceasing its provocative behavior, improving its relations with its
neighbors, complying with international law, and taking irreversible steps toward fulfilling its
denuclearization commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement.
The attack on the Cheonan served as a stark reminder of the importance of our alliance in the
face of continued North Korean provocations and raised tensions to a level not seen in many
years. This unprovoked aggression reinforces the need to be prepared for a broad range of
security challenges from the North and all manner of unpredictable developments. American,
Japanese and ROK commitment to the peace and security of Northeast Asia will remain critical
to deal with North Korea, but also to ensure a context for peace and stability in the greater Asia-
Pacific.
As President Obama has stated, the U.S. is a ―Pacific power.‖ Our alliance relationship with the
Republic of Korea serves as a critical anchor for our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.
Looking back over the past 60 years, it is amazing to see the evolution of the U.S.-ROK
relationship. The relationship is no longer defined solely through the monocular lens of North
Korea, but is increasingly global in scope. Our shared interests and democratic values will prove
instrumental in ensuring a context of peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific for the coming
years.
Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this timely and important
issue. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.
http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/09%20September/Campbell%2009-16-10.pdf
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United Nations A/HRC/16/L.11
General Assembly Distr.: Limited
18 March 2011
Original: English
Human Rights Council
Sixteenth session
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Austria* , Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Bulgaria*, Canada*, Croatia*, Cyprus*, Czech Republic*, Denmark*, Estonia*, Finland*, France, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary (on behalf of the European Union), Iceland*, Ireland*, Italy*, Latvia*, Liechtenstein*, Lithuania*, Luxembourg*, Malta*, Monaco*, Montenegro*, Netherlands*, New Zealand*, Norway, Peru*, Poland, Portugal*, Romania*, Slovakia, Slovenia*, Spain, Sweden*, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay: draft resolution
16/… Situation of human rights in Myanmar
The Human Rights Council,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights, and reaffirming also previous resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, including Council resolutions 10/27 of 27 March 2009, 12/20 of 2 October 2009 and 13/25 of 26 March 2010, and General Assembly resolutions 64/238 of 24 December 2009 and
65/241 of 24 December 2010,
Welcoming the latest report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,1 in which the Special Rapporteur urged the implementation of the recommendations contained therein and those within previous reports, concerned about the lack of implementation of previous recommendations, and regretting the fact that no visit of the Special Rapporteur has been allowed to the country since February 2010,
Increasingly concerned that the urgent calls contained in the above-mentioned resolutions and reports and in those of other United Nations bodies concerning the human rights situation in Myanmar have still not been met, and emphasizing the urgent need for significant progress towards meeting those calls of the international community,
Recalling Council resolutions 5/1 on institution-building of the Council and 5/2 on the code of conduct for special procedures mandate holders of the Council, of 18 June
* Non-Member State of the Human Rights Council.
1 A/HRC/16/59.
GE.11-11980
A/HRC/16/L.11
2007, and stressing that the mandate holder shall discharge his or her duties in accordance with those resolutions and the annexes thereto,
Reaffirming that it is the responsibility of the Government of Myanmar to ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of its entire population, as stated in the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other applicable human rights instruments,
Particularly concerned by the restrictions imposed on the representatives of the National League for Democracy and other political parties and other relevant stakeholders, including a number of ethnic groups, thus preventing a genuine process of dialogue, national reconciliation and transition to democracy,
Deeply regretting that the Government of Myanmar did not take the necessary steps to ensure a free, fair, transparent and inclusive electoral process leading up to the election of 7 November 2010, noting in particular in this respect the restrictions imposed by the electoral laws as enacted and implemented by the Government, including those placed on the registration of voters, parties and candidates, as well as the detention of political activists, the restrictions on the presence of international observers, on free reporting and on freedom of assembly, the limited access to media, funding and campaigning possibilities, the reported incidents of official intimidation, the cancellation of elections in certain ethnic areas, and the lack of independence of the electoral commission, and also expressing concern at the failure by the electoral commission to follow up on complaints about the electoral process, including voting procedures, and expressing serious concern at reports of fraud, including through advance voting arrangements,
Welcoming the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following the most recent period of her arbitrary house arrest, while expressing grave concern at the continuingly high number of prisoners of conscience and consistent reports of their torture and ill-treatment,
Taking note of the participation by the Government of Myanmar in the universal periodic review in January 2011 as the State under review, acknowledging in this regard its support for certain recommendations, expressing hope for the due consideration and acceptance of as many pending recommendations as possible and for the implementation in practice of the many important recommendations that were rejected, including calls to release all political prisoners, to end impunity for human rights violations, to begin a transparent and inclusive dialogue with all national stakeholders and to halt discrimination against Rohingya, Karen, Chin, Shan and Mon and other ethnic groups,
Noting with serious concern that the grave human rights situation in Myanmar forces thousands of people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries,
1. Strongly condemns the ongoing systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar;
2. Urges the Government of Myanmar to begin an inclusive post-election process of national reconciliation for a credible transition to democracy, including through meaningful dialogue and the participation of representatives of all groups in the political life of the country, within the framework of a transition to a civilian, legitimate and accountable system of government, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to these ends to take immediate measures to engage in a meaningful and substantive dialogue through all channels with all opposition parties, political, ethnic and civil society groups and actors, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi;
3. Welcomes the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following the most recent period of her arbitrary house arrest, and noting that her release is unconditional, calls on the Government of Myanmar to guarantee full enjoyment of all human rights, including civil and political rights, and fundamental freedoms, for all people in Myanmar, including Daw
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A/HRC/16/L.11
Aung San Suu Kyi, in particular with regard to unrestricted movement in and outside the country and unrestricted contact with all domestic stakeholders, including members of the National League for Democracy;
4. Calls on the Government of Myanmar to protect the physical safety of all people in Myanmar, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in a manner that is consistent with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
5 Strongly regrets that the elections failed to meet international standards, and strongly calls upon the Government to recognize the National League for Democracy‘s pre- election registration status and lift all restrictions imposed on its representatives, as well as on other political and civil society actors in the country;
6. Strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar to cooperate with the international community in order to achieve concrete progress as regards human rights and fundamental freedoms, and political processes;
