MahaThuriya
NEWS, VIEWS & OPINIONS BY YE KYAW SWA
No 6 - Wednesday, November 23, 2011
This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/News,Views&Opinions
Wednesday, November 23, 2011 NO 6
Collector’s Items
- Clinton to become first U.S. secretary of state to visit Burma in 50 years - By David Nakamura, Published: November 18, 2011
- အေမရိကန္ ျမန္မာ ဆက္ဆံေရး တ႐ုတ္ စိုးရိမ္ဖုိ႔ မလိုဟု အေမရိကန္ အရာရွိေျပာ 2011-11-18 Radio Free Asia
- NLD အဓိကလုပ္ငန္း ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံုျပင္ေရး ျဖစ္မည္ ေသာၾကာ, 18 ႏိုဝင္ဘာ 2011 voanews
- Testimony of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell - Foreign Policy On North Korea ( March 1, 2011)
- Testimony Philip H. Gordon -Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs U.S. Russian Relations (July 28, 2009)
- Prepared Testimony by Dr Thant Myint-U ,before the East Asia Sub-Committee
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Washington DC – (30 September 2009)
- ဒီမိုကေရစီ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား - ( ရဲေက်ာ္စြာ ) (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) by Ye Kyaw Swa
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Clinton to become first U.S. secretary of state to visit Burma in 50 years
By David Nakamura, Published: November 18, 2011
1.
BALI, Indonesia — Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will visit Burma next month, in a thawing of diplomatic ties between the United States and the Southeast Asian nation whose strong-arm government has outraged the West.
The two-day trip, starting Dec. 1, would mark the first visit by a U.S. secretary of state in 50 years.
President Obama says Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will travel to Burma as the U.S. looks to seize what could be an historic opportunity for progress in the repressed country. (Nov. 18)
President Obama made the announcement Friday shortly after he began a series of meetings here with Southeast Asian leaders about regional security, including disaster relief. Obama is the first U.S. president to participate in a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose chairmanship recently was awarded to Burma, also known as Myanmar. The main summit meetings will take place on Saturday.
Burma’s military rulers, who have held power since a 1962 coup, have taken a hard anti-democratic line, cracking down on opposition leaders including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been under house arrest for years.
But she was freed last year, and hundreds of other political prisoners have been released since then, suggesting that Burma might be signaling an opening to the West as a hedge in its relationship with China.
At the urging of the United States, Burmese President Thein Sein recently began talks with Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy.
Her party decided Friday to rejoin politics and register for future elections in view of the government’s overtures. The NLD’s decision to register again officially as a political party was reached unanimously in a meeting of senior members from across Burma, the Associated Press reported. Among the members who spoke in favor of reentering Burmese politics was Suu Kyi.
“Personally I am for re-registration,” Suu Kyi told NLD delegates at the party headquarters in Rangoon, AP reported.
The NLD refused to register last year because of a government restriction that barred Suu Kyi from running for office, and the party boycotted Burma’s November 2010 elections. The new government that took office after the elections lifted the restriction this year.
NLD spokesman Nyan Win said Suu Kyi likely would run for office, AP reported. He said the party would file registration papers with the Election Commission as soon “as soon possible.”
The NLD decisively won a 1990 general election, but the ruling junta refused to honor the results and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest for most of the next two decades.
Among its other recent overtures, the new government has created a human rights commission, lifted media restrictions and proposed a new labor organization to represent the rights of workers, senior Obama administration officials said.
Burma also suspended work on a controversial Chinese-sponsored dam on a legendary river inside the country, the officials said.
In his remarks, Obama said he called Suu Kyi on Thursday night from Air Force One as he flew into Bali, and she welcomed Clinton’s visit. Obama said he has seen “flickers of progress” in recent weeks from Thein Sein, whom Obama saw during the ASEAN meeting Friday.
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2.
“We remain concerned about Burma’s closed political system, its treatment of minorities and holding of political prisoners, and its relationship with North Korea,” Obama said. “But we want to seize what could be an historic opportunity for progress, and make it clear that if Burma continues to travel down the road of democratic reform, it can forge a new relationship with the United States of America.”
On her trip, Secretary Clinton will press Burma to pursue more reforms and assess how the United States can help “begin a new chapter between our countries,” Obama said.
The president arrived in Bali on the final leg of his nine-day Asia-Pacific tour, during which he has aimed to reestablish the United States as a leader on economics and security in the region. The trip has been marked by tension with China as Obama has called on Beijing to “play by the rules” on international trade and in disputes involving military confrontations in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
Burma is located between India and China and has long had strong bilateral relations with Beijing. But the United States has interpreted the country’s recent actions as signals that Burma’s rulers are interested in improving their ties with the West.
In 2009, Obama asked Clinton to initiate a review of U.S. policy toward Burma, one senior White House official said.
“We came to conclusion that a policy of sanctions-only was not addressing our strategic interests,” the official added. At that point, the administration began trying to open a dialogue with the government and Suu Kyi.
During Obama’s phone conversation with the Nobel winner, which lasted 20 minutes, they discussed the importance of reconciliation and how to stop violence in ethnic regions. There was also a lighter moment when Suu Kyi asked how Obama’s dog Bo was doing.
In a speech to Australia’s Parliament on Thursday before heading to Bali, Obama said the United States will lead in Asia based on the principle that there are universal human rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion and the freedom of citizens to choose their own leaders.
“They stir in every soul, as we’ve seen in the democracies that have succeeded here in Asia,” Obama said. “Other models have been tried and they have failed — fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee. And they failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the ultimate source of power and legitimacy — the will of the people.”
On Friday, in addition to announcing the Burma visit, Obama met one-on-one with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh; Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak; and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines.
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အေမရိကန္ ျမန္မာ ဆက္ဆံေရး တ႐ုတ္ စိုးရိမ္ဖုိ႔ မလိုဟု အေမရိကန္ အရာရွိေျပာ
2011-11-18
အေမရိကန္ အစိုးရနဲ ့ ျမန္မာ အစိုးရ အၾကား ဆက္ဆံေရး တိုးျမႇင့္မႈဟာ တ႐ုတ္ႏုိင္ငံကုိ အနီးကပ္ ေစာင့္ၾကည့္ဖို ့ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ မရွိတဲ့ အတြက္ တိုးတက္မႈ တစ္ရပ္ အျဖစ္ တ႐ုတ္ အစိုးရ ႐ႈျမင္ ႀကိဳဆိုသင့္တယ္လို ့ အေမရိကန္ အစိုးရက ဒီကေန ့ ေျပာလုိက္ပါတယ္။
ျမန္မာ၊ တရုတ္ႏွင့္ အေမရိကန္ ျပည္ေထာင္စု အလံမ်ား။
အေမရိကန္ ႏုိင္ငံျခားေရး ၀န္ႀကီး Hillary Clinton ကုိ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံကို ေစလႊတ္မယ္လို ့ သမၼတ ဘာရက္ အိုဘားမားက ေၾကညာလိုက္တဲ့ေနာက္ အေမရိကန္ အစိုးရ ထိပ္ပုိင္း တာ၀န္ရွိသူေတြက အခုလို ေျပာတာပါ။ တစ္ဆက္တည္းမွာပဲ ျမန္မာနဲ႔ ့အေမရိကန္ ၂ ႏုိင္ငံ ဆက္ဆံေရး တိုးျမႇင့္တဲ့ အစီအစဥ္ေတြနဲ႔ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး တရုတ္ အစိုးရကိုလည္း တုိင္ပင္ ေဆြးေႏြးသြားမယ္လို႔ ေျပာပါတယ္။
အမည္ မေဖၚလိုတဲ့ အေမရိကန္ အစုိးရ အရာရွိ တစ္ဦးကေတာ့ ျမန္မာ အေမရိကန္ ဆက္ဆံေရး တုိးျမႇင့္တဲ့ ကိစၥဟာ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ အေရး ျဖစ္ၿပီး တ႐ုတ္ႏုိင္ငံ အေရး မဟုတ္ဘူးလို႔ ေျပာပါတယ္။ ျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ တည္ၿငိမ္ ေအးခ်မ္းေရးနဲ ့ ႏုိင္ငံတကာ အ၀န္းအ၀ိုင္းမွာ ပါ၀င္လာႏုိင္ေရးကို တ႐ုတ္ အစိုးရ အေနနဲ ့ လိုလားသင့္ပါတယ္လို ့ဆိုပါတယ္။
ႏုိင္ငံေရး အကဲခတ္သူေတြ ကေတာ့ တ႐ုတ္ရဲ႕အိမ္နီးခ်င္း ႏုိင္ငံေတြ အေပၚ အေမရိကန္ ၾသဇာ လႊမ္းမိုးလာမဲ့ အေရးကို တရုတ္ အစိုးရ စိုးရိမ္မႈ ႀကီးမားလာတယ္လို ့ ႐ႈျမင္ သုံးသပ္ေနၾကပါတယ္။
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NLD အဓိကလုပ္ငန္း ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံုျပင္ေရး ျဖစ္မည္
ေသာၾကာ, 18 ႏိုဝင္ဘာ 2011
By ကိုသားညႊန္႔ဦး
၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ဖဲြ႔စည္းအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ပံု အေျခခံဥပေဒထဲက ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံအတြက္ အက်ိဳးမရိွေစတဲ့ အခ်က္ေတြကို ျပင္ဆင္သြားႏိုင္ေရးဟာ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖဲြ႔ခ်ဳပ္ တရား၀င္ ျပန္မွတ္ပံုတင္ၿပီးတဲ့ ေနာက္မွာ အဓိကထားၿပီး လုပ္ေဆာင္ရမယ့္ လုပ္ငန္းတစ္ခုျဖစ္တယ္လို႔ ျမန္မာ့ဒီမိုကေရစီေခါင္းေဆာင္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က ေျပာသြားပါတယ္။ ဒါ့အျပင္ ႏုိင္ငံမွာ တရားဥပေဒ စိုးမိုးေရးနဲ႔ ျပည္တြင္းစစ္ ရပ္စဲေရးကိစၥေတြကိုလည္း ႀကိဳးပမ္းသြားမယ္လို႔ ေျပာပါတယ္။ ကိုသားညႊန္႔ဦးက အေၾကာင္းစံု တင္ျပထားပါတယ္။
အမ်ဳိးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံမွာ တရားဝင္ပါတီတစ္ခု အေနနဲ႔ ျပန္လည္ မွတ္ပုံတင္ၿပီး ေနာင္လာမယ့္ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲေတြမွာ ဝင္သြားဖို႔ ဆံုးျဖတ္လိုက္ပါၿပီ။ ျပည္နယ္နဲ႔တိုင္း အသီးသီးက ဗဟိုဦးစီးအဖြဲ႔ဝင္ေတြ မေန႔က NLD ရံုးခ်ဳပ္မွာ စည္းေဝးၿပီး အားလံုးသေဘာတူ ဆံုးျဖတ္လိုက္ၾကတာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
