SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011
This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/ News,Views & Opinions
Thursday, September 15, 2011 NO 4
QUOTATION
"The talent of insinuation is more useful than that of persuasion, as everybody is open to insinuation, but scarce any to persuasion. "
Philip Dormer Stanhope Chesterfield, 4th Earl
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insinuation?fromRef=true (Quotes)
Collector’s Items
- Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma (Media Note)
- Derek Mitchell - Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma (September 14, 2011 )
- James Mann’s About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)
- The Depression in the United States (1929)--An Overview
- US.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century - Statement of Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State (July 27, 2010)
- Korea, Republic of (ROK) – History - (Encyclopedia of the Nations)
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Home » Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs » Bureau of Public Affairs » Bureau of Public Affairs: Press Relations » Press Releases » Press Releases: 2011 » Press Releases: September 2011 » Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma
Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
September 6, 2011
Ambassador Derek Mitchell, the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, will depart on his first trip to Burma in his position on Wednesday, September 7. During his trip, he looks forward to meeting with a full spectrum of Burmese society, including government officials, members of political parties, local civil society organizations, and others.
His trip is intended to build upon U.S. dialogue and engagement toward shared goals of genuine reform, reconciliation, and development for the Burmese people.
Ambassador Mitchell will attend meetings in Nay Pyi Taw on September 9-10 and will continue consultations in Rangoon September 10-14. The Ambassador plans to consult with officials in Bangkok September 14-15 and Jakarta September 16-17.
PRN: 2011/1416
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htm
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Derek Mitchell: Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma
By Derek Mitchell
Thursday, 15 September 2011 10:12
Derek Mitchell, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma
Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma
Thursday, 15 September 2011, 2:43 pm Press Release: US State Department
Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma
Remarks Derek Mitchell Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Rangoon, Burma September 14, 2011
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Mingalaba. Good Morning. Let me read a brief prepared statement. I have just completed my first visit to Burma as U.S. Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator. I have spent the past five days in intensive consultations with a full spectrum of interlocutors in Nay Pyi Taw and in Rangoon to discuss the situation here and ways in which the United States can support and promote democracy, human rights, development and national reconciliation in the country in our common interests.
I want to acknowledge first the government’s excellent hospitality, Chargé d’Affaires Michael Thurston and his outstanding team at the U.S. Embassy for a quick turnaround in organizing a visit, and all my interlocutors for their time and candor during our meetings over the past several days.
Being my initial visit, my primary goal was to introduce myself, listen to local perspectives, and establish relationships that I will build on as I proceed to fulfill my mandate and responsibilities for managing U.S. Burma policy.
In Nay Pyi Taw, I met with Union Parliament Speaker Khin Aung Myint, People’s Parliament Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, Labor and Social Welfare Minister Aung Kyi, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Thein Htay, Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, and USDP Secretary General Htay Oo. I also met with a cross section of opposition MPs, including representatives from ethnic minority regions.
I was encouraged by and pleased with the quality and openness of the exchanges, and the constructive and respectful tone of each interaction I had. During these meetings, my government interlocutors repeatedly stated that this country had opened a new chapter to a civilian-led democratic governing structure and expressed that they were sincerely committed to reform in the interest of human rights, democracy, development, and national reconciliation.
I responded that the United States recognized and welcomed recent gestures from Nay Pyi Taw, such as President Thein Sein’s meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission, public emphasis on dialogue with ethnic minority groups in the interest of national reconciliation, and moderate easing of media censorship. Among both the international community and the Burmese
people, it is clear from my visit that there are heightened expectations and hopes that change, real change, may be on the horizon.
At the same time, I was frank about the many questions the United States – and others – continue to have about implementation and follow-through on these stated goals. I noted that many within the international community remain skeptical about the government’s commitment to genuine reform and reconciliation, and I urged authorities to prove the skeptics wrong.
To that end, I raised concerns regarding the detention of approximately 2,000 political prisoners, continued hostilities in ethnic minority areas accompanied by reports of serious human rights violations, including against women and children, and the lack of transparency in the government’s military relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
I offered respectfully that the government should take concrete actions in a timely fashion to demonstrate its sincerity and genuine commitment to reform and national reconciliation, including by releasing all political prisoners unconditionally, engaging in meaningful outreach to the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and engaging in dialogue rather than armed conflict with ethnic minority groups. I affirmed the importance of establishing a legitimate and credible mechanism for investigating reported abuses in ethnic areas as a first step toward building trust and promoting national reconciliation through accountability. I also urged the government to adhere to all of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions related to proliferation.