7. Strongly urges the unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience without delay, while expressing concern over their continuingly high number, and also strongly urges the Government of Myanmar to desist from carrying out further politically motivated arrests and to release, without delay and without condition, all prisoners of conscience, whose number is estimated to be approximately two thousand two hundred, including the Chairman of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, U Khun Tun Oo, the leader of the 88 Generation Students Group, U Min Ko Naing, and one of the founders of the 88 Generation Students Group, Ko Ko Gyi, and to allow their full participation in the political process;
8. Strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar to lift restrictions on the freedom of assembly, association, movement and expression, including for free and independent media, by ensuring the openly available and accessible use of Internet and mobile telephone services and ending the use of censorship, including the use of the Electronic Transactions Law to prevent the reporting of views critical of the Government;
9. Calls upon the Government of Myanmar to undertake a transparent, inclusive and comprehensive review of compliance of the Constitution and all national legislation with international human rights law, while fully engaging with democratic opposition, political, ethnic and civil society groups and actors, recalling once more that the procedures established for the drafting of the Constitution resulted in a de facto exclusion of opposition groups from the process;
10. Urges the Government of Myanmar to ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the independence of lawyers, to guarantee due process of law and to fulfil previous assurances given by the authorities of Myanmar to the Special Rapporteur with respect to beginning a dialogue on judicial reform;
11. Strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar to take urgent measures to put an end to the continuing grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the targeting of persons based on their belonging to particular ethnic groups, the targeting of civilians as such in military operations, and rape and other forms of sexual violence, and to end impunity for such acts without delay;
12. Expresses serious concern that previous calls to end impunity have not been heeded, and therefore strongly renews its calls upon the Government of Myanmar to undertake, without delay, a full, transparent, effective, impartial and independent investigation into all reports of human rights violations, some of which may entail categories of crimes against humanity or war crimes, including enforced disappearances, forced displacements, forced labour, arbitrary detention, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and to bring to justice those
A/HRC/16/L.11
responsible in order to end impunity for violations of human rights, and also strongly calls on the Government of Myanmar to do so as a matter of priority and with appropriate attention from the United Nations;
13. Urges the Government of Myanmar to ensure compliance of the Constitution with international human rights standards, including by repealing clauses of the Constitution guaranteeing immunity to officials in respect of any act done in the execution of their respective duties;
14. Calls upon the Government of Myanmar to address, as a matter of urgency, consistent reports of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners of conscience, and to ensure that proper investigations are conducted of all deaths in prison, with family members duly informed of the findings, as well as to improve conditions in prisons and other detention facilities, and to avoid the dispersal of prisoners of conscience to isolated prisons far from their families where they cannot receive regular visits or deliveries of supplementary supplies, including food and medicine;
15. Strongly recommends that the Government of Myanmar resume cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and allow visits to prisons;
16. Strongly urges the Government of Myanmar to end all forms of discrimination and to protect civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in particular, to comply with its human rights obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in this regard;
17. Expresses its serious concern at the continuing discrimination, human rights violations, violence, displacement and economic deprivation affecting numerous ethnic minorities, including, but not limited to, the Rohingya ethnic minority in Northern Rakhine State, and calls upon the Government of Myanmar to take immediate action to bring about an improvement in their respective situations and to recognize the right of members of the Rohingya ethnic minority to nationality and to protect all of their human rights;
18. Welcomes the prolongation in February 2011 of the Supplementary Understanding between the International Labour Organization and the Government of Myanmar, the Government‘s commitment to introduce new legislation making forced labour illegal and repealing the provisions of the Villages and Towns Acts 1907, and the joint Government-International Labour Organization awareness-raising activities, but strongly condemns the continued and serious harassment of complainants and facilitators and urgently calls for the release of those who remain in detention, and urges the Government to proactively intensify measures to end forced labour, including the agreement to produce information brochures in all national languages and to facilitate the strengthening of cooperation of the International Labour Organization in Myanmar to further enhance the efficiency of the educative and complaints-management activities undertaken by the liaison officer of the International Labour Organization;
19. Strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar to end the practice of systematic forced displacement of large numbers of persons within their country and to neighbouring countries, and to end other causes of refugee flows, including the targeting of persons based on their belonging to particular ethnic groups;
20. Also strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar to put an immediate end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of international law by all parties, welcomes the recent engagement of the Government on this issue and urges it to intensify measures to ensure the protection of children from armed conflict and to pursue its collaboration with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and
4
A/HRC/16/L.11
armed conflict, including by granting access to areas where children are recruited, for the purpose of implementing an action plan to halt this practice;
21. Urges the Government of Myanmar to provide, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, adequate human rights and international humanitarian law training for its armed forces, police and prison personnel, to ensure their strict compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to hold them accountable for any violations thereof;
22. Calls upon the Government of Myanmar to ensure timely, safe, full and unhindered access to all parts of Myanmar, including conflict and border areas, for the United Nations, international humanitarian organizations and their partners, and to cooperate fully with those actors to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered throughout the country to all persons in need, including displaced persons;
23. Also calls upon the Government of Myanmar to consider acceding to the remaining international core human rights treaties, which would enable a dialogue with other human rights treaty bodies;
24. Further calls upon the Government of Myanmar to allow human rights defenders to pursue their activities unhindered and to ensure their safety, security and freedom of movement in that pursuit;
25. Decides to extend for one year the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1992/58 of 3 March 1992 and 2005/10 of 14 April 2005, and Council resolutions 7/32 of 28 March 2008, 10/27 of 27 March 2009 and 13/25 of 26 March 2010;
26. Strongly urges the Government of Myanmar to respond favourably and on a more timely basis to the Special Rapporteur‘s requests to visit the country, to extend its full cooperation, including by providing access to all relevant information, bodies, institutions and persons, so as to enable him to fulfil his mandate effectively, and to implement, without delay, the recommendations addressed to the Government contained in his reports2 and in Council resolutions S-5/1 of 2 October 2007, 6/33 of 14 December 2007, 7/31 of 28 March
2008, 8/14 of 18 June 2008, 10/27, 12/20 and 13/25;
27. Requests the Special Rapporteur to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session and to the Council in accordance with its annual programme of work;
28. Calls upon the Office of the High Commissioner to provide the Special Rapporteur with all assistance and resources necessary to enable him to discharge his mandate fully;
29. Calls upon the Government of Myanmar to continue to engage in a dialogue with the Office of the High Commissioner with a view to ensuring full respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
30. Expresses its strong support for the good offices mission and commitment of the Secretary-General, and calls upon the Government of Myanmar to ensure full cooperation with the Secretary-General, his Special Adviser on Myanmar and the Special Rapporteur.