အခုလို NLD ျပန္မွတ္ပံုတင္ဖို႔ ဆံုးျဖတ္လိုက္တဲ့ေနာက္ ၂၀၀၈ ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံုပါ ႏိုင္ငံအတြက္ အက်ိဳးမရိွေစတဲ့ အခ်က္ေတြကို ျပန္လည္ ျပင္ဆင္သြားႏိုင္ဖို႔ ကိစၥဟာ NLD ရဲ႕ အဓိကလုပ္ငန္းႀကီး ျဖစ္လာမယ္လို႔ ျမန္မာ့ဒီမိုကေရစီေခါင္းေဆာင္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က မေန႔က အဲဒီ ဗဟိုဦးစီးအဖဲြ႔ အစည္းအေ၀းအၿပီးသတ္ မိန္႔ခြန္းမွာ ေျပာဆိုသြားပါတယ္။
“ဖြဲ႔စည္းပံု အေျခခံဥပေဒထဲမွာ ႏိုင္ငံကိုအက်ိဳးေပးတယ္လို႔ က်မတို႔မျမင္တဲ့အခ်က္ေတြကို ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲဖုိ႔ က်မတုိ႔ ႀကိဳးစားသြားရမွာပဲ။ ဒါ ႏိုင္ငံသူႏိုင္ငံသားမ်ားရဲ႕ တာ၀န္တစ္ခုအေနနဲ႔ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမုိကေရစီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္က ေဆာင္ရြက္သြားရမယ္လို႔ က်မ ဒီအတိုင္းပဲ ယံုၾကည္ပါတယ္။ ဒီဟာက က်မတို႔ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီ အဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ကို ျပန္ၿပီးေတာ့ မွတ္ပံုတင္တဲ့အခါမွာ လုပ္ေဆာင္ရမယ့္ အဓိကလုပ္ငန္းႀကီးတစ္ခုျဖစ္တယ္လို႔ ျမင္ပါတယ္။”
ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီမ်ား မွတ္ပံုတင္ျခင္းဥပေဒမွာေတာ့ ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံုကို ထိန္းသိမ္းကာကြယ္ရမည္ ဆိုတဲ့ေနရာမွာ ေလးစားလိုက္နာပါမည္ ဆိုတာကို ေျပာင္းလဲ ျပင္ဆင္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ဒါဟာ ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံုပါအရ လက္ခံရမွာျဖစ္သလို ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲသင့္တာေတြကိုလည္း ေျပာင္းလဲရမွာျဖစ္တယ္လို႔ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က ေျပာပါတယ္။ ဒီလိုျပင္ဆင္တဲ့အခါ တတိုင္းတျပည္လံုးအေျခအေန တိုင္းရင္းသားေတြရဲ႕ အေျခအေန စသျဖင့္ လိုအပ္ခ်က္ေတြအတိုင္း ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံု ျပင္ဆင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးကို ေဆာင္ရြက္သြားမယ္လို႔ ေျပာပါတယ္။
“က်မတို႔ ၂၀၁၀ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲကို မ၀င္ခဲ့ရတဲ့အေၾကာင္းေတြမွာ အဲဒီတုန္းက ျပန္ၿပီးေတာ့ မွတ္ပံုမတင္ရတဲ့ အေၾကာင္း တစ္ခုထဲမွာ ဖြဲ႔စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒကို မေက်နပ္လို႔ဆိုတာလည္း ပါပါတယ္။ တရား၀င္ အေၾကာင္းျပခ်က္အရ၊ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္အရကေတာ့ ဒီ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲနဲ႔ပတ္သက္တဲ့ ဥပေဒေတြဟာ တရားမမွ်တလို႔ က်မတို႔ လက္ခံႏိုင္စရာအေၾကာင္း မရွိဘူး။ ဒါေပမဲ့လည္း ဖြဲ႔စည္းပံု အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ျပင္ဆင္သင့္တယ္ဆိုတာဟာ ေရႊဂံုတုိင္ ေၾကညာခ်က္တုန္းက ပါခဲ့ပါတယ္။ အဲဒီေတာ့ ဒီ ဖြဲ႔စည္းပံုအေျခခံ ဥပေဒကို ျပင္ဆင္သင့္တယ္ဆိုတာ က်မတို႔က ႏိုင္ငံရဲ႕အနာဂတ္ကို ၾကည့္ၿပီးေတာ့ေျပာတာပါ။ က်မတို႔ အဖြဲ႔တစ္ခုတည္းအတြက္ ေျပာတာမဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ တႏုိင္ငံလံုးအတြက္ က်မတို႔ရဲ႕ ျပည္ေထာင္စု တိုင္းရင္းသား အားလံုးအတြက္ လိုအပ္တဲ့ျပင္ဆင္မႈေတြအတြက္ က်မတို႔ ဦးတည္ၿပီးေတာ့ လုပ္သြားရမွာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။”
တဆက္တည္းပဲ အခုလို တရား၀င္မွတ္ပံုတင္ဖို႔ ဆံုးျဖတ္တာဟာ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖဲြ႔ခ်ဳပ္ ရပ္တည္ေရးသက္သက္အတြက္ မဟုတ္ေပမဲ့လို႔ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖဲြ႔ခ်ဳပ္ ရပ္တည္ႏိုင္ေရးဟာလည္း အသံုးခ်ရမယ့္ နည္းလမ္းတစ္ခုျဖစ္တယ္လို႔ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က ေျပာသြားပါတယ္။
“အဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ရဲ႕ ရပ္တည္ေရးတစ္ခုတည္းအတြက္ ဒါ လုပ္တယ္ဆိုရင္ သေဘာမတူဘူးလို႔ေျပာတာ ဒါဟာ အင္မတန္မွ မွန္ကန္တဲ့သံုးသပ္ခ်က္ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါေပမဲ့ တစ္ခုပဲ က်မ သတိေပးခ်င္တာက အဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ရဲ႕ ရပ္တည္ေရး ဆိုတာကေတာ့ အေရးႀကီးပါတယ္။ အေရးႀကီးတာက ဒါက ပန္းတုိင္အေနနဲ႔ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ လုပ္နည္းလုပ္ထုံးတစ္ခု အေနနဲ႔ပါ။ အသံုးခ်သြားဖို႔ နည္းလမ္းတစ္ခု အေနနဲ႔ပါ။ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ ရပ္တည္ေရးဆိုတာဟာ ဒီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ ရပ္တည္ေရးအတြက္ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ ျပည္သူေတြအတြက္ ရပ္တည္တယ္လို႔ က်မ ျမင္ခ်င္ပါတယ္။”
တခ်ိန္တည္းမွာ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္ဟာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီတရပ္လို ပီပီျပင္ျပင္ ရပ္တည္ လႈပ္ရွားသြားႏုိင္ဖို႔လည္း ႀကိဳးစားသြားမွာျဖစ္တယ္လို႔ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က ေျပာပါတယ္။
“ဘာျဖစ္လို႔လဲဆိုေတာ့ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအဖြဲ႔ခ်ဳပ္က ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီတစ္ခုအေနနဲ႔ မလႈပ္ရွားရတာ အေတာ္ၾကာၿပီ။ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီတစ္ခုရဲ႕ အလုပ္ေတြကို မလုပ္ခဲ့တာ အေတာ္ၾကာၿပီ။ က်မတို႔ ျပန္ၿပီးေတာ့ ေလ့က်င့္ယူရမယ္။ ေလ့က်င့္ယူရမယ္ဆိုတာ က်မတို႔ လူငယ္ေတြလည္း ရွိတယ္။ အရင္တုန္းက လက္ေဟာင္းေတြလည္း ရွိတယ္။ အားလံုးဟာ ျပန္ၿပီးေတာ့ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ တစ္ခုအေနနဲ႔ လုပ္သင့္လုပ္ထိုက္ တာေတြကို လုပ္ရေတာ့မယ္။ ဒီမိုကေရစီစနစ္ေအာက္မွာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီတစ္ခု ထူေထာင္ၿပီဆိုကတည္းက ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲေတြမွာ တခ်ိန္တခါမွာ ယွဥ္ၿပိဳင္ရေတာ့မွာ။ ဒီေတာ့ အဲဒါကလည္း ဒီမိုကေရစီမူအရလည္း လုပ္သင့္တဲ့ကိစၥျဖစ္လို႔ က်မတို႔ လုပ္ခ်င္တယ္။”
အခုလို အဖဲြ႔ခ်ဳပ္ ျပန္လည္ မွတ္ပံုတင္လိုက္တဲ့ေနာက္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္း တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးနဲ႔ ျပည္တြင္း စစ္ရပ္စဲေရး၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအက်ဥ္းသား လြတ္ေျမာက္ေရးကိစၥေတြကို သူတို႔အေနနဲ႔ ဆက္လုပ္သြားမယ္လို႔ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က ေျပာပါတယ္။ တဘက္မွာ အဖဲြ႔ခ်ဳပ္ မွတ္ပံုတင္တာကို မလိုလားတဲ့ အဖဲြ႔၀င္ေတြကိုလည္း အဖဲြ႔ခ်ဳပ္လုပ္ငန္းေတြမွာ နားလည္မႈရိွရိွ ဆက္လက္ လက္တဲြေဆာင္ရြက္သြားၾကဖို႔ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က တိုက္တြန္းသြားပါတယ္။
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Dr. Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
March 1, 2011
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on North Korea, one of our most enduring foreign policy challenges. I would also like to personally thank this committee for its leadership in advancing discussion and opportunities for American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, I would like to use this occasion to focus on the Administration’s North Korea policy through a broader regional context.
Introduction:
The primary strategic objective for U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is to promote a peaceful and stable security environment that advances the interests of the United States, our allies, and partners in the region. Essential to this approach is the security and stability that our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines provide. These relationships underwrite peace and security in the region and provide a context for the region’s tremendous economic dynamism and vitality. In addition, our alliances are buttressed by a network of partnerships ranging from Indonesia to New Zealand and an evolving regional political and security architecture that will help create rules of the road for this rapidly evolving and strategically critical region. China is also a key U.S. partner in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, and the Joint Statement issued during President Hu’s January 2011 to Washington underscored that “in coordination with other parties, the United States and China will endeavor to increase cooperation to address common concerns and promote shared interests.”
Despite the tremendous opportunities in Asia that have become part of our popular discourse, one country stands out as an outlier, and in fact an impediment, to the region’s promising future: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK). The DPRK’s brazen attack on the ROK corvette Cheonan in March of last year, its recent disclosure of a uranium enrichment program, its shelling of Yeonpyong Island that resulted in the tragic loss of South Korean lives, and its ongoing human rights violations underscore the threat that the DPRK’s policies and provocations, including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities, pose to regional stability and global security.
The verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is the core objective of the 2005
Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, is an essential ingredient to the Asia-Pacific region’s
long-term success and to our own security. Progress toward this goal requires close coordination
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between the ROK, Japan, and the United States, as well as with China and Russia. Our Northeast Asian alliances play an essential role in maintaining regional security, deterring North Korean provocations, providing a reliable and robust strategic deterrent posture, and bringing maximum leverage to bear on the DPRK to change its current course and become a member of the community of nations. To this end, we have actively engaged our regional partners to ensure robust implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1718 and 1874 on North Korea, and though there is still work to be done, strong regional cooperation, particularly with Japan and South Korea, has made it more difficult for North Korea to successfully engage in proliferation and other illicit activities. We will continue to take steps to enhance and broaden our bilateral political, economic, and security relations, as well as make progress on key alliance modernization initiatives. We will also work to develop a more integrated trilateral framework for cooperation and coordination between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Furthermore, we are taking steps to enhance coordination with China and Russia – both of which have important relationships with North Korea – to create a more favorable context for denuclearization and peace and security. In addition to the aforementioned five key parties, we are working more closely with other stakeholders like the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), India, and Australia to broaden region-wide efforts to compel North Korea to abide by its denuclearization commitments and obligations, as well as with the UN Security Council.
The Republic of Korea:
The U.S.-ROK alliance is grounded in the threat that North Korea poses to the ROK. However, over the course of the past few years, the United States has undertaken steps to expand alliance cooperation in both regional and global settings. In 2011, we will aggressively pursue initiatives to increase collaboration in the peninsular, regional, and global contexts.