I want to emphasize that our dialogue on these topics was respectful and open, which I greatly appreciated. I noted that progress on these issues will be essential to progress in the bilateral relationship, and that if the government takes genuine and concrete action, the United States will respond in kind.
Here in Rangoon, I continued the conversation on current conditions and trends in the country with a broad cross section of civil society. I consulted with the business and diplomatic communities, and local and international NGOs, including citizens doing
heroic and courageous work providing free funeral services for the poor and treating those with HIV/AIDS.
And of course I met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the National League for Democracy to discuss their perspectives on recent developments in the country, the future of their party, and U.S. policy approaches. I was reminded consistently during my visit that Daw Suu remains deeply important to the citizens of this country, Burman and ethnic minority alike, and that any credible reform effort must include her participation. It was also clear that she remains fully committed to the cause of peaceful change through dialogue.
Unfortunately, I was only here for a few days and thus was unable to explore the full breadth and diversity of this beautiful country. However, the courage and commitment of those with whom I met give me great hope for the country’s future should genuine reform and reconciliation proceed. I will be following developments closely from afar, and look forward to many return visits here to continue the United State’s principled engagement policy.
Again, I would like to thank the government for hosting me so warmly for my inaugural visit in my new post, and to all my interlocutors for sharing their valuable insights. I consider this a highly productive visit. I will now take a few questions before I have to catch a plane.
QUESTION: Did you get any assurance of the release of political prisoners from the government?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: As I suggested, we had a very candid dialogue on this subject. There were no absolute commitments on anything. But we had a very productive exchange on the subject, so nothing further I can say on that.
QUESTION: And my second question is would it be possible for your government to lift the sanctions if the political prisoners were not released?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: The issue of sanctions, again, that was not a primary point of discussion. There are a lot of issues that we need to deal with in terms of the
relationship, and sanctions are one component, as I said. Most of this is about our engagement, our principled engagement, with the regime. I know yesterday there was a report that came out unfortunately, sad to say, that I think mischaracterized my position on this, referring to a roadmap to lift sanctions. I think it took my words out of context. It mischaracterized what I said in response to a question. I never presented, nor have I developed such a roadmap. The conversation flow and tone were as I just described earlier about the full range of issues being addressed concerning exchange of views, concerning what we would need to see in order to truly develop a productive relationship and to change the parameters of the bilateral relationship.
QUESTION: What is the most important criterion for assessing the situation in this country?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: There's no particular single issue, obviously. I listed the things we needed to see that we thought were elements of demonstrating credible and genuine commitment to reform. So there's no single answer to that, but if we see some of the things that I outlined, I think it would demonstrate the kind of genuine commitment that people are looking for, not just probably -- obviously from the outside, but people within the country. And the issue of skepticism and uncertainty about how far this is going and where it's leading, I think the government recognizes that the skepticism is out there and we'll just see how this proceeds. And as I say, if we see actions that are credible, the United States will respond.
QUESTION: I would like to ask if you've seen any change of attitude from the current government during your visit?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Well this is my first visit, so I can't compare it to any previous visit to say whether they've changed or not. I can answer that question during my second visit, which I hope will be soon. I have to say though, that I know there were concerns about my position, coming in. My position was, as many of you know, was mandated by Congress under the JADE Act. In the United States, the JADE Act is the sanctions act. So there were concerns that I was purely a function of sanctions, that I was simply here to talk sanctions, and not to talk more broadly about the relationship and to get a feel for the place and what's happening here. So my sense was, again, I
was very pleased with the reception I got, very pleased with the nature of the conversations, very pleased with how welcoming they were. And I detected no nervousness about me or my position. And I look forward to continuing those relationships in a very frank and candid manor that befits a healthy relationship.
QUESTION: Yesterday the State Department released an annual religious freedom report, and Burma being designated as one of the eight nations, countries of most particular concern. Did you have a chance to meet the various religious organizations? If so, what is their concern? Do they still have these concerns? How likely is Burma to be out of this list soon?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: I did not meet with representatives of those organizations. So I can't speak for them in terms of how they view the situation in the country. There's a separate section of the State Department that looks at these things independently and I can't comment any further on the context or substance
QUESTION: I need a little clarification. Does it mean that the U.S. will continue to employ the two-track policy, retaining the sanctions and engaging with the government at the same time? So in view of the current developments that you just mentioned, are you going to, is the U.S. going to establish Ambassadorial-level engagement soon? And another one is, does the government give any indication that they're initiating any tri-partite dialogue that involves ethnic minorities?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: On the latter, we didn't discuss that, so I don't know what their intentions are, or the prospects of that. I know there's been discussion of that here. Before I came I read there was some kind of discussion of a potential peace commission through the legislature, but that's in process. But I heard nothing specifically on this during my visit, on a tri-partite process.