5
2 A/HRC/6/14, A/HRC/7/18, A/HRC/7/24, A/HRC/8/12, A/HRC/10/19, A/HRC/13/48 and
A/HRC/16/59.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
TOM LANTOS BLOCK BURMESE JADE (JUNTA‘S ANTI-DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS) ACT OF 2008
122 STAT. 2632 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
Public Law 110–286
110th Congress
An Act
July 29, 2008 [H.R. 3890]
Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta‘s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of
2008.
Human rights. Political prisoners.
50 USC 1701 note.
50 USC 1701 note.
Aung San Suu
Kyi.
To impose sanctions on officials of the State Peace and Development Council in Burma, to amend the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 to exempt humanitarian assistance from United States sanctions on Burma, to prohibit the importation of gemstones from Burma, or that originate in Burma, to promote a coordinated international effort to restore civilian democratic rule to Burma, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‗‗Tom Lantos Block Burmese
JADE (Junta‘s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008‘‘.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Beginning on August 19, 2007, hundreds of thousands of citizens of Burma, including thousands of Buddhist monks and students, participated in peaceful demonstrations against rapidly deteriorating living conditions and the violent and repressive policies of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military regime in Burma—
(A) to demand the release of all political prisoners, including 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi; and
(B) to urge the regime to engage in meaningful dialogue to pursue national reconciliation.
(2) The Burmese regime responded to these peaceful pro- tests with a violent crackdown leading to the reported killing of approximately 200 people, including a Japanese photo- journalist, and hundreds of injuries. Human rights groups fur- ther estimate that over 2,000 individuals have been detained, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, tortured, or otherwise intimidated as part of this crackdown. Burmese military, police, and their affiliates in the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) perpetrated almost all of these abuses. The Burmese regime continues to detain, torture, and otherwise intimidate those individuals whom it believes participated in or led the protests and it has closed down or otherwise limited access to several monasteries and temples that played key roles in the peaceful protests.
(3) The Department of State‘s 2006 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices found that the SPDC—
(A) routinely restricts freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement;
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2633
(B) traffics in persons;
(C) discriminates against women and ethnic minorities; (D) forcibly recruits child soldiers and child labor; and (E) commits other serious violations of human rights,
including extrajudicial killings, custodial deaths, disappear- ances, rape, torture, abuse of prisoners and detainees, and the imprisonment of citizens arbitrarily for political motives.
(4) Aung San Suu Kyi has been arbitrarily imprisoned or held under house arrest for more than 12 years.
(5) In October 2007, President Bush announced a new Executive Order to tighten economic sanctions against Burma and block property and travel to the United States by certain senior leaders of the SPDC, individuals who provide financial backing for the SPDC, and individuals responsible for human rights violations and impeding democracy in Burma. Additional names were added in updates done on October 19, 2007, and February 5, 2008. However, only 38 discrete individuals and
13 discrete companies have been designated under those sanc- tions, once aliases and companies with similar names were removed. By contrast, the Australian Government identified more than 400 individuals and entities subject to its sanctions applied in the wake of the 2007 violence. The European Union‘s regulations to implement sanctions against Burma have identi- fied more than 400 individuals among the leadership of govern- ment, the military, and the USDA, along with nearly 1300 state and military-run companies potentially subject to its sanc- tions.
(6) The Burmese regime and its supporters finance their ongoing violations of human rights, undemocratic policies, and military activities in part through financial transactions, travel, and trade involving the United States, including the sale of petroleum products, gemstones and hardwoods.
(7) In 2006, the Burmese regime earned more than $500 million from oil and gas projects, over $500 million from sale of hardwoods, and in excess of $300 million from the sale of rubies and jade. At least $500 million of the $2.16 billion earned in 2006 from Burma‘s two natural gas pipelines, one of which is 28 percent owned by a United States company, went to the Burmese regime. The regime has earned smaller amounts from oil and gas exploration and non-operational pipe- lines but United States investors are not involved in those transactions. Industry sources estimate that over $100 million annually in Burmese rubies and jade enters the United States. Burma‘s official statistics report that Burma exported $500 million in hardwoods in 2006 but NGOs estimate the true figure to exceed $900 million. Reliable statistics on the amount of hardwoods imported into the United States from Burma in the form of finished products are not available, in part due to widespread illegal logging and smuggling.
(8) The SPDC seeks to evade the sanctions imposed in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. Millions of dollars in gemstones that are exported from Burma ulti- mately enter the United States, but the Burmese regime attempts to conceal the origin of the gemstones in an effort to evade sanctions. For example, according to gem industry experts, over 90 percent of the world‘s ruby supply originates
122 STAT. 2634 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
Ibrahim Gambari. Than Shwe.
in Burma but only 3 percent of the rubies entering the United States are claimed to be of Burmese origin. The value of Bur- mese gemstones is predominantly based on their original quality and geological origin, rather than the labor involved in cutting and polishing the gemstones.
(9) According to hardwood industry experts, Burma is home to approximately 60 percent of the world‘s native teak reserves. More than 1⁄4 of the world‘s internationally traded teak origi- nates from Burma, and hardwood sales, mainly of teak, rep- resent more than 11 percent of Burma‘s official foreign exchange earnings.
(10) The SPDC owns a majority stake in virtually all enter- prises responsible for the extraction and trade of Burmese natural resources, including all mining operations, the Myanmar Timber Enterprise, the Myanmar Gems Enterprise, the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise, and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. Virtually all profits from these enterprises enrich the SPDC.
(11) On October 11, 2007, the United Nations Security Council, with the consent of the People‘s Republic of China, issued a statement condemning the violence in Burma, urging the release of all political prisoners, and calling on the SPDC to enter into a United Nations-mediated dialogue with its polit- ical opposition.
(12) The United Nations special envoy Ibrahim Gambari traveled to Burma from September 29, 2007, through October
2, 2007, holding meetings with SPDC leader General Than Shwe and democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi in an effort to promote dialogue between the SPDC and democracy advo- cates.
(13) The leaders of the SPDC will have a greater incentive to cooperate with diplomatic efforts by the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the People‘s Republic of China if they come under targeted economic pres- sure that denies them access to personal wealth and sources of revenue.
(14) On the night of May 2, 2008, through the morning of May 3, 2008, tropical cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Burma, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Burmese. (15) The response to the cyclone by Burma‘s military leaders illustrates their fundamental lack of concern for the welfare of the Burmese people. The regime did little to warn citizens of the cyclone, did not provide adequate humanitarian assistance to address basic needs and prevent loss of life, and continues to fail to provide life-protecting and life-sustaining
services to its people.