The ROK’s security is critically affected by North Korea due to their complex historical relationship, geographic proximity, and the tangible threat that North Korea’s conventional military capabilities, nuclear programs, and ballistic missile developments pose to South Korea. As President Obama stated during his November 2010 visit to Seoul, “In the face of these threats, the U.S.-ROK alliance has never been stronger…The United States will never waver in our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.” Following the attack on Yeonpyong Island, President Obama stated that we will stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the ROK and reaffirmed our commitment to its defense. This commitment is being translated through efforts
to bolster ROK defensive capabilities. For example, last November the ROK participated in USS George Washington Carrier Group exercises. We continue to hold regular joint military
exercises to enhance extended deterrence, interoperability, and the readiness of alliance forces to respond to threats to peace.
Over the last 60 years, our alliance with the ROK has continued to expand from its military roots into one of the most vibrant, full-spectrum strategic partnerships in modern history, encompassing dynamic political, economic, and social cooperation. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement is a way not only to strengthen U.S.-ROK economic ties and increase American jobs through exports to Korea but also to enhance the enduring strength of this strategic relationship. Regionally, we are working closely with the ROK on a number of key issues, such as improving
maritime security through the ASEAN Regional Forum and advancing the capacities of countries
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in the Lower Mekong region. We welcome and support the ROK government’s efforts to realize its “Global Korea” vision, expanding its global reach to be commensurate with its economic status. We applaud the ROK’s leadership in addressing global concerns, such as proliferation, counter-piracy, and development assistance. Last year’s G20 Summit in Seoul and the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012 are a testament to the ROK’s global leadership.
Close coordination and the broadening and deepening of our security commitments with the ROK are key guiding principles for how we approach North Korea. The steps that our two militaries are taking, for example, to enhance our joint interoperability and strategic deterrent, are critical to creating a security environment that deters North Korean provocations, increases our collective leverage on Pyongyang to change course, and maintains peace and stability in the broader East Asia environment. A U.S.-ROK relationship that will only grow stronger and continued close bilateral coordination on our strategies for the way forward on North Korea will reinforce our common message to Pyongyang – that taking irreversible steps toward
denuclearization, abiding by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and improving relations with the ROK and its other neighbors is the only way for the DPRK to break free from its isolation
and enjoy the security, political, and economic benefits that come with integrating into the international community.
In the short-term, the United States supports direct talks between the DPRK and the ROK to address the South’s legitimate grievances, including North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan and its shelling of Yeonpyong Island. We believe that North-South dialogue is an important initial step toward the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. North Korea’s decision to walk out of the recent colonel-level North-South military-to-military talks squandered a valuable opportunity to improve North-South relations and demonstrate its commitment to dialogue. We will carefully monitor events on the Korean Peninsula for evidence of a North Korean commitment to improving inter-Korean relations.
Japan:
President Obama underscored the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance during his November
2010 trip to Japan: “As allies for over half a century, the partnership between Japan and the United States has been the foundation for our security and our prosperity – not only for our two countries, but also for the region.” Last year, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the U.S.- Japan alliance. This year, we are working to create a roadmap for the next 50 years to broaden and deepen this cornerstone alliance. In this context, Secretaries Clinton and Gates will co-host their Japanese counterparts in Washington, D.C. for a 2+2 Security Consultative Committee meeting. This meeting will focus on reaffirming the core mission of our alliance – the security of Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific – as well as articulating new common strategic objectives and approaches that demonstrates the expanse of our relationship.
Progress on key issues associated with modernizing our military relationship will continue and is essential to adapt our alliance to better manage the complex evolutions in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, as well as promote and protect the global commons. We think that Japan should follow the ROK and take steps to accede to the Hague Convention on International Parental Child Abduction.
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North Korea remains Japan’s most immediate national security concern and a key feature of our diplomatic engagement with Tokyo. North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and past abduction of Japanese citizens underscore the tangible threat the DPRK poses to Japan’s national security. North Korea’s recent provocative actions have reinforced Japan’s concerns and led to enhanced ROK-Japan cooperation and closer trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination. We welcome the commitment of ROK and Japanese leaders to deepen the ROK-Japan bilateral
relationship. We appreciate Japan’s key role in working to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue peacefully and its commitment to implementing unilateral and multilateral sanctions against the DPRK to curb its proliferation activities. The United States fully supports Japanese efforts to resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.
Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Coordination:
In addition to strengthening U.S. alliances with the ROK and Japan, we will take ambitious steps to increase trilateral cooperation to further develop a more integrated Northeast Asia security architecture. Robust trilateralism is essential to deal with the DPRK’s provocative behavior and to shape the emerging regional strategic environment. Trilateral engagement demonstrates to North Korea that its reckless actions will be met with collective resolve. The benefits of
trilateral coordination were on full display when Secretary Clinton hosted Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara and ROK Foreign Minister Kim in a historic U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Ministerial meeting in December 2010. At this meeting, the three countries jointly affirmed the importance of unity and ways to enhance policy coordination on myriad issues from ASEAN to North Korea. On North Korea, they declared that the DPRK’s belligerent actions threaten all three countries and will be met with solidarity from all three countries. The United States reaffirmed its security alliances with both Japan and the ROK, and all three countries jointly condemned the DPRK’s uranium enrichment facility as a violation of the DPRK’s commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Institutionalization of trilateral cooperation will be an important focus of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the coming year and a point of conversation when Secretary Clinton meets with the ROK and Japanese Foreign Ministers in the coming year. Additionally, with our Japanese and South Korean allies, we are continually working to enhance cooperation with
China and Russia on ways to deal with the DPRK – underscoring the strategic benefits of strong
Five-Party unity and coordination in denuclearization negotiations.
China:
North Korea remains a key foreign policy issue in our bilateral relationship with China. We share the same goals of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as North Korea’s verifiable denuclearization in a peaceful manner. China is uniquely positioned to influence the DPRK because of its significant economic and humanitarian aid to the DPRK, its shared border with the DPRK, and historical ties. We have urged China to press North Korea to take appropriate steps to improve relations with South Korea and to denuclearize. We also continue to work with China to enhance effective implementation of sanctions under UNSCR 1718 and
1874.
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During the January 2011 China state visit, President Obama emphasized to President Hu that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are increasingly a direct threat to the security of the United States and our allies. The President also expressed appreciation for China’s role in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula but underscored the need for China to leverage its unique relationship with North Korea to compel Pyongyang to abide by its commitment to the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks as well as its obligations under UNSCR 1718 and 1874. Both leaders agreed that the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains our paramount goal and that North Korea must avoid further provocations.
The Joint Statement issued during President Hu’s visit also reflects our shared concern over the DPRK’s claimed uranium enrichment program. The United States and China jointly “expressed concern regarding the DPRK’s claimed uranium enrichment program…opposed all activities inconsistent with the 2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations and commitments…and…called for the necessary steps that would allow for the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks process to address this and other relevant issues.” We are working closely with China and our other partners and allies at the UN to develop an appropriate UN response to the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program.
Russia:
We value our continuing cooperation with Russia, another key partner in the Six-Party Talks, to achieve our shared goal of denuclearization in North Korea. As a result of its historical relationship with the DPRK and its status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, like China, Russia is well positioned to influence the DPRK through both direct bilateral diplomacy and multilateral efforts.
In the wake of the DPRK’s provocations over the last year, we welcome the constructive role that Russia has played to press Pyongyang to refrain from further destabilizing actions, to abide by its international commitments and obligations, and to take irreversible steps toward denuclearization. Russia has publicly stated that it backs UN Security Council discussion of the North Korean uranium enrichment program, and we seek further cooperation from Russia in our efforts to affirm unequivocally that the DPRK’s uranium enrichment activities violate the relevant UNSCR.
Other Key Regional Players: ASEAN, India, Australia:
Due to the security threats posed by North Korea to the entire Asia-Pacific region, our deep diplomatic activity and coordination on North Korea extend beyond the Five Parties to other key partners in the region. As a fulcrum of regional multilateralism, ASEAN has been actively engaged on regional security issues. The ASEAN-centered East Asia Summit presents a unique opportunity to engage with traditional allies and new partners on a range of areas central to U.S. interests in Asia, which may grow to include North Korea. We will continue to work closely with ASEAN to identify ways for the organization to play a more engaged role in denuclearization discussions.
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India and Australia also share our goal of enhancing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. The United States and India have discussed North Korea in our Strategic Dialogue and other bilateral and multilateral exchanges. India’s growing security and political relations with Japan and South Korea will also enhance prospects for security and stability in Northeast Asia. Australia has strongly supported international implementation of UNSCR 1718 and 1874, participated in the international investigation of the sinking Cheonan, and supported efforts to bring the issue before the UN Security Council.
Conclusion:
The goal of the United States and our allies and partners remains a stable, peaceful Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, the United States intends to maintain strong solidarity with South Korea, Japan, and other states with a vested interest in the future of the Korean Peninsula and the stability and prosperity of Northeast Asia. We will continue to encourage the DPRK to engage in meaningful negotiations on denuclearization and to honor its commitments and international obligations. At the same time, we will work to ensure the implementation of U.S. and international sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and proliferation networks and its involvement in other illicit activities. We will also carefully watch internal political and economic developments in North Korea, particularly as they relate to succession and the promotion of heir apparent Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il.
The Obama Administration has repeatedly stressed that there remains a positive path open to North Korea. North Korea has the choice to take a path that will lead to security and economic opportunity or to continue in its pattern of confrontation and isolation. The United States remains committed to meaningful dialogue, but we will not reward North Korea for shattering the peace or defying the international community. If North Korea improves relations with South
Korea and demonstrates a change in behavior, including taking irreversible steps to denuclearize, complying with international law, and ceasing provocative behavior, the United States will stand ready to move toward normalization of our relationship. However, if it maintains its path of defiance and provocative behavior and fails to comply with its obligations and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong and prosperous nation.
Our concerns with North Korea are not limited to the threat it poses to regional stability and global security. Human rights violations harm the North Korea people and violate international norms for the rule of law and respect for individual rights. Respect for human rights by North Korea will also be necessary for it to fully participate in the international community. Human rights are a top U.S. priority and an addressing of human rights issues by the DPRK will have a significant impact on the prospect for closer U.S.-DPRK ties.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I welcome any questions that you may have.
U.S.-Russian Relations
Testimony
Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Statement before the House Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
July 28, 2009
Chairman Wexler, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the Administration's achievements in Moscow as a result of the summit meeting of President Obama and President Medvedev July 6-8. I would like to submit my full testimony for the record, and would like to take this opportunity to make a few brief remarks.
Let me begin by putting the results of the summit into a somewhat wider context. The Obama Administration entered office seeking to put an end to the dangerous drift in our bilateral relations with Russia. Last December, then President-elect Obama called for a “reset” in our relations with Russia. He argued that the United States and Russia have mutual interests in a number of areas– including nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, and Afghanistan for example –and argued that it should be possible to cooperate practically in these areas even as we disagreed on other issues. The results of the Moscow Summit demonstrate that the President’s instincts were correct.
In the six months since President Obama took office, the United States and Russia worked hard to achieve such a fresh start. Not only have our leaders made progress in improving the tone of our relations and helping to build goodwill between our two countries, but as the Moscow Summit demonstrates, we have succeeded in translating the rhetoric about potential collaboration into identifiable, concrete actions that are fundamental to the security and the prosperity of both our countries.
This significant progress in our relations with Russia, moreover, did not in any way come at the expense of our principles or partnerships with friends and allies. There are still many areas where the United States and Russia disagree and will continue to disagree. Nevertheless, in Moscow we demonstrated in real terms our shared desire to build a relationship based on respect, cooperation, and common interests.
First and foremost, the United States and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. The two Presidents signed a Joint Understanding for a follow-on agreement to START that commits both parties to a legally binding treaty that will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by at least one third of our current treaty limitations. They also agreed to participate in a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea. Wasting no time in launching this effort, an interagency team of experts is heading out to Moscow this week to begin discussions.