Yes, our policy has not changed. My trip is consistent with the policy. That sanctions remain in place is a component of our policy. But really this trip was about going beyond that to engage in a principled fashion, to discuss a broad range of issues, but particularly to talk about the relationship and what would be required to change the parameters of the relationship to date. And to get a feel for what's happening here on
the ground. You can't learn about a country from afar. You have to come. You have to talk to people directly. You have to get a lot of different perspectives. You have to listen. My point in coming here was to listen as well as provide very candidly the U.S. perspective so that people here were not misunderstanding our policy. I'm sure there's not a clear understanding of what does principled engagement mean, what are your intentions, how far can this go, and the same here. So again, I didn't see enough of the country in some fashion. I didn't see everybody that maybe I could see while here. Believe me, I worked very hard. I was having meetings from the first thing in the morning until late at night, trying to meet as many people as I possibly could to get as broad a perspective on what's happening here. And as I said, my sense is people are hopeful about change. People do have high expectations and are hopeful that something real may happen. The question is how far that will go and what the concrete steps will be going forward. So it's a long answer to the question; our policy has not changed.
QUESTION: (Inaudible – repeat of question about reestablishing Ambassador-level engagement from Rangoon.)
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Oh, well the issue is… that's a hypothetical. We've made no decisions on that. Again, no changes to the way we've done things to date along those lines.
QUESTION: (Interpreted from Burmese). Yesterday you met with the Human Rights Commission here. If the commission is formed by former government officials, so do you think they will genuinely investigate the abuses here? What is your comment?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: It was a very good meeting. They gave us an overview of their plans, their thinking. But they're at the very, very early stages of thinking about it themselves. I have some sympathy for them They're trying to get up and running quickly and think things through I have no preconceptions about what they will or will not be able to do. I certainly have an open mind about that and they're struggling themselves, I think, about it. They said they will have to work with Nay Pyi Taw and send things, report up to Nay Pyi Taw. So I'm hopeful. I think it is a positive gesture. It's one of those things that I said to counterparts and put in my statement that is
certainly a positive move to establish a human rights commission. But like everything else, the proof of its legitimacy will be how they proceed to implement that mandate after establishment. So I was grateful for the opportunity to have the conversation. We'll obviously be watching them.
The other thing is we offered that given there is not a lot of expertise in this, and there is some skepticism about whether it will be a real commission looking at abuses, reported abuses, alleged abuses here that it might be useful to have some partnership with international organizations, individuals with experience. And I said that also to the folks in Nay Pyi Taw that we remain open to assisting with helping them do a job like investigating or doing accountability in ethnic minority areas in the interests of national reconciliation. So again our minds are open but are arms are outstretched too to assist as we can in making them a fully credible and productive institution in the interests of national reconciliation, human rights and democracy.
QUESTION: When you go back to the States you'll be reporting to the Congress, right? So if somebody from the Congress asks you what is the most significant outcome of your trip, what would you answer?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Significant outcome… I think it's the remarkable sense of hope that we see here among people. That they see something happening. There is, something is happening, something may be changing. It may be small gestures now. But again that sense of expectation is very, very important. And as I say, I really hope that I think everybody who follows this country knows that there have been stops and starts, that expectations have been dashed. That things only go so far, and then they stop or they reverse themselves. And I really urged the leadership to prove the skeptics wrong. But it was very encouraging to me that my reception was as warm and welcome as it was. And that the leadership in Nay Pyi Taw were open to having discussions, having exchanges. Again, no commitments made. No outcomes that are tangible. But we were open to have a dialogue with respect, and I was able to say that I and the international community need to see the concrete action and genuine action for us to feel that something is not only hope but real change here over time. So I'll have a very frank exchange with my friends in Congress and they I think, they're just like the rest.
They want the best - everyone in America. I hope it's clear to folks that people in the United States wish this country no ill will at all. We want to do what's best to help this country develop itself. Those four goals that were outlined by the government – democracy, human rights, development, and national reconciliation – we share. If the government is serious and committed to those goals in a credible fashion they will have a partner in the United States and I think Congress and others will be watching very closely to see what this government decides to do in order to move credibly forward toward those goals.