(16) The international community responded immediately to the cyclone and attempted to provide humanitarian assist- ance. More than 30 disaster assessment teams from 18 different nations and the United Nations arrived in the region, but the Burmese regime denied them permission to enter the country. Eventually visas were granted to aid workers, but the regime continues to severely limit their ability to provide assistance in the affected areas.
(17) Despite the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis, the junta went ahead with its referendum on a constitution drafted by an illegitimate assembly, conducting voting in
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2635
unaffected areas on May 10, 2008, and in portions of the affected Irrawaddy region and Rangoon on May 26, 2008.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‗‗account‘‘, ‗‗correspondent account‘‘, and
‗‗payable-through account‘‘ have the meanings given the terms in section 5318A(e)(1) of title 31, United States Code.
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term
‗‗appropriate congressional committees‘‘ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (B) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
(3) ASEAN.—The term ‗‗ASEAN‘‘ means the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
(4) PERSON.—The term ‗‗person‘‘ means—
(A) an individual, corporation, company, business association, partnership, society, trust, any other non- governmental entity, organization, or group; and
(B) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any person described in subparagraph (A).
(5) SPDC.—The term ‗‗SPDC‘‘ means the State Peace and Development Council, the ruling military regime in Burma. (6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‗‗United States per-
son‘‘ means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) condemn the continued repression carried out by the
SPDC;
(2) work with the international community, especially the People‘s Republic of China, India, Thailand, and ASEAN, to foster support for the legitimate democratic aspirations of the people of Burma and to coordinate efforts to impose sanctions on those directly responsible for human rights abuses in Burma; (3) provide all appropriate support and assistance to aid
a peaceful transition to constitutional democracy in Burma; (4) support international efforts to alleviate the suffering
of Burmese refugees and address the urgent humanitarian needs of the Burmese people; and
(5) identify individuals responsible for the repression of peaceful political activity in Burma and hold them accountable for their actions.
SEC. 5. SANCTIONS.
(a) VISA BAN.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The following persons shall be ineligible for a visa to travel to the United States:
(A) Former and present leaders of the SPDC, the Bur- mese military, or the USDA.
50 USC 1701 note.
50 USC 1701 note.
50 USC 1701 note.
122 STAT. 2636 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
(B) Officials of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA involved in the repression of peaceful political activity or in other gross violations of human rights in Burma or in the commission of other human rights abuses, including any current or former officials of the security services and judicial institutions of the SPDC.
(C) Any other Burmese persons who provide substan- tial economic and political support for the SPDC, the Bur- mese military, or the USDA.
(D) The immediate family members of any person described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the visa ban described in paragraph (1) only if the President determines and certifies in writing to Congress that travel by the person seeking such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States.
(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to conflict with the provisions of section
694 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law
110–161), nor shall this subsection be construed to make ineli- gible for a visa members of ethnic groups in Burma now or previously opposed to the regime who were forced to provide labor or other support to the Burmese military and who are otherwise eligible for admission into the United States.
(b) FINANCIAL SANCTIONS.—
(1) BLOCKED PROPERTY.—No property or interest in prop- erty belonging to a person described in subsection (a)(1) may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt with if—
(A) the property is located in the United States or within the possession or control of a United States person, including the overseas branch of a United States person; or
(B) the property comes into the possession or control of a United States person after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.—Except with respect to transactions authorized under Executive Orders 13047 (May
20, 1997) and 13310 (July 28, 2003), no United States person may engage in a financial transaction with the SPDC or with a person described in subsection (a)(1).
(3) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.—Activities prohibited by reason of the blocking of property and financial transactions under this subsection shall include the following:
(A) Payments or transfers of any property, or any transactions involving the transfer of anything of economic value by any United States person, including any United States financial institution and any branch or office of such financial institution that is located outside the United States, to the SPDC or to an individual described in sub- section (a)(1).
(B) The export or reexport directly or indirectly, of any goods, technology, or services by a United States person to the SPDC, to an individual described in subsection (a)(1) or to any entity owned, controlled, or operated by the SPDC or by an individual described in such subsection.
(c) AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL BANKING SANCTIONS.—
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2637
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in con- sultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General of the United States, and the Chairman of the Board of Gov- ernors of the Federal Reserve System, may prohibit or impose conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account by any financial institution (as that term is defined in section 5312 of title 31, United States Code) or financial agency that is organized under the laws of a State, territory, or possession of the United States, for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if the Secretary determines that the account might be used—
(A) by a foreign banking institution that holds property or an interest in property belonging to the SPDC or a person described in subsection (a)(1); or
(B) to conduct a transaction on behalf of the SPDC
or a person described in subsection (a)(1).
(2) AUTHORITY TO DEFINE TERMS.—The Secretary of the
Treasury may, by regulation, further define the terms used
in paragraph (1) for purposes of this section, as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
(d) LIST OF SANCTIONED OFFICIALS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit
to the appropriate congressional committees a list of—
(A) former and present leaders of the SPDC, the Bur-
mese military, and the USDA;
(B) officials of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or
the USDA involved in the repression of peaceful political
activity in Burma or in the commission of other human
rights abuses, including any current or former officials
of the security services and judicial institutions of the
SPDC;
(C) any other Burmese persons or entities who provide
substantial economic and political support for the SPDC,
the Burmese military, or the USDA; and
(D) the immediate family members of any person
described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) whom the
President determines effectively controls property in the United States or has benefitted from a financial transaction with any United States person.
(2) CONSIDERATION OF OTHER DATA.—In preparing the list required under paragraph (1), the President shall consider the data already obtained by other countries and entities that apply sanctions against Burma, such as the Australian Govern- ment and the European Union.
(3) UPDATES.—The President shall transmit to the appro- priate congressional committees updated lists of the persons described in paragraph (1) as new information becomes avail- able.
(4) IDENTIFICATION OF INFORMATION.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall devote sufficient resources to the identification of information concerning poten- tial persons to be sanctioned to carry out the purposes described in this Act.
Deadline. President.
President.
122 STAT. 2638 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any contract or other financial transaction with any nongovernmental humanitarian organization in Burma.
(f) EXCEPTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The prohibitions and restrictions described in subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to medicine, medical equipment or supplies, food or feed, or any other form of humanitarian assistance provided to Burma.