Second, we made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, including by working together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. At the summit, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Russian Chief of the General Staff General Makarov agreed to work plan for resuming military-to-military cooperation in areas such as coutner-terrorism, search and rescue, and counterpiracy.
Another very tangible result of the summit was Russia’s agreement to allow the United States to transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force as well as our Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This agreement will add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply routes, resulting in a potential savings of up to $133 million in fuel, maintenance, and other transportation costs. The significance of this contribution to our efforts to bring about peace and stability to Afghanistan, which is also of strategic benefit to Russia as well, should not be understated. It is an excellent example of how the two countries can cooperate in the pursuit of common interests, without any quid pro quos.
We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in non-strategic areas. For example, the United States and Russia took steps to build cooperation in public health, which could include strengthening work between U.S. and Russian scientific research institutions on HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and prevention and treatment of cardiovascular disease. And we agreed to restore the work of the Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.
Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized the need for a more structured foundation for advancing our cooperation in key areas across our respective inter-agencies. The Bilateral Presidential Commission – to be chaired by the two presidents and led by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov – will provide a mechanism for sustaining and expanding on the progress we achieved in Moscow, while also proving a for a in which we can work together effectively to narrow our differences.
Notwithstanding all of these positive developments, we have no illusions that our reset of relations will be easy, or that we will not continue to have differences with Russia. Nonetheless, we are confident that the United States and Russia can still work together where our interests coincide while at the same time seeking to narrow our differences in an open and mutually respectful way, be it on issues of human rights or Russia’s unlawful recognition of Georgia’s separatist regions. In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his message that the “reset” in our bilateral relationship will not come at the expense of our friends and allies. More than in words, but in actions, we have demonstrated our commitment to the territorial integrity and independence of Russia’s neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia. President Obama made very clear in Moscow that we will continue to support their sovereignty and their right to choose their own security alliances, a message reinforced by the Vice President’s trip to those two countries just last week. The President also stressed, both privately and publicly, America’s enduring support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
To conclude, at the Moscow Summit the United States and Russia took significant steps forward in translating the “reset” in relations into concrete achievements to benefit both our nations and our global partners. Without abandoning our principles or our friends and allies, we demonstrated that the United States and Russia can work effectively together on a broad range of issues where our interests coincide.Let me begin by putting the results of the summit into a somewhat wider context. The Obama Administration entered office seeking to put an end to the dangerous drift in our bilateral relations with Russia. Last December, then President-elect Obama called for a “reset” in our relations with Russia. He argued that the United States and Russia have mutual interests in a number of areas– including nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, and Afghanistan for example –and argued that it should be possible to cooperate practically in these areas even as we disagreed on other issues. The results of the Moscow Summit demonstrate that the President’s instincts were correct.
In the six months since President Obama took office, the United States and Russia worked hard to achieve such a fresh start. Not only have our leaders made progress in improving the tone of our relations and helping to build goodwill between our two countries, but as the Moscow Summit demonstrates, we have succeeded in translating the rhetoric about potential collaboration into identifiable, concrete actions that are fundamental to the security and the prosperity of both our countries.
This significant progress in our relations with Russia, moreover, did not in any way come at the expense of our principles or partnerships with friends and allies. There are still many areas where the United States and Russia disagree and will continue to disagree. Nevertheless, in Moscow we demonstrated in real terms our shared desire to build a relationship based on respect, cooperation, and common interests.
First and foremost, the United States and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. The two Presidents signed a Joint Understanding for a follow-on agreement to START that commits both parties to a legally binding treaty that will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by at least one third of our current treaty limitations. They also agreed to participate in a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea. Wasting no time in launching this effort, an interagency team of experts is heading out to Moscow this week to begin discussions.
Second, we made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, including by working together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. At the summit, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Russian Chief of the General Staff General Makarov agreed to work plan for resuming military-to-military cooperation in areas such as coutner-terrorism, search and rescue, and counterpiracy.
Another very tangible result of the summit was Russia’s agreement to allow the United States to transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force as well as our Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This agreement will add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply routes, resulting in a potential savings of up to $133 million in fuel, maintenance, and other transportation costs. The significance of this contribution to our efforts to bring about peace and stability to Afghanistan, which is also of strategic benefit to Russia as well, should not be understated. It is an excellent example of how the two countries can cooperate in the pursuit of common interests, without any quid pro quos.
We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in non-strategic areas. For example, the United States and Russia took steps to build cooperation in public health, which could include strengthening work between U.S. and Russian scientific research institutions on HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and prevention and treatment of cardiovascular disease. And we agreed to restore the work of the Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.
Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized the need for a more structured foundation for advancing our cooperation in key areas across our respective inter-agencies. The Bilateral Presidential Commission – to be chaired by the two presidents and led by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov – will provide a mechanism for sustaining and expanding on the progress we achieved in Moscow, while also proving a for a in which we can work together effectively to narrow our differences.
Notwithstanding all of these positive developments, we have no illusions that our reset of relations will be easy, or that we will not continue to have differences with Russia. Nonetheless, we are confident that the United States and Russia can still work together where our interests coincide while at the same time seeking to narrow our differences in an open and mutually respectful way, be it on issues of human rights or Russia’s unlawful recognition of Georgia’s separatist regions. In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his message that the “reset” in our bilateral relationship will not come at the expense of our friends and allies. More than in words, but in actions, we have demonstrated our commitment to the territorial integrity and independence of Russia’s neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia. President Obama made very clear in Moscow that we will continue to support their sovereignty and their right to choose their own security alliances, a message reinforced by the Vice President’s trip to those two countries just last week. The President also stressed, both privately and publicly, America’s enduring support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak before you today, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions.
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Prepared Testimony by Dr Thant Myint-U
before the East Asia Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington DC – 30 September 2009
The policies of the United States and other Western governments over the past twenty years towards Burma have failed. They have not been helpful in moving the country towards meaningful democratic change and at the same time have largely neglected the country’s multiple ethnic and armed conflicts as well as its pressing humanitarian challenges.
As we move towards a very welcome review and adjustment of American policy, I think it’s important to reflect on the history behind today’s challenges, appreciate the critical and complex watershed Burma now faces, and try to identify pragmatic ways forward.
War and state-building
There is a myth that Burma emerged from British rule in 1948 as a peaceful democracy with all the attributes necessary for later success, only to fall mysteriously into dictatorship and extreme poverty. Burma in 1948 was actually already at civil war, its economy in ruins. And this civil war has continued until today. It is the longest running set of armed conflicts anywhere in the world, setting the Burmese army against an amazing array of battlefield opponents – from the Mujahedeen along the former East Pakistan/Bangladesh border, to remnants of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Army, to drug-lords, to Beijing-backed communist rebels, to Christian-led ethnic Karen insurgents in the jungles near Thailand.
The Burmese army has been in the field uninterrupted for more than six decades. For the army, the history of these six decades has been the history of their fighting back, to hold the country together, from a time when they barely controlled the then capital Rangoon, to today, when they believe they are within reach of a final victory.
State-building in Burma has gone hand-in-hand with war-making. And the military regime remains at its core a counter-insurgency operation. It was designed and built-up to identify enemies, contain them, and crush them when possible. The men in charge may be motivated by desires for personal power and profit, but they also believe themselves to be patriots. And after two generations of fighting foreign-backed rebellions, they are primed to see foreign conspiracies behind all opposition.
In 1962, the army overthrew the last elected government, in part to pursue its counter-insurgency operations unhindered by civilian oversight. It established what it called The Burmese Way to Socialism, which nationalized all major businesses, expelled the country’s Indian merchant class, and sought to isolate Burma from the world, banning nearly all international aid, trade and investment. The military state grew up and consolidated its rule in this self-created isolation. It is its default condition.
These twin legacies – ethnic conflict and international isolation - have been instrumental for the consolidation and continuation of military rule. Progress towards peace, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and the reintegration of Burma into the global community are essential if we are going to see any sustainable transition to civilian government. Yet not only has there been little focus on these issues, but key opportunities in recent years have been missed.
The end of Burmese socialism and missed opportunities
The early and mid-1990s provided a unique chance to move Burma in the right direction. General Ne Win, dictator of Burma since 1962 was old and ailing and a new generation of generals had come to the fore. The Chinese backed communist insurgency had collapsed and cease-fires were agreed between the Burmese army and more than two dozen different insurgent forces.
While rejecting democratic reform, many in the new leadership wanted to end decades of self-imposed isolation and move towards a more free-market economy. Trade and investment laws were liberalized and tourism encouraged for the first time in decades. Satellite television soon brought the world into millions of Burmese households and travel in and out of the country, both legally and illegally became routine. The government sought development assistance from the UN and the International Financial Institutions. US and international policy should have been to lock in these tentative steps, especially the ceasefires and market reforms, rather than ignore them, impose economic sanctions, cut off assistance, and insist on an immediate democratic transition.
US policy’s near singular focus since 1988 on support for the democracy movement led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is understandable, especially given ongoing repression and her party’s decisive win in the 1990 elections. In the early 1990s I was a staunch supporter of the toughest approach possible towards the regime and argued for comprehensive sanctions. I believe I was wrong and I had changed mind by 1993 when I saw that sanctions were unlikely to ever really pressure the regime and were instead impeding the positive momentum that was there.
There was political repression in Burma, but that’s been the constant since 1962. What was different in the 1990s was the end of fighting across the north and northeast and the opening up of the economy. I am convinced that had we embraced these changes and used them as opportunities to move towards a just peace while also reconnecting Burma with the world, the democracy movement would be in a far stronger position today.
The problem with sanctions
Sanctions have not only been ineffective in promoting democratic reform, they have also been hugely counter-productive in reducing Western influence, reinforcing isolationist tendencies, constraining moves towards market-reforms, and decimating the position of the Burmese professional, managerial and entrepreneurial classes. The last generation of US and UK educated technocrats has now retired or is close to retirement, and very few in the bureaucracy or universities today have had any foreign
training. The country is far less prepared for a sustainable democratic transition today than it was in the early 1990s.
We have to remember this: politics in Burma like everything else operates on a landscape cultivated by over sixty years of war and nearly fifty years of military dictatorship. Little will change without first transforming that landscape. Focusing on regime-change at the top will simply not work. Sanctions and related divestment campaigns and campaigns to minimize tourism have drastically reduced chances for the emergence of new and outward looking economic forces. The political economy which has emerged under sanctions, based now on a few extractive industries and trade ties with a handful of regional countries, has proven particularly easy for the incumbent regime to control. Aid restrictions, restrictions on high-level contacts and travel by senior Burmese officials, and embargos on trade and investment all have had the direct if unintended consequence of reinforcing the status quo. And to say that the government’s own policies are also to blame do not absolve the role that US and other Western sanctions have played in entrenching poverty and engendering a political economy that is the antithesis of one that could have thrown up positive social change.
We need also to differentiate between punishment and pressure for change. Sanctions may be seen as a form of punishment, in the sense that the regime doesn’t like them. But sanctions do not constitute pressure for change, quite the opposite, they strengthen the hand of those who are uninterested in further engagement with the outside world and in particular the West. Real pressure comes with increasing the regime’s international exposure, creating new desires, and placing tough options on the table. Having to choose between Western sanctions and a handover of power is simple. But with greater international exposure, a choice between real policy change and improved governance on the one hand or a future as an impoverished dependency of China on the other won’t be as easy.
The present watershed
Burma now faces an historic watershed, and whatever happens, I am certain that the next 12-18 months will be the most important time in Burmese politics since the failed 1988 uprising.