One last question.
QUESTION: You said that this is your very first trip. So when will you be coming again? And also I would like to know your opinions on the rising China influence here.
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: It was not a topic of conversation, really, with the leadership. I do get a sense, talking to some citizens and others here that there is a palpable sense of Chinese influence, Chinese presence. But we really didn't have much of a discussion of that topic. The leadership here and the citizens here will have to decide how they deal with their neighbor. Obviously whenever you have neighbors, there are challenges, there are opportunities. But there's really nothing more I would say about Chinese influence in that regard.
Thank you all very much. I do have to catch the plane. I appreciate this and I will see you next time I'm sure.
ENDS
http://www.encburma.net/index.php/archives/internationl/70-international/630-derek-mitchell-press-conference-in-rangoon-burma.html
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James Mann’s About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)
About the Author & Prologue
James Mann provides an American perspective to Sino-American relations between the years of the Nixon and Clinton administrations in his book About Face. Mann served as the Los Angeles Times Beijing bureau chief from 1984 to 1987 and more recently has served as a diplomatic correspondent and foreign affairs columnist for the Washington bureau of the same newspaper. Mann is also the author of Beijing Jeep, has served as a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and has won awards for his work.
Mann uses sources from interviews, journal articles, books, and the National Security Archives to support the information in his book. His writing style reflects his personal experience in China, and provides a journalistic viewpoint on the events that shaped Sino-American relations during the timeframe he presents to readers.
Mann begins About Face with a prologue that introduces American diplomat Winston Lord, who is living in China after a decade and a half of being a visiting honored guest in the country. Mann explains how Lord’s previous diplomatic work during the Nixon years was more climactic than his more recent experiences in China. The prologue shows how the conditions in China have changed from the 1970s to the 1990s while giving examples of what Lord was doing
at different times in this period.
Mann uses Lord’s experiences to explain why he chose to write his book. He states that his goal is to ―explore, describe, and interpret American policy toward China over the past quarter-century‖ in the hopes of ―overcoming collective ignorance.‖ The book uses a chronological structure that describes how each administration from Nixon to Clinton came about their decisions on China policy.
The Nixon Years
Chapters one through three describe how U.S. President Richard Nixon sought normalization of relations with China after 20 years of no formal dealings between the two countries. Chapter one, Opening Moves, provides notes written by Nixon prior to meeting with Chinese leaders. The notes show what Nixon thought the Chinese wanted from the U.S., what
the U.S. wanted from China, how to treat Chairman Mao Tsetung, and issues regarding Taiwan and Vietnam.
Chapter one also introduces Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. By the end of chapter one the reader finds out how Nixon and Kissinger worked independently of the State Department and other government agencies to perform their secret China diplomacy. People like CIA operative James R. Lilley, helped to open up covert channels to China’s leaders.
Chapters two and three provide details about Nixon and Kissinger’s first trips to China while explaining how these first meetings would set the precedence for future China visits by American diplomats. Mann points out how Nixon was trying to use his secret trips in order to benefit himself politically. Self-interest aside, Nixon had other ideas about how China could help the U.S. Nixon wanted out of the war in Vietnam and thought the Chinese leadership would help in the process. Nixon did not receive any promises on Vietnam and Mao Tsetung did not
receive any assurances regarding the re-unification of Taiwan.
Nixon and Kissinger did make some promises though. Kissinger told Chou Enlai that the U.S. would tell China about any understandings it had with the Soviet Union that affected China’s interests, and later on promised to prevent Japan from obtaining a nuclear weapon. On Taiwan, the U.S.’s new approach was to recognize that ―Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but China and that Taiwan is part of China‖
By the end of chapter three Mann has explained how the U.S. was no longer fighting Communism in general, but rather the Soviet Union specifically. He shows how the Nixon administration continued its policy of secret diplomacy with China to try to win them over as an ally in the Cold War. Although Nixon sought normalization of relations with China, he could not
achieve this goal during his time as president.
Ford’s China Policy
After Nixon’s resignation over Watergate, Gerald Ford became president, however his administration could not achieve Nixon’s goal of normalization. Chinese leaders were worried that Nixon’s resignation would nullify his secret assurances, but Kissinger remained in office and promised that policy would not change under the new president.
Ford could not follow through with full normalization of relations though because, just like Nixon, he needed the support of the Republican conservative base, who were staunch supporters of Taiwan, to win re-election. Ford appointed George Bush as head of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing. Kissinger felt threatened by this appointment but later came to realize that Bush would follow through on previous policy decisions made under the Nixon administration.