(2) REGULATORY EXCEPTIONS.—For the following purposes, the Secretary of State may, by regulation, authorize exceptions to the prohibition and restrictions described in subsection (a), and the Secretary of the Treasury may, by regulation, authorize exceptions to the prohibitions and restrictions described in sub- sections (b) and (c)—
(A) to permit the United States and Burma to operate their diplomatic missions, and to permit the United States to conduct other official United States Government busi- ness in Burma;
(B) to permit United States citizens to visit Burma;
and
(C) to permit the United States to comply with the
President. Certification.
National League for Democracy.
President. Certification.
50 USC 1701 note.
United Nations Headquarters Agreement and other applicable international agreements.
(g) PENALTIES.—Any person who violates any prohibition or restriction imposed pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) shall be subject to the penalties under section 6 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as for a violation under that Act.
(h) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The sanctions imposed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall apply until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the SPDC has—
(1) unconditionally released all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy;
(2) entered into a substantive dialogue with democratic forces led by the National League for Democracy and the ethnic minorities of Burma on transitioning to democratic government under the rule of law; and
(3) allowed humanitarian access to populations affected by armed conflict in all regions of Burma.
(i) WAIVER.—The President may waive the sanctions described in subsections (b) and (c) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
SEC. 6. AMENDMENTS TO THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting after section 3 the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 3A. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF JADEITE AND RUBIES FROM BURMA AND ARTICLES OF JEWELRY CONTAINING JADEITE OR RUBIES FROM BURMA.
‗‗(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
‗‗(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term
‗appropriate congressional committees‘ means—
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2639
‗‗(A) the Committee on Ways and Means and the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
‗‗(B) the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
‗‗(2) BURMESE COVERED ARTICLE.—The term ‗Burmese cov- ered article‘ means—
‗‗(A) jadeite mined or extracted from Burma;
‗‗(B) rubies mined or extracted from Burma; or
‗‗(C) articles of jewelry containing jadeite described in
subparagraph (A) or rubies described in subparagraph (B).
‗‗(3) NON-BURMESE COVERED ARTICLE.—The term ‗non-Bur-
mese covered article‘ means—
‗‗(A) jadeite mined or extracted from a country other
than Burma;
‗‗(B) rubies mined or extracted from a country other
than Burma; or
‗‗(C) articles of jewelry containing jadeite described in
subparagraph (A) or rubies described in subparagraph (B).
‗‗(4) JADEITE; RUBIES; ARTICLES OF JEWELRY CONTAINING
JADEITE OR RUBIES.—
‗‗(A) JADEITE.—The term ‗jadeite‘ means any jadeite
classifiable under heading 7103 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (in this paragraph referred
to as the ‗HTS‘).
‗‗(B) RUBIES.—The term ‗rubies‘ means any rubies
classifiable under heading 7103 of the HTS.
‗‗(C) ARTICLES OF JEWELRY CONTAINING JADEITE OR
RUBIES.—The term ‗articles of jewelry containing jadeite
or rubies‘ means—
‗‗(i) any article of jewelry classifiable under heading
7113 of the HTS that contains jadeite or rubies; or
‗‗(ii) any article of jadeite or rubies classifiable
under heading 7116 of the HTS.
‗‗(5) UNITED STATES.—The term ‗United States‘, when used
in the geographic sense, means the several States, the District
of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession
of the United States.
‗‗(b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF BURMESE COVERED ARTI-
CLES.—
‗‗(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until such time as the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that Burma has met the conditions described in section 3(a)(3), beginning 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta‘s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, the President shall prohibit the importation into the United States of any Burmese covered article.
‗‗(2) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized to, and shall as necessary, issue such proclamations, regula- tions, licenses, and orders, and conduct such investigations, as may be necessary to implement the prohibition under para- graph (1).
‗‗(3) OTHER ACTIONS.—Beginning on the date of the enact- ment of this Act, the President shall take all appropriate actions to seek the following:
President. Certification. Effective date.
122 STAT. 2640 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
President. Certification. Effective date.
Records.
Exports.
‗‗(A) The issuance of a draft waiver decision by the Council for Trade in Goods of the World Trade Organization granting a waiver of the applicable obligations of the United States under the World Trade Organization with respect to the provisions of this section and any measures taken to implement this section.
‗‗(B) The adoption of a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly expressing the need to address trade in Burmese covered articles and calling for the creation and implementation of a workable certification scheme for non-Burmese covered articles to prevent the trade in Bur- mese covered articles.
‗‗(c) REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTATION OF NON-BURMESE COV-
ERED ARTICLES.—
‗‗(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), until such time as the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that Burma has met the conditions described in section 3(a)(3), beginning 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Tom Lantos Block Bur- mese JADE (Junta‘s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, the President shall require as a condition for the importation into the United States of any non-Burmese covered article that—
‗‗(A) the exporter of the non-Burmese covered article has implemented measures that have substantially the same effect and achieve the same goals as the measures described in clauses (i) through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B) (or their functional equivalent) to prevent the trade in Burmese covered articles; and
‗‗(B) the importer of the non-Burmese covered article agrees—
‗‗(i) to maintain a full record of, in the form of reports or otherwise, complete information relating to any act or transaction related to the purchase, manu- facture, or shipment of the non-Burmese covered article for a period of not less than 5 years from the date of entry of the non-Burmese covered article; and
‗‗(ii) to provide the information described in clause (i) within the custody or control of such person to the relevant United States authorities upon request.
‗‗(2) EXCEPTION.—
‗‗(A) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the requirements of paragraph (1) with respect to the importa- tion of non-Burmese covered articles from any country with respect to which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees has imple- mented the measures described in subparagraph (B) (or their functional equivalent) to prevent the trade in Bur- mese covered articles.
‗‗(B) MEASURES DESCRIBED.—The measures referred to in subparagraph (A) are the following:
‗‗(i) With respect to exportation from the country of jadeite or rubies in rough form, a system of verifiable controls on the jadeite or rubies from mine to expor- tation demonstrating that the jadeite or rubies were not mined or extracted from Burma, and accompanied by officially-validated documentation certifying the country from which the jadeite or rubies were mined
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2641
or extracted, total carat weight, and value of the jadeite or rubies.
‗‗(ii) With respect to exportation from the country of finished jadeite or polished rubies, a system of verifiable controls on the jadeite or rubies from mine to the place of final finishing of the jadeite or rubies demonstrating that the jadeite or rubies were not mined or extracted from Burma, and accompanied by officially-validated documentation certifying the country from which the jadeite or rubies were mined or extracted.