The current watershed has at least three principal components:
(1) First is the civil war. Burma’s civil war may either be nearing an end or entering a new and violent chapter. There still exist more than two dozen distinct ethnic-based insurgent forces, fielding well over 40,000 troops in total. Vast areas of the country, in particular in the north and east are ruled by a mix of Burmese army battalions, insurgent armies and local militia. Though the cease-fire arrangements between the Burmese army and nearly all insurgent forces remain, many are increasingly tenuous. In recent weeks we have seen the oldest of the cease-fires, the twenty-year agreement between the Burmese army and the Kokang militia break down. The coming months may well see successful efforts by the Burmese army to pressure or persuade the various armed groups to transform themselves into quasi-autonomous militia and accept
the new constitutional order. But a return to full-scale hostilities, though unlikely, is also far from impossible.
(2) Second is the generational transition within the armed forces. Most if not all the present army leadership will retire in the coming months to be replaced by officers in their late 40s and early 50s. This new generation will be the first to have risen to senior command on the basis of their administrative rather than any significant combat experience, the first without training in the United States, and the first for whom the West, rather than China, has been portrayed as the main strategic threat.
(3) Third is the political transition under the new constitution. Entirely new political structures, including fourteen state and regional governments will be established in 2010 under the new constitution. Central power will at least nominally be bifurcated between a new and powerful president and a new armed forces commander-in-chief. General elections may or may not create an opening for more independent political voices, but the transition to the new constitutional set-up will present at the very least a massive shake-up of existing systems of authority and patronage. We do not know if the leadership will be able to manage the transition as they wish. 2010 may well throw up unexpected new dynamics, especially as they come at the same as major changes in the army’s top ranks.
Burma’s relationships with her neighbors, in particular China, are also changing fast. The migration of hundreds of thousands if not millions of ethnic Chinese into the country, the rapid expansion of Chinese business interests, and the construction of huge new infrastructure projects linking Burma to southwest China, including a massive Chinese oil pipeline, designed to transport Middle Eastern and African oil across Burma to China’s Yunnan province, will have an enormous impact on the Burmese economy and society, especially as there take place during a period of Western economic withdrawal. Burma is already a major exporter of energy to Thailand in the form of natural gas. Burma may soon also export large quantities of natural gas to China and hydroelectric power to China, India and Thailand. How well and how transparently revenues from energy exports are managed will be a key test of any future government.
On China, we have to remember that the present army leadership grew up fighting the Communist Party of Burma, a well-armed Chinese-supported insurgent force that once threatened huge parts of the eastern uplands. There is no love lost between Beijing and Naypyitaw. The present leadership rose up the ranks seeing China as their number one strategic threat and the US as their ally. Many see their present dependence on China as an anomaly, a tactical move that needs correction.
I have visited Burma often in recent years, at least ten times since the beginning of 2007. I’ve travelled extensively around the country, without escort and few restrictions, and have met hundreds of people, from senior army officers to dissidents to businessmen to local aid workers, including friends and family, some well-off, others struggling each day to feed their families. This is a country where political opposition is violently repressed and there is a obvious desire for greater freedom and government
accountability. But it’s a also a country where there exists an increasingly vibrant civil society, a heavily-censored but largely privately-owned media, with dozens of newspapers and magazines, widespread access to satellite television and foreign movies, an energetic contemporary music scene, extensive religious freedom, and a weak but resilient private sector. There are literally hundreds of genuinely independent local non-governmental organizations in Burma today, and thousands of community-based organizations, all working to improve living conditions for ordinary people, a young country of 55 million, one of the most ethnically diverse in the world. I say all this not to deemphasize the political repression that exists. Make no mistake – there is little or no political freedom in Burma and the continued detention of an estimated 2,000 prisoners of conscience is rightly seen as unacceptable. But outrage alone changes little. And to move to towards a more results-oriented approach we need to see Burma in all its complexity.
I said that Burma is at a watershed. The ceasefires could collapse leading to a new round of inter-ethnic conflict, a new generation of generals could emerge hostile to the world as well as their own people, and plight of ordinary people could worsen still, even while the rest of Asia moves forward. The demise of current leaders could lead to elite fracture and even state collapse. Alternatively, if more pragmatic views prevail, a freer and more prosperous future may not be so far away. The difference will be determined inside the country, but I believe that are key areas where help from the outside will be significant, as outlined below.
The importance of increasing humanitarian assistance
The Administration’s support for increased humanitarian assistance is extremely welcome and scaling up aid should be a top priority. Burma has the 13th lowest per capita GDP in the world and its child mortality rate is the second-highest rate outside Africa, after Afghanistan. The average family spends an estimated 75% of its small income on food. Burma has the highest HIV rate in Southeast Asia, and malaria, a treatable and preventable disease, is the leading cause of mortality and morbidity.
Yet assistance to the Burmese people in 2007 was less than USD 4 per capita. Though this has increased in response to last year’s Cyclone Nargis, aid remains the lowest per capita among the fifty-five poorest countries in the world. By comparison, Zimbabwe receives USD 41 per captia and Sudan USD 55. Tens of thousands of people a year die from treatable diseases. The United Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations are all able to deliver aid directly to needy people. But funding has fallen far short of what is necessary.
Cyclone Nargis opened up the Irrawaddy delta to unprecedented and almost unlimited access by international organizations and international and national non-governmental organizations. Almost four thousand aid workers operate there today in over two thousand villages. In addition to providing life-saving assistance and helping villagers restart their lives and livelihoods, their work is significantly strengthening local civil society. Yet funding for recovery efforts has been only a fraction of what is needed. A unique opportunity to help the Burmese people directly and support local civil society may be squandered without more financial support.
In providing humanitarian assistance, I believe very strongly that we must put all other agendas aside and simply provide aid as best we can to those who require help most and continuously press for access to all needy communities. I believe the US should not only significantly increase humanitarian assistance but actively encourage other donor governments to do the same.
Enabling Change
Though positive change in all areas will have to come from within, the outside world can make a difference in enabling that change and making it sustainable. I would suggest:
(1) Maximize elite exposure. Every scenario for political change in Burma depends on at least a degree of support from within the military establishment. Yet virtually nothing has been done to try to influence the mind-set of the up and coming officer corps or show them that other paths to stability and development exist. The isolation of the country’s leadership from the rest of the world is a key pillar of the status quo, its removal is critical for any lasting political change. Dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual concern – such as disaster risk reduction - should be used towards this end.
(2) Engage in dialogue on economic reform. Supporters of sanctions are correct when they say that poverty in Burma is not due primarily to sanctions but to the chronic mismanagement of the economy. I favor lifting all economic sanctions, but I also favor more robust efforts to press for economic and related governance reform, separate from any political agenda. This should start with a removal of all restrictions on the United Nations system and the International Financial Institutions, especially the World Bank in engaging the government, including at the highest levels. Efforts to build up the administrative capacity necessary to turn the economy around should be supported, not hindered. As new ministers take up their positions in 2010, they must at least understand the need for more broad-based development, the impact of their own policies, and the options for poverty reduction going forward.
(3) Don’t forget the private sector. Humanitarian assistance and other aid is needed now, but Burma, a country rich in natural resources and situated between Asia’s emerging economic giants, should make sure it avoids becoming an aid-dependent country. Scaling up international assistance makes no sense if at the same time we are holding back through broad economic sanctions the possibilities for private sector growth. We need to shift the debate away from sanctions and towards a practical discussion of the kind of trade and investment that would most benefit ordinary people. US sanctions crippled the emerging textile industry and threw 70,000 or more people out of work. Removing the ban on the import of garments from Burma would be a step in the right direction. And if there are specific government obstacles that stand in the way or direct economic engagement with the Burmese private sector (beyond a few top cronies), than the removal of these obstacles should be at the center of dialogue with the authorities.
(4) Build capacity. No sustainable shift from a military to civilian rule will be possible without radically increasing civilian administrative capacity and capacity in society more generally. We cannot underestimate the impact that decades of self-imposed isolation and external sanctions have had on education standards and technocratic skills. Efforts to build capacity – through training and scholarships – should be actively promoted, including through international organizations.
A democratic Burma
Nothing I have said should suggest any changes in the long term aims we all share – a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Burma. In a country as ethnically and culturally diverse as Burma, only a genuinely liberal democracy with strong local government institutions can, I believe, guarantee lasting stability. A free and economically vibrant Burma at Asia’s crossroads is a worthy goal. But we should not underestimate the real and practical challenges that exist between those aims and the situation today. There can be no grand strategy from the outside, only efforts to use and build on opportunities as they come along. And seeing those opportunities depends on being more present on the ground, in direct contact with the Burmese people. This is what a new engagement-oriented approach should be all about.
Thank you.
END
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Myint-UTestimony090930p.pdf
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ဒီမိုကေရစီ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation)
နိဒါန္း
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၏အနာဂတ္အတြက္ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) သည္သာလွ်င္ တိုင္းျပည္အတြက္ လက္ေတြ ့ အလုပ္လုပ္၍္ အျဖစ္ႏိုင္ဆံုးေသာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးလမ္းညြွန္သေဘာတရား ျဖစ္သည္ ။
သို ့ရာ တြင္ ဤ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) ကို အာဏာရွိ ၊ အာဏာမဲ့ ၊ လက္နက္ရွိ ၊ လက္နက္မဲ့ ၊ အျပန္အလွန္ တရားမွ်တ စြာ သေဘာေပါက္နားလည္လက္ခံႀကမွ သာ ၊ လက္ေတြ ့အေကာင္အထည္ ေဖၚေဆာင္၍ ရႏိုင္လိမ့္မည္။
အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရး ၊ တရားစီရင္ေရး ႏွင့္ တကြ ၊ အစိုးရ ယႏၱရား ႀကီး တခုလံုး ကို ျပဳျပင္ ေျပာင္းလဲရန္ လိုသည္။ ႏွစ္အတန္ႀကာ တမိန္ ့တအာဏာ ႏွင့္ ဥပေဒျပဳ ခဲ့ရျခင္း ကို လူထု ကိုယ္စားျပဳ စနစ္ျဖင့္ အစားထိုးရမည္။ယခု အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းေရး ၏ ပဏာမ ေျခလွမ္း ကိုအလြန္တရာ ေႏွးေကြးစြာ စတင္ေနေပသည္။
အစိုးရ ယႏၱရား ႀကီး မွ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရး ၊ တရားစီရင္ေရး အျပင္ ၊ ကုန္စည္ကူးသန္းေရာင္း၀ယ္ ေရး ၊ အခြန္ေကာက္စနစ္ ႏွင့္ ႏွဳန္းထားသတ္မွတ္မွဳ ၊ သယ္ယူပို ့ေဆာင္ေရး ႏွင့္ စက္မွဳ ကုန္ထုတ္လုပ္မွဳ ၊ လယ္ယာစိုက္ပ်ိဳးေရး ႏွင့္ သားငါး ဓါတ္သတၱဳ ဆည္ေျမာင္း လွ်ပ္စစ္ စသည္ တို ့ပါ မက်န္ အေထြေထြအ၀၀ ကို ျပဳျပင္ ေျပာင္းလဲေရး ျဖစ္သည္ ။
အဘယ့္ေႀကာင့္နည္း ….. ?