Ford helped to arrange the purchasing of British jet engines by China and continued to
share intelligence with China in the fight against the Soviets.
Carter and the New Chinese Leadership.
Changes in leadership in both China and the United States helped to shape the beginning of a new era for Sino-American relations in the late 1970s. Chou Enlai and Mao Tsetung both passed away in 1976, which led to the arrest of Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. The arrests removed leaders who were opposed to having good relations with the U.S. and paved the way for the return of Deng Xiaoping, who, in the mid-1970s, was known for swapping jokes about
the Soviets with American counterparts.
Chapters four and five discuss the normalization of relations in 1979 under Jimmy Carter. Normalization helped to improve ties between the two countries military and intelligence during this Cold War period. Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, followed in Kissinger’s secretive style of diplomacy and helped influence policy, despite the State Department’s opposing positions. Mann describes how Carter was a human rights advocate, except when it came to China he chose to ignore any abuses, which drew complaints from the
Soviet Union.
Carter wanted to extend MFN benefits to both the Soviet Union and China, but others in the administration did not want the Soviets to obtain the same benefits. Eventually MFN benefits were granted to China under Carter, who also helped to extend Export-Import bank financing and the easing of export controls.
In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which would later prove to draw the Chinese and American intelligence and military communities closer together. Brzezinski pushed for the U.S.-China military alliance; however, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was opposed to the idea. The Soviet invasion allowed Carter and Brzezinski to move forward with their goal of strengthening U.S.-China military relations. After the invasion, Carter immediately postponed ratification of the new SALT treaty, blocked grain sales to the Soviets, and began focusing on security issues in the Persian Gulf. Mann uses a quote from Brzezinski’s book Power and Principle to make the point that Carter used the invasion to strengthen U.S.-China relations.
Brzezinski is quoted as saying: ―that we use the Soviet invasion of a country in a region of strategic sensitivity to Asia as a justification for opening the doors to a U.S.-China defense relationship.‖
The Cold War and Reagan
Ronald Reagan inherited the previous administrations’ Cold War policies when he became president, but he was a strong supporter of Taiwan and an anti-Communist, so his relationship with Chinese leaders was not always friendly at first.
By his second term, Reagan had reversed policy however and continued to provide military cooperation with the Chinese and was willing to exchange intelligence with them to use against the Soviets. Chapters six and seven discuss these issues in more depth while providing information about China’s weapons program. These chapters also explain how Reagan reversed the decision to sell Taiwan FX jet fighters, feeling pressured by China who took advantage of the decision by asking for more concessions. China wanted the U.S. to end arms sales to Taiwan altogether and was threatening to downgrade their relations with the U.S., however Reagan refused to end sales, and relations did not downgrade after China agreed to an official
communiqué in 1982.
Alexander Haig had left the State Department by this time and was working for a private company selling weapons. He influenced China policy by trying to sell his company’s Sikorsky helicopters to Taiwan, while also trying to sell weapons to China. Under Reagan, the arms race between the Soviets and the U.S. intensified. Reagan’s Star War Program pushed other countries to not only modernize their own weapons, but to gain financially by selling weapons to third world countries.
Although China was working with the U.S. to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, they did not feel restricted to just selling weapons to western friendly countries, and by the 1980s were selling billions of dollars worth of weapons to Iraq and Iran, and other anti-western Middle
Eastern countries.
Bush and Tiananmen
President George Bush wanted to return to the style of relations China and the U.S. had under Nixon, but the student protests in Tiananmen and other domestic policy issues would make this impossible. The protests forced Bush to shift policy that would restrict relations between the two countries. Because of the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States’ policy toward China was no longer based on their relationship against the Soviets in the Cold War. Under Bush there was a significant cooling of relations and reports of Chinese arms deals to Middle Eastern countries was worrying Pentagon officials.
Bush was obliged to follow the Taiwan Relations Act, which had passed in 1979, and in 1992, he allowed the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. Bush seemed to support the sale, but at the same time wanted better relations with China, even after the violence during the Tiananmen Square protests, but domestic politics would not allow him to follow through on his wishes. Bush was still concerned about security in the Persian Gulf, which had become a focus under the Carter administration. He sent U.S. troops to Kuwait to push back the Iraqi military who invaded the country in 1990. Both China and the U.S. had supplied arms to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran wars.
Chapters nine through fourteen discuss Bush’s China policy in detail and explain the intricacies of the two countries’ economic relations. Mann states how Bush tended to run China policy from his own desk, leaving other foreign policy experts out of the decision making process.