‗‗(iii) With respect to exportation from the country of articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies, a system of verifiable controls on the jadeite or rubies from mine to the place of final finishing of the article of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies demonstrating that the jadeite or rubies were not mined or extracted from Burma, and accompanied by officially-validated documentation certifying the country from which the jadeite or rubies were mined or extracted.
‗‗(iv) Verifiable recordkeeping by all entities and individuals engaged in mining, importation, and expor- tation of non-Burmese covered articles in the country, and subject to inspection and verification by authorized authorities of the government of the country in accord- ance with applicable law.
‗‗(v) Implementation by the government of the country of proportionate and dissuasive penalties against any persons who violate laws and regulations designed to prevent trade in Burmese covered articles.
‗‗(vi) Full cooperation by the country with the United Nations or other official international organiza- tions that seek to prevent trade in Burmese covered articles.
‗‗(3) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized to, and shall as necessary, issue such proclamations, regula- tions, licenses, and orders and conduct such investigations, as may be necessary to implement the provisions under para- graphs (1) and (2).
‗‗(d) INAPPLICABILITY.—
‗‗(1) IN GENERAL.—The requirements of subsection (b)(1) and subsection (c)(1) shall not apply to Burmese covered articles and non-Burmese covered articles, respectively, that were pre- viously exported from the United States, including those that accompanied an individual outside the United States for per- sonal use, if they are reimported into the United States by the same person, without having been advanced in value or improved in condition by any process or other means while outside the United States.
‗‗(2) ADDITIONAL PROVISION.—The requirements of sub- section (c)(1) shall not apply with respect to the importation of non-Burmese covered articles that are imported by or on behalf of an individual for personal use and accompanying an individual upon entry into the United States.
‗‗(e) ENFORCEMENT.—Burmese covered articles or non-Burmese covered articles that are imported into the United States in violation of any prohibition of this Act or any other provision law shall
Records.
122 STAT. 2642 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
President.
50 USC 1701 note.
be subject to all applicable seizure and forfeiture laws and criminal and civil laws of the United States to the same extent as any other violation of the customs laws of the United States.
‗‗(f) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—
‗‗(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the
President should take the necessary steps to seek to negotiate
an international arrangement—similar to the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme for conflict diamonds—to prevent
the trade in Burmese covered articles. Such an international
arrangement should create an effective global system of controls
and should contain the measures described in subsection
(c)(2)(B) (or their functional equivalent).
‗‗(2) KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME DEFINED.—
In paragraph (1), the term ‗Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme‘ has the meaning given the term in section 3(6) of
the Clean Diamond Trade Act (Public Law 108–19; 19 U.S.C.
3902(6)).
‗‗(g) REPORT.—
‗‗(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE
(Junta‘s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report describing what actions the United States has taken
during the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment
of such Act to seek—
‗‗(A) the issuance of a draft waiver decision by the
Council for Trade in Goods of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, as specified in subsection (b)(3)(A);
‗‗(B) the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations
General Assembly, as specified in subsection (b)(3)(B); and
‗‗(C) the negotiation of an international arrangement,
as specified in subsection (f)(1).
‗‗(2) UPDATE.—The President shall make continued efforts
to seek the items specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and
(C) of paragraph (1) and shall promptly update the appropriate
congressional committees on subsequent developments with
respect to these efforts.
‗‗(h) GAO REPORT.—Not later than 14 months after the date
of the enactment of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta‘s
Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, the Comptroller General of
the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the effectiveness of the implementation
of this section. The Comptroller General shall include in the report
any recommendations for improving the administration of this Act.‘‘.
(b) DURATION OF SANCTIONS.—
(1) CONTINUATION OF IMPORT SANCTIONS.—Subsection (b)
of section 9 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
2003 (Public Law 108–61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
‗‗(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of this sub-
section, any reference to section 3(a)(1) shall be deemed to
include a reference to section 3A (b)(1) and (c)(1).‘‘.
(2) RENEWAL RESOLUTIONS.—Subsection (c) of such section
is amended by inserting after ‗‗section 3(a)(1)‘‘ each place it
appears the following: ‗‗and section 3A (b)(1) and (c)(1)‘‘.
(3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2643
(A) IN GENERAL.—The amendments made by this sub- section take effect on the day after the date of the enact- ment of 5th renewal resolution enacted into law after the date of the enactment of the Burmese Freedom and Democ- racy Act of 2003, or the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever occurs later.
(B) RENEWAL RESOLUTION DEFINED.—In this para- graph, the term ‗‗renewal resolution‘‘ means a renewal reso- lution described in section 9(c) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 that is enacted into law in accordance with such section.
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 3(b) of the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–61; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended—
(1) by striking ‗‗prohibitions‘‘ and inserting ‗‗restrictions‘‘;
(2) by inserting ‗‗or section 3A (b)(1) or (c)(1)‘‘ after ‗‗this
section‘‘; and
(3) by striking ‗‗a product of Burma‘‘ and inserting ‗‗subject
to such restrictions‘‘.
SEC. 7. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND POLICY COORDINATOR FOR BURMA.
(a) UNITED STATES SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND POLICY COORDINATOR FOR BURMA.—The President shall appoint a Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) RANK.—The Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma appointed under subsection (a) shall have the rank of ambassador and shall hold the office at the pleasure of the President. Except for the position of United States Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Special Rep- resentative and Policy Coordinator may not simultaneously hold a separate position within the executive branch, including the Assistant Secretary of State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, the United States Ambassador to Burma, or the Charge
d‘affairs to Burma.
(c) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator for Burma shall—
(1) promote a comprehensive international effort, including
multilateral sanctions, direct dialogue with the SPDC and
democracy advocates, and support for nongovernmental
organizations operating in Burma and neighboring countries,
designed to restore civilian democratic rule to Burma and
address the urgent humanitarian needs of the Burmese people;
(2) consult broadly, including with the Governments of
the People‘s Republic of China, India, Thailand, and Japan,
and the member states of ASEAN and the European Union
to coordinate policies toward Burma;
(3) assist efforts by the United Nations Special Envoy to
secure the release of all political prisoners in Burma and to
promote dialogue between the SPDC and leaders of Burma‘s
democracy movement, including Aung San Suu Kyi;
(4) consult with Congress on policies relevant to Burma
and the future and welfare of all the Burmese people, including
refugees; and
50 USC 1701 note.
President. Government organization.