လြတ္လပ္ေရးရသည္မွ ယေန ့ထိ ၊ ျငိမ္းခ်မ္း ညီညြတ္ စြာ တိုင္းျပည္ ထူေထာင္ရေသာကာလ ဟူ၍ မရွိ။
နိဂံုးမခ်ဳပ္ႏိုင္ေသးေသာ ျပည္တြင္းစစ္ ႏွင့္ ၊ တပ္ဖက္ ႏွင့္ အရပ္ဖက္ စိတ္၀မ္းကဲြေနမွဳ ပဋိပကၡ ႀကီး လက္ငင္းတည္ရွိေနျခင္း။
ကိုလိုနီေခတ္ ဥပေဒ မ်ား ႏွင့္ တပါတီဆိုရွယ္လစ္ေခတ္ ဥပေဒ မ်ား သည္ ေနာက္ပိုင္း စစ္တပ္အာဏာရွင္ စနစ္၏ အမိန္ ့ဥပေဒ မ်ား ႏွင့္ ပါ ကာလရွည္ႀကာစြာ ေရာျပြမ္း ေန ျခင္း ။
စသည္ တို ့ေႀကာင့္ ျဖစ္ သည္။
တိုင္းျပည္ကို စက္မွဳကုန္ထုတ္ စံနစ္ သို ့အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းရာတြင္ ၊ ျပည္တြင္းျပည္ပ ရင္းႏွီးျမွဳပ္ႏွံမွဳႏွင့္
လြတ္လပ္ေသာ စီးပြားေရးစံနစ္ ကို လက္၀ါးႀကီးအုပ္မွဳ မဲ့ စြာ ၊ ဥပေဒ က အာမခံ ခ်က္ျပဳ ေရး ။
ေျမယာပိုင္ဆိုင္ခြင့္ ၊ အေျခခ် စိုက္ပ်ိဳး ေမြးျမဴခြင့္ တို ့ကိုအကန့္အသတ္ျဖင့္“လုပ္သူသာပိုင္ခြင့္ရွိ“စံနစ္ျဖင့္
ေဆာင္ရြက္ေရး ။
ဤ သည္ ကို ဒီမိုကေရစီ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) ဟု ေခၚတြင္ ေပ သည္ ။
အေသးစိပ္ အားျဖင့္ ဆိုရေသာ္ ၊ ပညာေရး ၊ က်န္းမာေရး ၊ ဘဏၭာေရး မူ၀ါဒ ႏွင့္ ေငြေႀကးစနစ္ ၊ တိုင္းျပည္လံုျခံဳေရး ႏွင့္ စစ္မွဳေရးရာ ၊ အရပ္ဖက္အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရး ဆိုင္ရာမ်ား ၊ ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရး၀ါဒ ႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံတကာဆက္ဆံေရး ၊ ယဥ္ေက်းမွဳ ႏွင့္ လူမွဳ လံုျခံဳေရးရာမ်ား ၊ အဆင့္ျမင့္ နည္းပညာ အျပင္ ဗုဒၶသာသနာေတာ္ေရး ႏွင့္ အျခားဘာသာေရးရာ မ်ား စသည္တို ့ပါ၀င္သည္ ။
အေျခခံ မူ၀ါဒ မွာ ၊ ”ေျမယာလူ ့အဖဲြ ့အစည္း ကို စက္မွဳကုန္ထုတ္ အရင္းရွင္ဒီမိုကေရစီ လူ့အဖဲြ ့အစည္း
အျဖစ္သို ့ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား (the political ideology of General
Reformation) ျဖင့္ ၊ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းေရး မူ၀ါဒ ျဖစ္၏ ။
ရဲေက်ာ္စြာ
၁၃၇၂ ခုႏွစ္ ျပာသိုလဆန္း (၈) ရက္ ၊ ဗုဒၶဟူးေန ့
ရန္ကုန္ျမိဳ ့၊ ျမန္မာျပည္ ။
Wednesday, January 12, 2011 (5:30:50 PM)
Friday, March 25, 2011
၁။ (ပါတီ တည္ရွိေရး လိုအပ္ခ်က္)
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံတြင္ ၂၀၀၈ ဖြဲ ့စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒ အရ ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ားဖဲြ ့ခြင့္ရလာခဲ့ပါသည္။
သို ့ေသာ္ ၁၉၉၀ ေရြးေကာက္ပဲြရလာဒ္ တရားေသဆုပ္ကိုင္သူမ်ား ႏွင့္ တိုင္းျပည္ကို ေတာ္လွန္ေျပာင္းလဲ လိုသူမ်ားက ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ား ကို ျပင္းထန္စြာ ဆန္ ့က်င္ႀကပါသည္။
တပ္မေတာ္ ဘက္မွလည္း ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ား ကို တရားမွ်တ ၊ လြတ္လပ္စြာ ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရး ေဆာင္ရြက္ခြင့္ မေပးေသးပါ။ နအဖ က အစိုးရအသစ္ အား အာဏာတရား၀င္ လဲြွ ေျပာင္းေပးျပီး သည့္တိုင္ ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ား ၏ တရားမွ်တ စြာ လြတ္လပ္ေသာ ဥပေဒေဘာင္တြင္းလုပ္ပိုင္ခြင့္ ဆိုင္ရာ ကံႀက မၼာ မွာ မွန္းဆရခက္ခဲေသးဆဲ ရွိေနပါေသးသည္။
တပ္မေတာ္ သည္ ၎ ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ား သည္၎ ၊ လြတ္လပ္ေရးရျပီးသည္မွ စ၍ ၊ ယေန ့တိုင္ အမ်ိဳးသားညီညြတ္ေရး ကင္းမဲ့လ်က္ ၊ ျပည္တြင္းစစ္ ႏွင့္ ဗဟို မွ ခ်ဳပ္ကိုင္ သည့္ ႏိုင္ငံေရး စီးပြားေရး စံနစ္ တို ့ ကိုအျမစ္မျဖတ္ ႏိုင္ေသးေသာေႀကာင့္ ၎ ၊ ၁၉၈၈ လူထုအံုႀကြမွဳ၏ အက်ိဳးဆက္ ႏွစ္ေပါင္း ၂၀ ေက်ာ္ ႏိုင္ငံေရး အေဟာသိကံ ျဖစ္ခဲ့ရမွဳ ေႀကာင့္ ၎ ၊ တိုင္းျပည္ ကိုေကာင္းစြာ ထူေထာင္ ခဲ့ရျခင္းအလ်ဥ္း မရွိခဲ့ပါ။
ထို ့ေႀကာင့္ ဥပေဒ ႏွင့္ အညီ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ား တည္ရွိေရး မွာ တိုင္းျပည္ထူေထာင္ေရး တြင္ အေျခခံက်ေသာ လိုအပ္ခ်က္တရပ္ ဟု ဆိုပါက မမွားေပ။
၂။ (စစ္ဖက္-အရပ္ဖက္ မခြဲျခားပဲ တိုင္းျပည္ ထူေထာင္ေရး)
တိုင္းျပည္၏ လက္ရွိအေျခအေနမွာ -စစ္ဖက္-အရပ္ဖက္ မခြဲျခားပဲ ၊ အတိတ္ ႏိုင္ငံေရး ေ၀ဒနာ မ်ားကို သင္ခန္းစာယူ ၊ သင္ပုန္းေခ် ၊ သင္ႀကားနာယူ ၍ ၊ မ်က္ေမွာက္တိုင္းျပည္၏ ႏိုင္ငံေရး စီးပြားေရး အေထြေထြ ျပႆနာမ်ားကို ၊ အနာဂတ္အက်ိဳးစီးပြားအလို ့ငွာ ပူးေပါင္းအေျဖရွာေျဖရွင္း သြားေရးပင္ျဖစ္ပါသည္။
တပ္မေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ား အျပန္အလွန္အသိအမွတ္ျပဳ ၍ အနာဂတ္ တိုင္းျပည္ အက်ိဳးစီးပြား အတြက္ ရိုးသားတည္ႀကည္စြာ လံု ့လဥႆဟျပဳသြားႀကေရး ပင္ ျဖစ္ပါသည္။
တိုင္းေရးျပည္ေရး ဆို သည္ တဦးေကာင္းတေယာက္ေကာင္း တဖဲြ ့ေကာင္းတသင္းေကာင္း ေဆာင္ ၍ ရစေကာင္း ဟုမမွတ္ယူအပ္ေပ။
အမ်ိဳးသားညီညြတ္ေရး ဟူသည္ စစ္ဖက္ အရပ္ဖက္ သာမက ၊ လူမ်ိဳးေရး ႏွင့္ ယံုႀကည္ကိုးကြယ္မွဳ တို့တြင္ပါ မခြဲျခားေရး မူ ကို အေျချပဳ၏။ လူသား၀ါဒကိုတန္ဖိုးထားျခင္းသည္ ကံ ကံ၏အေႀကာင္းအက်ိဳး၊ လူမွဳစီးပြားျပဌာန္းခ်က္ ၏ အကဲျဖတ္ ခံ လူတန္းစား ကြဲျပားျခားနားမွဳ ကို ပါ ၊အေတြးအေခၚ အယူအဆ အရ အလိုအေလွ်ာက္ တြန္းလွန္ဖယ္ရွားျပီးျဖစ္၏။ ေလာကီ ႏွင့္ ေလာကုတၱရာ ကို ပိုင္းျခားအပ္၏။
အမ်ိဳးသားညီညြတ္ေရး ကို အေျခခံ ေသာ တိုင္းျပည္ထူေထာင္ေရး ရည္မွန္းခ်က္ မွာ ဤ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး လမ္းစဥ္ ၏ အဓိက အႏွစ္သာရပင္ ျဖစ္၏။
၃။ (တပ္အေပၚသေဘာထား ၊ လူထုအေပၚသေဘာထား )
ယခုအခါ (၁) တိုင္းျပည္ကို ေတာ္လွန္ေျပာင္းလဲ လို သူမ်ားႏွင့္ (၂) ျပဳျပင္ ထူေထာင္ ေျပာင္းလဲလို သူမ်ား ဟူ၍ အေျခခံ အရ လမ္းစဥ္ ႏွစ္ မ်ိဳး ႏွစ္ စား ကြဲျပားလ်က္ရွိေနပါသည္။
ေတာ္လွန္လိုသူမ်ား က လက္ရွိ အစိုးရ ကို လူထုအံုႀကြေသာနည္းျဖင့္ ျဖဳတ္ခ် ၍ အစိုးရအသစ္ ဖဲြ ့ လိုႀက သည္။
ျပဳျပင္ေရး လိုလား သူမ်ား က လက္ရိွ အစိုးရ ကို အသိအမွတ္ျပဳ ဆက္ဆံ ၍ ၊ တိုင္းျပည္ ၏ စံနစ္ ႏွင့္ မူ၀ါဒ မ်ား ကို မွန္ကန္စြာ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ ေသာ နည္းလမ္း ျဖင့္တိုင္းျပည္ ကို ျပဳျပင္ ထူေထာင္ ေျပာင္းလဲလို ႀကသည္။