The events surrounding the Tiananmen Square protests had a significant impact on the future of U.S.-China relations. Immediately following the crackdown on protestors, Chinese activist Fang Lizhi took refuge inside the American embassy to prevent the Chinese government from arresting him for his supposed role in the student protests and his pro-democracy stance.
Bush used Fang as a negotiating tactic with the Chinese, but according to Mann, Bush
was not entirely successful at using Fang to get concessions from the Chinese.
Bill Clinton’s About Face
When President Bill Clinton came to office public anger in the U.S. over China’s crackdown on Tiananmen protestors was still lingering, but Clinton’s focus was not on foreign policy. When Clinton did look at foreign policy, he had a whole host of issues to deal with including violence in Yugoslavia and the Middle East and problems in Haiti.
Clinton’s China policy focused on human rights and the economy, which he tried to tie together to negotiate better terms with the Chinese, but was mostly unsuccessful. Clinton ended up extending MFN with China, despite not getting Chinese leaders to agree to improve their human rights record.
Chapters fourteen through sixteen discuss Clinton’s dealings with China during his presidency, including the issue of Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s president, who brought the attention of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan into the spotlight when he visited the United States in 1995. China questioned the U.S. and their former promises to not have formal relations with Taiwan. Taiwain’s effort to persuade Congress to allow the visit showed how foreign lobbyists could influence the legislative branch of government. Clinton reassured China that Taiwan policy had not changed and went as far as signing the ―three noes‖, which stated the same promises Nixon and Kissinger had agreed to over Taiwan. Also under Clinton, some tension between China and the U.S. almost became hostile when China sent several missiles into the waters around Taiwan. Clinton deployed warships to the area, but problems were resolved peacefully.
Mann shows readers how Clinton’s presidency was surrounded by scandal with allegations of sexual misconduct with Monica Lewinsky and accusations of receiving illegal campaign contributions. About Face also shows how Clinton was influenced by Chinese students who pressed Congress to extend their visas. Students ultimately lost their influence when it came to China’s MFN status, and let the business community dictate economic policy.
Conclusion
Mann argues in his conclusion that there has been a lack of continuity in American policy toward China from Nixon to Clinton. He states that the title, About Face, is about administrative shifts in policy, which sometimes saw a 360 degree turn from their policy at the outset of their first terms.
Mann explains how events during the Cold War shaped much of America’s China policy, and how each U.S. president attempted to keep foreign policy decisions within the executive branch. He says that after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests the American public began to pay more attention to China policy. Mann shows how Congress changed the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches by directly changing China policy after the protests.
About Face shows how American policy toward China can shift according to world events and domestic politics, but how people like Kissinger have still managed to influence multiple administrations, thus providing some continuity in American foreign policy. Mann says policy changed significantly after the fall of the Soviet Union and that the China-U.S. relationship was directly impacted by the crumbling of the Soviet empire. He says policy formed sometimes as a reaction to the Cold War, and that the end of the war created new challenges for the United States and China.
Mann does not attempt to predict what the future of China-U.S. relations will look like, but he does say that history can help us to understand what might happen. Mann’s arranges his sources in note form at the end of the book. Some of his sources include books by Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Baker, and Henry Kissinger. He interviews with officials such as Winston Lord, and documents from the CIA and State Department.
http://www.chinausrelations.com/about-face-summary.html
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The Depression in the United States--An Overview
The Great Depression
In October 1929 the stock market crashed, wiping out 40 percent of the paper values of common stock. Even after the stock market collapse, however, politicians and industry leaders continued to issue optimistic predictions for the nation's economy. But the Depression deepened, confidence evaporated and many lost their life savings. By 1933 the value of stock on the New York Stock Exchange was less than a fifth of what it had been at its peak in 1929. Business houses closed their doors, factories shut down and banks failed. Farm income fell some 50 percent. By 1932 approximately one out of every four Americans was unemployed.
The core of the problem was the immense disparity between the country's productive capacity and the ability of people to consume. Great innovations in productive techniques during and after the war raised the output of industry beyond the purchasing capacity of U.S. farmers and wage earners. The savings of the wealthy and middle class, increasing far beyond the possibilities of sound investment, had been drawn into frantic speculation in stocks or real estate. The stock market collapse, therefore, had been merely the first of several detonations in which a flimsy structure of speculation had been leveled to the ground.