122 STAT. 2644 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
50 USC 1701 note.
50 USC 1701 note.
(5) coordinate the imposition of Burma sanctions within the United States Government and with the relevant inter- national financial institutions.
SEC. 8. SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN BURMA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to assist Burmese democracy activists who are dedicated to nonviolent opposition to the SPDC in their efforts to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights in Burma.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2008 to—
(1) provide aid to democracy activists in Burma;
(2) provide aid to individuals and groups conducting democ- racy programming outside of Burma targeted at a peaceful transition to constitutional democracy inside Burma; and
(3) expand radio and television broadcasting into Burma.
SEC. 9. SUPPORT FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE BUR- MESE PEOPLE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the international community should increase support for nongovern- mental organizations attempting to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of the Burmese people.
(b) LICENSES FOR HUMANITARIAN OR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN BURMA.—Section 5 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—
(1) by inserting ‗‗(a) OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE TO
BURMA.—‘‘ before ‗‗The Secretary‘‘; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
‗‗(b) LICENSES FOR HUMANITARIAN OR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN BURMA.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Sec- retary of the Treasury is authorized to issue multi-year licenses for humanitarian or religious activities in Burma.‘‘.
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there are authorized to be appropriated $11,000,000 to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2008 to support operations by nongovernmental organizations, subject to paragraph (2), designed to address the humanitarian needs of the Burmese people inside Burma and in refugee camps in neighboring coun- tries.
(2) LIMITATION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under subpara- graph (B), amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be provided to—
(i) SPDC-controlled entities;
(ii) entities run by members of the SPDC or their
families; or
(iii) entities providing cash or resources to the SPDC, including organizations affiliated with the United Nations.
(B) WAIVER.—The President may waive the funding restriction described in subparagraph (A) if—
(i) the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States;
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2645
(ii) a description of the national interests need for the waiver is submitted to the appropriate congres- sional committees; and
(iii) the description submitted under clause (ii) is posted on a publicly accessible Internet Web site of the Department of State.
SEC. 10. REPORT ON MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE AID TO BURMA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing a list of countries, companies, and other entities that provide military or intelligence aid to the SPDC and describing such military or intelligence aid provided by each such country, company, and other entity.
(b) MILITARY OR INTELLIGENCE AID DEFINED.—For the purpose of this section, the term ‗‗military or intelligence aid‘‘ means, with respect to the SPDC—
(1) the provision of weapons, weapons parts, military vehicles, or military aircraft;
(2) the provision of military or intelligence training, including advice and assistance on subject matter expert exchanges;
(3) the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, capabilities, and technology, including nuclear, chem- ical, or dual-use capabilities;
(4) conducting joint military exercises;
(5) the provision of naval support, including ship develop- ment and naval construction;
(6) the provision of technical support, including computer and software development and installations, networks, and infrastructure development and construction; or
(7) the construction or expansion of airfields, including radar and anti-aircraft systems.
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex and the unclassified form shall be placed on the Department of State‘s website.
SEC. 11. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ARMS SALES TO BURMA.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead efforts in the United Nations Security Council to impose a mandatory international arms embargo on Burma, curtailing all sales of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, and military air- craft to Burma until the SPDC releases all political prisoners, restores constitutional rule, takes steps toward inclusion of ethnic minorities in political reconciliation efforts, and holds free and fair elections to establish a new government.
SEC. 12. REDUCTION OF SPDC REVENUE FROM TIMBER.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, and other Federal officials, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on Burma‘s timber trade con- taining information on the following:
50 USC 1701 note.
Public information. Website.
50 USC 1701 note.
50 USC 1701 note. Deadline.
122 STAT. 2646 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
Deadline.
50 USC 1701 note.
(1) Products entering the United States made in whole or in part of wood grown and harvested in Burma, including measurements of annual value and volume and considering both legal and illegal timber trade.
(2) Statistics about Burma‘s timber trade, including raw wood and wood products, in aggregate and broken down by country and timber species, including measurements of value and volume and considering both legal and illegal timber trade. (3) A description of the chains of custody of products described in paragraph (1), including direct trade streams from Burma to the United States and via manufacturing or trans-
shipment in third countries.
(4) Illegalities, abuses, or corruption in the Burmese timber sector.
(5) A description of all common consumer and commercial applications unique to Burmese hardwoods, including the fur- niture and marine manufacturing industries.
(b) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The report required under subsection
(a) shall include recommendations on the following:
(1) Alternatives to Burmese hardwoods for the commercial applications described in paragraph (5) of subsection (a), including alternative species of timber that could provide the same applications.
(2) Strategies for encouraging sustainable management of timber in locations with potential climate, soil, and other condi- tions to compete with Burmese hardwoods for the consumer and commercial applications described in paragraph (5) of sub- section (a).
(3) The appropriate United States and international cus- toms documents and declarations that would need to be kept and compiled in order to establish the chain of custody con- cerning products described in paragraphs (1) and (3) of sub- section (a).
(4) Strategies for strengthening the capacity of Burmese civil society, including Burmese society in exile, to monitor and report on the SPDC‘s trade in timber and other extractive industries so that Burmese natural resources can be used to benefit the majority of Burma‘s population.
SEC. 13. REPORT ON FINANCIAL ASSETS HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE SPDC.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep- resentatives, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of the Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report containing a list of all countries and foreign banking institutions that hold assets on behalf of senior Burmese officials.
(b) DEFINITIONS.—For the purpose of this section:
(1) SENIOR BURMESE OFFICIALS.—The term ‗‗senior Burmese officials‘‘ shall mean individuals covered under section 5(d)(1) of this Act.
(2) OTHER TERMS.—Other terms shall be defined under the authority of and consistent with section 5(c)(2) of this Act.
PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
122 STAT. 2647
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. The report shall also be posted on the Department of Treasury‘s website not later than 30 days of the submission to Congress of the report. To the extent possible, the report shall include the names of the senior Burmese officials and the approximate value of their holdings in the respective foreign banking institutions and any other pertinent information.
SEC. 14. UNOCAL PLAINTIFFS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Congress that the United States should work with the Royal Thai Government to ensure the safety in Thailand of the 15 plaintiffs in the Doe v. Unocal case, and should consider granting refugee status or humanitarian parole to these plaintiffs to enter the United States consistent with existing United States law.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a report on the status of the Doe vs. Unocal plaintiffs and whether the plaintiffs have been granted refugee status or humanitarian parole.