ဤ တြင္ လက္ရွိ အစိုးရ ဆို သည္ တပ္မေတာ္ ပင္ျဖစ္၍ ၊ လာမည့္အစိုးရ ဆိုလွ်င္ လည္း တပ္မေတာ္ က ေနာက္ခံျပဳထားေသာ အစိုးရ သာလွ်င္ျဖစ္ေသာ ေႀကာင့္ ၊ တပ္ အေပၚ သေဘာထား ဟု တနည္းအားျဖင့္ ဆိုရေသာ္ မမွားေပ။
ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး လမ္းစဥ္ ၏ စိတ္ဓါတ္ပိုင္း အႏွစ္သာရ မွာ အစိုးရ သည္ လူထုကို အလုပ္အေကြ်းျပဳေရးျဖစ္၏။
ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး လမ္းစဥ္ သည္ ျမန္မာ့လူ ့အဖဲြ ့အစည္း ကို အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ ေရး အရ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းသြားေစရန္ ျဖစ္၏။ ေခတ္ေနာက္ျပန္ဆြဲ ေရး မဟုတ္ ၊ ေခတ္ေရွ့ သို ့ဦးေဆာင္ေရး ျဖစ္၏။
၄။ (ပကတိ အေထြေထြ အေျခအေန ႏွင့္ မဟာဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ )
သို ့ေသာ္ လူထု သည္ ၎ ၊ လူတန္းစား အသီးသီး သည္၎ ၊ တျပည္လံုးအတိုင္းအတာအရ ၊ စား၀တ္ေနေရး လူမွဳ ဘ၀၌ ေန ့စဥ္ နစ္မြန္းလ်က္ရွိကာ ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရး ဆိုသည္ ႏွင့္ တေန ့တျခား ကင္းကြာလ်က္သာရွိလာေနခဲ့ပါသည္။
ေတာ္လွန္ လို သူမ်ား ကလည္း လူထုအံု ႀကြ ရန္ ကိုသာ ႏွိဳး ဆြေပး လ်က္၊ လူ ့အဖဲြ ့အစည္း ၏ ပကတိ သရုပ္မွန္ဘ၀ ႏွင့္ ကင္းကြာစြာ သာ ၊ လူထု ေနာက္ျမီးဆြဲ လ်က္ စည္းစံနစ္မရိွ အာဏာဖီဆန္ေရး ပံုစံေဟာင္းထဲ သို ့ တိုင္းျပည္ကို သြတ္သြင္းရန္ႀကံယံုမွတပါး အျခားမလုပ္တတ္ႀကပါ။
က မၻာ့ ႏိုင္ငံႀကီးမ်ား ၏ မူ၀ါဒ မ်ား ၊ လမ္းစဥ္မ်ား ကို လည္း မွန္မွန္ကန္ကန္ ဆန္းစစ္ သံုးသပ္ႏိုင္စြမ္း အလ်ဥိးမရွိပါ။ တိုင္းႀကီးျပည္ႀကီး တို ့ ၏ ႏိုင္ငံျခားေရး ၀ါဒမ်ား ၊ ေဒသဆိုင္ရာ လံုျခံဳေရး မူ၀ါဒမ်ား ၊ ကုန္သြယ္ေရး မူ၀ါဒမ်ား စသည္တီု ့ ကို အျပန္အလွန္ ႏွိဳင္းယွဥ္ သံုးသပ္မွဳ မ်ားလည္း မရွိႀကပါ။
ပုဂၢိဳလ္စြဲ ၊ ဂိုဏ္းစြဲ ၊ ဆႏၵစြဲ ၊သမိုင္းအျမင္လြဲ မ်ား ျဖင့္ သာ ၊ ဆဲေရးပုတ္ခတ္ရန္ေထာင္ လ်က္အခ်ိန္ျဖဳန္းလာခဲ့ႀကပါသည္။မိမိကိုယ္မိမိ ပင္ ေကာင္းစြာ ခိုင္ စြာ အယူအဆေရး ၌ မွ်ပင္ တည္ေဆာက္ ယူထားႏိုင္စြမ္းအားမရွိခဲ့ႀကပါ။
စည္းစံနစ္ရွိေသာ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးမ်ိဳး လည္း မဟုတ္ ၊ တေယာက္တေပါက္ တစုတမ်ိဳး ေျပာခ်င္ရာေျပာ လုပ္ခ်င္ရာလုပ္ ႏွင့္ ၊ အစိုးရမွန္သမွ်ဆန္ ့က်င္ေရး သည္ မင္းမဲ့၀ါဒ သာျဖစ္ေႀကာင္း ရွင္းလွပါသည္။
တပ္မေတာ္ အစိုးရ ကို စဥ္းလံုးေခ်ာေကာင္းသည္ဟုမဆိုလိုပါ။ အမ်ိုးသားညီညြတ္ေရးမရွိ ၊ တိုင္းျပည္ထူေထာင္ေရး တန္ ့ရပ္ေန ျပီး ၊ ျပည္တြင္းစစ္ လံုး၀နိဂံုးမခ်ဳပ္ ေသးသည္ ့တိုင္းျပည္ မ်ိဳးမွာ ၊ အမွားတိုင္းအတြက္ အားလံုးမွာ ကိုယ္စီကိုယ္ငွ တာ၀န္ရွိႀကေႀကာင္း ခံယူအပ္ပါသည္။
အယူအဆ အမွား ၊ လမ္းစဥ္ အမွား ၊ လုပ္ရပ္အမွား မွအစ ၀ါဒသေဘာတရားအမွားအထိ ကိုယ္ပိုင္သေဘာေပါက္မွဳ ျဖင့္ တာ၀န္ယူရဲႀကဘို ့ဦးစြာလိုအပ္ပါသည္။
တေယာက္ကိုတေယာက္ လွြဲခ် ျပစ္တင္ ရန္ေထာင္ေနႀကရုံ ျဖင့္ အမ်ိဳးသားညီညြတ္ေရးမရႏိုင္ပါ။
အမ်ိဳးသားအက်ိဳးစီးပြား (National Interest ) ဆိုသည့္စကားရပ္ ကို ႏိုင္ငံႀကီးမ်ားက ဘာအတြက္ခ်မွတ္က်င့္သံုးႀကသည္ကို ၊ နားလည္ေအာင္လည္းသင္ယူႀကဘို ့လိုပါသည္။
ယခုအခါ လူထု ကေတြေ၀ ေနပါသည္။ ေတာ္လွန္ရမည္ေလာ ေမ်ာလိုက္ရမည္ေလာ ဘာလုပ္ရမွန္းေသခ်ာမသိပါ။ ဘယ္ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ ကိုမွ လည္းအားမကိုးေတာ့ပါ။လူထုကို ဦးေဆာင္မည့္ ပါတီမရွိပါ။
လူလတ္တန္းစားႀကံ့ခိုင္မွဳ မရွိေသးသည့္ ေျမရွင္လူ ့အဖြဲ ့အစည္းမ်ိဳးမွာ လူတန္းစားတရပ္ရပ္ကို ကိုယ္စားျပဳမည္ ့ ႏိုင္ငံေရးဦးေဆာင္ပါတီ မ်ိဳးမရွိနိုင္ သျဖင့္ ၊ ေတာ္လွန္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး လမ္းစဥ္မွာ မေအာင္ျမင္ႏိုင္ပါ။ လူတန္းစားအာဏာ ကို ရယူႏိုင္စြမ္းကင္းလ်က္ေပၚထလာရမည့္ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးသေႏၵ သားမွာ မဖြားမွီ ကပင္ ေလွ်ာပ်က္လ်က္ရွိသည္ဟုျပတ္သားစြာဆိုရပါခ်ိမ္ ့မည္။
သို ့ေႀကာင့္ ပင္လွ်င္၊ ျမန္မာ့လူ ့အဖဲြ ့အစည္းအတြက္ အသင့္ေတာ္ဆံုး ၊ အလိုအပ္ဆံုး ႏွင့္ မလုပ္မျဖစ္လုပ္ကိုလုပ္ရမည့္ တိုင္းျပည္ထူေထာင္ေရးလမ္းစဥ္မွာ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးလမ္းစဥ္ သာျဖစ္ေႀကာင္းဆိုရပါမည္။
၅။ (ေသနဂၤဗ်ဳဟာ နည္းပညာ)
၅.၁။ (လူထု ကို ဦးေဆာင္ပါ ၊ ပကတိအရွိ တရား ကို လက္သင့္ခံ ပါ)
အဘယ့္ေႀကာင့္ တိုင္းျပည္ထူေထာင္ေရးလမ္းစဥ္မွာ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးလမ္းစဥ္ သာျဖစ္၏ ဟု ဆိုျပီးသည့္ေနာက္ ၊ အဘယ္သို ့ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးလုပ္မည္ ဆိုသည္ကိုဆက္ရအံ့။
မဟာဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ ျပီးလွ်င္ နည္းဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ မ်ား လိုက္ပါလာစျမဲ ျဖစ္၏။
လတ္တေလာ အေျခအေန ၌ တိုင္းျပည္၏ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအင္အား တြင္ လက္နက္ရွိ လက္နက္မဲ့ ၊ အာဏာရိွ အာဏာမဲ့ ၊ ႏွစ္မ်ိဳးႏွစ္ပိုင္း ျခားနားစြာ ကဲြလ်က္တည္ရွိ၏။
ဤတြင္ တပ္မေတာ္ သည္ လက္နက္လည္းရွိ အာဏာလည္းရိွ ၏။
ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ မ်ားမွာ လက္နက္လည္းမရွိ အာဏာလည္းမရိွ ေပ။
တိုင္းရင္းသား လက္နက္ကိုင္ မ်ားမွာ လက္နက္ ႏွင့္ ေဒသအာဏာ အသင့္အတင့္ ရိွ၏။
အထက္ နိဒါန္း တြင္ ဆိုခဲ့သည့္ အတိုင္း ၊ ”ဤ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) ကို အာဏာရွိ ၊ အာဏာမဲ့ ၊ လက္နက္ရွိ လက္နက္မဲ့ ၊ အျပန္အလွန္ တရားမွ်တ စြာ သေဘာေပါက္နားလည္လက္ခံႀကမွ သာ ၊ လက္ေတြ ့ အေကာင္အထည္ ေဖၚေဆာင္၍ ရႏိုင္လိမ့္မည္။ ”
လက္ေတြ ့ႏုိင္ငံေရး ဟူသည္ ပကတိ အေျခအေနမွန္ ႏွင့္ ကင္းကြာလ်က္ မူ၀ါဒ လမ္းစဥ္ခ်မွတ္ ခါ လုပ္ေဆာင္ ၍ ရရိုးထံုးတမ္းစဥ္လာ မရွိပါေခ်။ ပကတိအရွိ တရား ကို ၊ သမိုင္းေပးသင္ခန္းစာ၊ ဘ၀ေပးအသိ ႏွင့္ သင္အံရယူခ်က္မ်ား ႏွင့္ တကြ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအေျခခံသေဘာတရား ပါ ေပါင္းစပ္လ်က္လက္ေတြ ့က်က် ခံယူက်င့္သံုး ႏိုင္ႀကရေပလိမ့္မည္။
လူထု ကို ဦးေဆာင္ႀကရမည္။ လူထု အႀကိဳက္ ေနာက္ျမီးဆဲြ မလုပ္ရ။
တိုင္းျပည္ ကို ထူေထာင္ႀက ။ မဖ်က္ဆီးႀက ႏွင့္။
၅.၂။ (နည္းဗ်ဳဟာ ႏွင့္ ကာယကံရွင္မ်ား)
ျပန္ေကာက္ရလွ်င္ ….