The presidential campaign of 1932 was chiefly a debate over the causes and possible remedies of the Great Depression. Herbert Hoover, unlucky in entering The White House only eight months before the stock market crash, had struggled tirelessly, but ineffectively, to set the wheels of industry in motion again. His Democratic opponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, already popular as the governor of New York during the developing crisis, argued that the Depression stemmed from the U.S. economy's
underlying flaws, which had been aggravated by Republican policies during the 1920s. President Hoover replied that the economy was fundamentally sound, but had been shaken by the repercussions of a worldwide depression -- whose causes could be traced back to the war. Behind this argument lay a clear implication: Hoover had to depend largely on natural processes of recovery, while Roosevelt was prepared to use the federal government's authority for bold experimental remedies.
The election resulted in a smashing victory for Roosevelt, who won 22,800,000 votes to Hoover's 15,700,000. The United States was about to enter a new era of economic and political change.
Roosevelt and the New Deal
In 1933 the new president, Franklin Roosevelt, brought an air of confidence and optimism that quickly rallied the people to the banner of his program, known as the New Deal. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself," the president declared in his inaugural address to the nation.
In a certain sense, it is fair to say that the New Deal merely introduced types of social and economic reform familiar to many Europeans for more than a generation. Moreover, the New Deal represented the culmination of a long-range trend toward abandonment of "laissez-faire" capitalism, going back to the regulation of the railroads in the 1880s, and the flood of state and national reform legislation introduced in the Progressive era of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.
What was truly novel about the New Deal, however, was the speed with which it accomplished what previously had taken generations. In fact, many of the reforms were hastily drawn and weakly administered; some actually contradicted others. And during the entire New Deal era, public criticism and debate were never interrupted or suspended; in fact, the New Deal brought to the individual citizen a sharp revival of interest in government.
When Roosevelt took the presidential oath, the banking and credit system of the nation was in a state of paralysis. With astonishing rapidity the nation's banks were first closed
-- and then reopened only if they were solvent. The administration adopted a policy of moderate currency inflation to start an upward movement in commodity prices and to afford some relief to debtors. New governmental agencies brought generous credit facilities to industry and agriculture. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured savings-bank deposits up to $5,000, and severe regulations were imposed upon the sale of securities on the stock exchange.
Unemployment
By 1933 millions of Americans were out of work. Bread lines were a common sight in most cities. Hundreds of thousands roamed the country in search of food, work and shelter. "Brother, can you spare a dime?" went the refrain of a popular song.
An early step for the unemployed came in the form of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a program enacted by Congress to bring relief to young men between 18 and 25 years of age. Run in semi-military style, the CCC enrolled jobless young men in work camps across the country for about $30 per month. About 2 million young men took part during the decade. They participated in a variety of conservation projects: planting trees to combat soil erosion and maintain national forests; eliminating stream pollution; creating fish, game and bird sanctuaries; and conserving coal, petroleum, shale, gas, sodium and helium deposits.
Work relief came in the form of the Civil Works Administration. Although criticized as "make work," the jobs funded ranged from ditch digging to highway repairs to teaching. Created in November 1933, it was abandoned in the spring of 1934. Roosevelt and his key officials, however, continued to favor unemployment programs based on work relief rather than welfare.
Agriculture
The New Deal years were characterized by a belief that greater regulation would solve many of the country's problems. In 1933, for example, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to provide economic relief to farmers. The AAA had at its core a plan to raise crop prices by paying farmers a subsidy to compensate for voluntary
cutbacks in production. Funds for the payments would be generated by a tax levied on industries that processed crops. By the time the act had become law, however, the growing season was well underway, and the AAA encouraged farmers to plow under their abundant crops. Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace called this activity a "shocking commentary on our civilization." Nevertheless, through the AAA and the Commodity Credit Corporation, a program which extended loans for crops kept in storage and off the market, output dropped.
Between 1932 and 1935, farm income increased by more than 50 percent, but only partly because of federal programs. During the same years that farmers were being encouraged to take land out of production -- displacing tenants and sharecroppers -- a severe drought hit the Great Plains states, significantly reducing farm production. Violent wind and dust storms ravaged the southern Great Plains in what became known as the "Dust Bowl," throughout the 1930s, but particularly from 1935 to 1938. Crops were destroyed, cars and machinery were ruined, people and animals were harmed. Approximately 800,000 people, often called "Okies," left Arkansas, Texas, Missouri and Oklahoma during the 1930s and 1940s. Most headed farther west to the land of myth and promise, California. The migrants were not only farmers, but also professionals, retailers and others whose livelihoods were connected to the health of the farm communities. California was not the place of their dreams, at least initially. Most migrants ended up competing for seasonal jobs picking crops at extremely low wages.