SEC. 15. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENTS IN BURMA’S OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY.
(a) FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS.—Congress finds the following: (1) Currently United States, French, and Thai investors
are engaged in the production and delivery of natural gas in the pipeline from the Yadana and Sein fields (Yadana pipe- line) in the Andaman Sea, an enterprise which falls under the jurisdiction of the Burmese Government, and United States investment by Chevron represents approximately a 28 percent nonoperated, working interest in that pipeline.
(2) The Congressional Research Service estimates that the Yadana pipeline provides at least $500,000,000 in annual rev- enue for the Burmese Government.
(3) The natural gas that transits the Yadana pipeline is delivered primarily to Thailand, representing about 20 percent of Thailand‘s total gas supply.
(4) The executive branch has in the past exempted invest- ment in the Yadana pipeline from the sanctions regime against the Burmese Government.
(5) Congress believes that United States companies ought to be held to a high standard of conduct overseas and should avoid as much as possible acting in a manner that supports repressive regimes such as the Burmese Government.
(6) Congress recognizes the important symbolic value that divestment of United States holdings in Burma would have on the international sanctions effort, demonstrating that the United States will continue to lead by example.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—
(1) Congress urges Yadana investors to consider voluntary divestment over time if the Burmese Government fails to take meaningful steps to release political prisoners, restore civilian constitutional rule and promote national reconciliation.
(2) Congress will remain concerned with the matter of continued investment in the Yadana pipeline in the years ahead.
Public information. Website. Deadline.
Thailand. Refugees.
50 USC 1701 note.
President. Deadline.
50 USC 1701 note.
122 STAT. 2648 PUBLIC LAW 110–286—JULY 29, 2008
(3) Congress urges the executive branch to work with all firms invested in Burma‘s oil and gas sector to use their influ- ence to promote the peaceful transition to civilian democratic rule in Burma.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that so long as Yadana investors remain invested in Burma, such inves- tors should—
(1) communicate to the Burmese Government, military and business officials, at the highest levels, concern about the lack of genuine consultation between the Burmese Government and its people, the failure of the Burmese Government to use its natural resources to benefit the Burmese people, and the mili- tary‘s use of forced labor;
(2) publicly disclose and deal with in a transparent manner, consistent with legal obligations, its role in any ongoing invest- ment in Burma, including its financial involvement in any joint production agreement or other joint ventures and the amount of their direct or indirect support of the Burmese Government; and
(3) work with project partners to ensure that forced labor is not used to construct, maintain, support, or defend the project facilities, including pipelines, offices, or other facilities.
Approved July 29, 2008.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 3890:
HOUSE REPORTS: No. 110–418, Pt. 1 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
Vol. 153 (2007): Dec. 11, considered and passed House.
Dec. 19, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Vol. 154 (2008): July 15, House concurred in Senate amendments with amendments pursuant to H. Res. 1341.
July 22, Senate concurred in House amendments. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 44 (2008):
July 30, Presidential remarks.
Æ
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Japan's foreign minister Koichiro Gemba to visit Myanmar
Published on Dec 13, 2011
TOKYO (AFP) - Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba said on Tuesday he will visit Myanmar later this month, in the latest high-profile diplomatic trip to try to propel reforms in the isolated nation.
Mr Gemba's visit is the first by a Japanese foreign minister since 2002, as Tokyo considers resuming official development aid as part of increasing international efforts to engage Myanmar's new military-backed civilian government.
'I wish to help solidify Myanmar's democratisation and national reconciliation,' Mr Gemba told reporters of his planned tour of Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia from Dec 25 to 29, according to local media in Tokyo.
Unlike major Western nations, Japan has maintained trade ties and dialogue with Myanmar and warned that a hardline approach could push Myanmar closer to neighbouring China, its main political supporter and commercial partner.
http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_744449.html
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US Policy towards Myanmar
Clinton's Myanmar trip 'won't hurt ties' China Daily - 14 December 2011 Ambassador Derek Mitchell, the US special representative and policy coordinator for Myanmar, has been in Beijing on the third leg of his Asia trip to brief China on Washington's improving relations with Myanmar after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit. Mitchell said in his meetings with Chinese officials he wanted "to gain perspectives about how China is thinking
about things and see if there might be opportunities to coordinate, cooperate and work together in the interests of regional stability as well as the interests of the (Myanmar) people", according to Reuters. Analysts also said the current US engagement with Myanmar is still at the "primary phase" and the lifting of sanctions is still not in sight. China recognizes and understands Myanmar's need to diversify its diplomatic ties, and that does not necessarily come at the expense of China-Myanmar relations, analysts said. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said earlier this month that China believes Myanmar and Western countries should improve relations on the basis of mutual respect, and relevant countries should lift sanctions on Myanmar to promote its stability and development.
Derek Mitchell: Press roundtable at US Embassy Beijing on 13 December 2011
"The biggest concern I think is the defining challenge, in essence, of Burma post-independence which is its national unity and national reconciliation. The ability of the country to find a resolution to the division between the ethnic minorities, ethnic nationalities and the center, and the Burman majority. They‘ve been basically at civil war, or at least had these constant internal conflicts I should say, since its inception as an independent nation. I think that remains the biggest concern that we all must have about the stability of the country, the sustainability, of the stability of the country." - Derek Mitchell
http://www.networkmyanmar.org/component/content/article/57/US-Myanmar-Relations
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Collector’s Items
Clinton Arrives in Myanmar to Assess Pace of Change - By STEVEN LEE MYERS (nytimes)
Hillary Clinton and Aung San Suu Kyi agree agenda - AP Friday 02 December 2011
Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma - By Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State
Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma – By Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State
Burma's Democracy Leader Aung San Suu Kyi Video Testimony to the U.S. Congress - Wednesday, June 22, 2011
The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula - Kurt M. Campbell (September 16, 2010)
General Assembly - Situation of human rights in Myanmar
TOM LANTOS BLOCK BURMESE JADE (JUNTA’S ANTI-DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS) ACT OF 2008
Japan's foreign minister Koichiro Gemba to visit Myanmar - Published on Dec 13, 2011 TOKYO (AFP)
Clinton's Myanmar trip 'won't hurt ties - China Daily - 14 December 2011 …………………………………………………………
SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA No 7 -Wednesday, December 21, 2011
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