(၁)ျပည္တြင္းစစ္လံုး၀နိဂံုးခ်ဳပ္၍အမ်ိဳးသားညီညြတ္ေရးကိုတိုင္းျခားဩဇာကင္းလ်က္ေဆာက္တည္ႏိုင္ရမည္။ထို ့ေနာက္တိုင္းျပည္ထူေထာင္ႀကရမည္။
(၂)တပ္မေတာ္ ၊ ရဲတပ္ဖဲြ ့အပါအ၀င္ လက္နက္ကိုင္အဖဲြ ့အားလံုး ႏွင့္တကြ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီ အဖဲြ့အစည္း မွန္သေရြ ့မွာ စင္စစ္ ၊ လူထု၏အစိပ္အပိုင္းသာျဖစ္၏။ျပည္သူလူထုမွေပါက္ဖြားလာႀကသည္သာျဖစ္၏။ ထို ့ေႀကာင့္ အစိုးရအဖဲြ ့၊ အစိုးရ၀န္ထမ္း၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးရာ စီးပြားေရးရာ ေဆာင္ရြက္သူမွန္လွ်င္ လူထုကို အလုပ္အေကြ်းျပဳ ရန္အေျခခံစိတ္ဓါတ္ရွိရမည္။
(၃)အလြန္တရာ သိမ္ေမြ ့နက္ရွိဳင္း လွသည္ ဟု ခံယူ နားလည္ အပ္ေသာ ကိစၥႀကီး (၂) ရပ္ အျဖစ္ (၁) ဗုဒၶသာသနာေတာ္ေရး ႏွင့္ အျခားဘာသာေရးရာ မ်ား ကိစၥ ၊ (၂) ႏိုင္ငံျခား ဆက္ဆံေရးရာ ကိစၥ တို ့ကို မူ ၊ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးအျမင္သက္သက္ျဖင့္ မဟုတ္မူပဲ ၊ သိပ္သည္းနက္နဲ စြာ က်စ္က်စ္လ်စ္လ်စ္ ျဖင့္ ၊ ေရွ့ေရးေနာက္ေရးအေျမွာ္အျမင္ႀကီးႀကီးထားလ်က္၊ဆင္ျခင္ႏွလံုးသြင္းေဆာင္က်ဥ္းအပ္ေပသည္။
ထို ့ေႀကာင့္ တပ္မေတာ္ သည္ ၎ ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရး ပါတီ မ်ားသည္ ၎ ၊ နိဂံုးမခ်ဳပ္ ႏိုင္ေသးေသာ ျပည္တြင္းစစ္ ၏ အက်ိဳးဆက္ ျဖစ္သည့္ လက္နက္ကိုင္အဖဲြ ့မ်ားသည္၎ ၊ ဤ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး မဟာဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ ၏ နည္းဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ တြင္ ပါကိုပါ၀င္ႀကရမည့္ ကာယကံရွင္မ်ားပင္ျဖစ္ေပ၏။
၅.၃။( အမ်ိဳးသားအက်ိဳးစီးပြား)
နားလည္ေအာင္လည္းသင္အံသင့္သည့္ အမ်ိဳးသားအက်ိဳးစီးပြား (National Interest ) ကို၊ သက္စြန့္ ႀကိဳးပမ္းကာကြယ္ႀကရန္ လည္း ၊ ဤ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး မဟာဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ ၌ ၊ အဓိက က် သည့္ လိုအပ္ခ်က္ႀကီးတရပ္ ျဖစ္၏။
အမ်ိဳးသားအက်ိဳးစီးပြား (National Interest ) မပါလွ်င္ အေမရိကန္ သည္ ၎ ၊ ရုရွား သည္ ၎ ၊ တရုတ္ သည္ ၎ ၊ ကံ သံုး ပါး စလံုး ကို တခု မွ် မလြန္ေစခဲ့ စဖူးဟု ၊ ပညာ ႏွင့္ သင္ရန္စာ တပါတည္း ယူ ၍ ၊ ေသနဂၤဗ်ဳဟာ အရပ္ရပ္ကိုစာေပသုေတသနဥႆဟျဖင့္အနာဂတ္အက်ိဳးအလို့ငွာ အျမဲတမ္းႀကိဳတင္ျပင္ဆင္ လံု ့လျပဳေနႀကသင့္သည္။
ဤ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး မဟာဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ သည္ အမ်ိဳးသားအက်ိဳးစီးပြား (National Interest ) ကို အေျခခံ သည္။ တိုင္းျခားဩဇာခံ ႏိုင္ငံျခားသြင္းကုန္ မဟုတ္ ၊ လံုး၀ ထိုသို ့မျဖစ္ေစရ။ ျမန္မာျပည္ ၏ ပင္ကိုယ္ဟန္ အျဖစ္ ထာ၀ရတည္ရွိေစရမည္။
ထို ့ေႀကာင့္ ဤ မဟာဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ ၌ ခံစစ္သည္ ၎ ၊ ထိုးစစ္ သည္ ၎ ၊ အေသးစိပ္ နည္းဗ်ဳဟာ လမ္းစဥ္ တိုင္း ၌ ပါရွိေစရမည္။
၅.၄။ (ေဂၚဘားေခ်ာ့ ႏွင့္ တိန္ေရွာက္ဖိန္ )
သီးျခားစာစု တြင္ဖတ္ပါ။
၅.၅။ (ေတာင္ကိုးရီးယား ႏွင့္ ျမန္မာျပည္ )
Korea Example ေဆာင္းပါး တြင္ ေဖၚျပျပီးသည္ မ်ားကို ေကာက္ႏွဳတ္သံခိပ္ျပဳရန္။ ထပ္ျဖည္ ့ရန္။
Saturday, March 26, 2011 ၂ း ၄၈ ေခတၱနား
၆။ ဘာေတြ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲႀကမွာလဲ
၆.၁။ အဓိက ႏွင့္ သာမည Thursday, March 31, 2011
အဓိက ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး မွာ အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ ျဖစ္၏။
အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ တို ့၏ လက္ေအာက္ခံ ကိစၥ တို ့ မွာ သာမည ပိုင္း ျဖစ္၏။
ထို ့ေႀကာင့္ လက္ေတြ ့က်က် ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲ ရမည္တို ့ မွာ သာမည ပိုင္း ၊ လက္ေအာက္ခံ ကိစၥ
တို ့ျဖစ္ႀက၏။ သို ့ေသာ္ အဓိက အခန္းကဏၭ ျဖစ္သည့္ အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ တို ့အား အေျခခံ ၍သာ လက္ေတြ ့လုပ္ငန္း တို ့ကို ေဆာင္ရြက္ႀကရမည္။
၆.၂။ အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ November 22, 2011
အေျခခံ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ လူမွဳေလာကအျမင္ အယူအဆ တို ့ကို ဆိုလိုအပ္သည္။
အရင္းရွင္ ဒီမိုကေရစီ ( Capitalist Democracy ) ကို ၊ ေျမယာ အာဏာရွင္ စနစ္ (Feudal Autocracy) ေနရာတြင္ အစားထိုး ၍ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းရာ၌ ၊ ဤျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးလမ္းစဥ္ႀကီးကိုက်င့္သံုးရန္ျဖစ္၍ အလ်င္စလို ျပဳ ရန္ကား အလ်ဥ္းမသင့္ေပ။
အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ ေျပာင္းေရး ဆိုသည္မွာ လည္း အခု ေရတြင္းတူးအခုေရႀကည္ေသာက္လို ၍ ကား လံုး၀ မရႏိုင္ ပါေခ်။
ပုဂၢဳိလ္ေရး ဆည္းကပ္ကိုးကြယ္လိုမွဳ သည္ ဒီမိုကေရစီ သေဘာ ႏွင့္ လံုး၀ပကတိ ဆန္ ့က်င္ဘက္ ျဖစ္ေႀကာင္း ကို မူ အထူး ႏွလံုးသြင္း အပ္၏။ ပုဂၢလ ဓိ႒ာန္ ကို ပယ္၍ ဓမၼဓိ႒ာန္ ကို က်င့္သံုးရမည္။ မူ ကို လူ ထက္ ဦးစားေပး အေျခခံ ႀကရမည္။ ဒီမိုကေရစီ အေျခခိုင္ လ်က္ရွိေနႀကကုန္ေသာ တိုင္းႀကီးျပည္ႀကီး မ်ား ကို ပမာျပယုဂ္ အျဖစ္ ရွဳ ႀကကုန္ေလာ့။
၆.၃။ လက္ေတြ ့ခန္း
အဓိက အခန္းကဏၭ ျဖစ္သည့္ အေတြးအေခၚ ႏွင့္ အယူအဆ တို ့အားအေျခခံ၍ လက္ေတြ ့လုပ္ငန္း တို ့ကို ေဆာင္ရြက္ႀက၌ ၊ ကာယကံရွင္မ်ား သည္ (၁) တိုင္းျပည္ ထူေထာင္ေရး (၂) လူမ်ိဳး အဓြန္ ့ရွည္ ႀကီးပြားေရး တို ့ကို အမ်ိဳးသားအက်ိဳးစီးပြား (National Interest ) အျမင္ ျဖင့္ အစဥ္ယွဥ္ လ်က္ မိမိသာသနာေတာ္အေရး ကို ပါ ထာ၀ရ ဦးထိပ္ပန္ဆင္ ျပီး ၊ ဦးတည္ လံု ့လ စိုက္ ႀကရန္ ျဖစ္၏။
နိဂံုး
ယခုအခါ ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရး မ်က္ႏွာစာ တြင္ ေပၚလြင္ စ ျပဳ လာ ေန သည့္ ဒီမိုကေရစီ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး မင္း လမ္း မ ႀကီး ( The Main Road of Democracy Reformation ) ကို ျမင္ေတြ ့ေနႀကရပါျပီ။ အေမရိကန္ ျပည္ေထာင္စု ၊ တရုတ္ ျပည္ သူ ့သမၼတ ႏိုင္ငံ ၊ ဂ်ပန္ႏိုင္ငံ တို ့မွ အစ အေရွ ့အာရွ တခြင္ လံုး ျမန္မာ့ အနာဂတ္ ေရာင္ျခည္ဦး ကို ႀကိဳဆို ႏွဳတ္ခြန္းဆက္ ခါ အားေပး ေထာက္ကူ လာႀကပါ ျပီ။
ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ ေသာ နည္းဗ်ဳဟာ ျဖင့္ ဒီမိုကေရစီ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး မင္း လမ္း မ ႀကီး ( The Main Road of Democracy Reformation ) ေပၚ သို ့ ၊ ေမတၱာ တရား အား လက္ကိုင္ ထားႀက ျပီး ၊ အနာဂတ္ ျမန္မာျပည္ ၏ အက်ိဳးစီးပြား အလို ့ငွာ တက္လွမ္း ႀကပါ စို ့ဟု ေလးနက္ တည္ႀကည္ စြာ တိုက္တြန္း ႏွိဳးေဆာ္ လိုက္ ရပါေႀကာင္း ။ ။
မွတ္ခ်က္ ။
မူႀကမ္း သာ ျဖစ္ ေသာေႀကာင့္ ၊ လို လွွ်င္ ျဖည္ ့ ပို လွ်င္ ျဖဳတ္ ျခင္း ျဖင္ ့ ၊ မ ျပည္ ့စံု မွဳ ကို ခြင့္ လြွတ္ သည္းခံ ေတာ္ မူ ႀက ပါ ။
ရဲေက်ာ္စြာ Ye Kyaw Swa
၁၃၇၃ ခုႏွစ္ ၊ တန္ေဆာင္မုန္း လျပည့္ေက်ာ္ ၁၂ ရက္ အဂၤါေန ့ Tuesday, November 22, 2011
ရန္ကုန္ ျမိဳ ့၊ ျမန္မာ ျပည္ ။ mahathuriya.yks@gmail.com
Collector’s Items
- Clinton to become first U.S. secretary of state to visit Burma in 50 years - By David Nakamura, Published: November 18, 2011
- အေမရိကန္ ျမန္မာ ဆက္ဆံေရး တ႐ုတ္ စိုးရိမ္ဖုိ႔ မလိုဟု အေမရိကန္ အရာရွိေျပာ 2011-11-18 Radio Free Asia
- NLD အဓိကလုပ္ငန္း ဖဲြ႔စည္းပံုျပင္ေရး ျဖစ္မည္ ေသာၾကာ, 18 ႏိုဝင္ဘာ 2011 voanews
- Testimony of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell - Foreign Policy On North Korea ( March 1, 2011)
- Testimony Philip H. Gordon -Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs U.S. Russian Relations (July 28, 2009)
- Prepared Testimony by Dr Thant Myint-U ,before the East Asia Sub-Committee
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Washington DC – (30 September 2009)
- ဒီမိုကေရစီ အေထြေထျြပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရး သေဘာတရား - ( ရဲေက်ာ္စြာ ) (The Political Ideology of Democratic General Reformation) by Ye Kyaw Swa
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SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA
No 6 - Wednesday, November 23, 2011
Contact, Comment & Counsel: mahathuriya.yks@gmail.com