The government provided aid in the form of the Soil Conservation Service, established in 1935. Farm practices that had damaged the soil had intensified the severity of the storms, and the Service taught farmers measures to reduce erosion. In addition, almost 30,000 kilometers of trees were planted to break the force of winds.
Although the AAA had been mostly successful, it was abandoned in 1936, when the tax on food processors was ruled unconstitutional. Six weeks later Congress passed a more effective farm-relief act, which authorized the government to make payments to farmers who reduced plantings of soil-depleting crops -- thereby achieving crop reduction through soil conservation practices.
By 1940 nearly 6 million farmers were receiving federal subsidies under this program. The new act likewise provided loans on surplus crops, insurance for wheat and a system of planned storage to ensure a stable food supply. Soon, prices of agricultural commodities rose, and economic stability for the farmer began to seem possible.
Industry and Labor
The National Recovery Administration (NRA), established in 1933 with the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), attempted to end cut-throat competition by setting codes of fair competitive practice to generate more jobs and thus more buying. Although the NRA was welcomed initially, business complained bitterly of over-regulation as recovery began to take hold. The NRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. By this time other policies were fostering recovery, and the government soon took the position that administered prices in certain lines of business were a severe drain on the national economy and a barrier to recovery.
It was also during the New Deal that organized labor made greater gains than at any previous time in American history. NIRA had guaranteed to labor the right of collective bargaining (bargaining as a unit representing individual workers with industry). Then in 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, which defined unfair labor practices, gave workers the right to bargain through unions of their own choice and prohibited employers from interfering with union activities. It also created the National Labor Relations Board to supervise collective bargaining, administer elections and ensure workers the right to choose the organization that should represent them in dealing with employers.
The great progress made in labor organization brought working people a growing sense of common interests, and labor's power increased not only in industry but also in politics. This power was exercised largely within the framework of the two major parties, however, and the Democratic Party generally received more union support than the Republicans.
The Second New Deal
In its early years, the New Deal sponsored a remarkable series of legislative initiatives and achieved significant increases in production and prices -- but it did not bring an end to the Depression. And as the sense of immediate crisis eased, new demands emerged. Businessmen mourned the end of "laissez-faire" and chafed under the regulations of the NIRA. Vocal attacks also mounted from the political left and right as dreamers, schemers and politicians alike emerged with economic panaceas that drew wide audiences of those dissatisfied with the pace of recovery. They included Francis E. Townsend's plan for generous old-age pensions; the inflationary suggestions of Father Coughlin, the radio priest who blamed international bankers in speeches increasingly peppered with anti-Semitic imagery; and most formidably, the "Every Man a King" plan of Huey P. Long, senator and former governor of Louisiana, the powerful and ruthless spokesman of the displaced who ran the state like a personal fiefdom. (If he had not been assassinated, Long very likely would have launched a presidential challenge to Franklin Roosevelt in 1936.)
In the face of these pressures from left and right, President Roosevelt backed a new set of economic and social measures. Prominent among these were measures to fight poverty, to counter unemployment with work and to provide a social safety net.
The Works Progress Administration (WPA), the principal relief agency of the so-called second New Deal, was an attempt to provide work rather than welfare. Under the WPA, buildings, roads, airports and schools were constructed. Actors, painters, musicians and writers were employed through the Federal Theater Project, the Federal Art Project and the Federal Writers Project. In addition, the National Youth Administration gave part-time employment to students, established training programs and provided aid to unemployed youth. The WPA only included about three million jobless at a time; when it was abandoned in 1943 it had helped a total of 9 million people.
But the New Deal's cornerstone, according to Roosevelt, was the Social Security Act of 1935. Social Security created a system of insurance for the aged, unemployed and disabled based on employer and employee contributions. Many other industrialized nations had already enacted such programs, but calls for such an initiative in the United States by the Progressives in the early 1900s had gone unheeded. Although
conservatives complained that the Social Security system went against American traditions, it was actually relatively conservative. Social Security was funded in large part by taxes on the earnings of current workers, with a single fixed rate for all regardless of income. To Roosevelt, these limitations on the programs were compromises to ensure passage. Although its origins were initially quite modest, Social Security today is one of the largest domestic programs administered by the U.S. government.
A New Coalition
In 1936, the Republican Party nominated Alfred M. Landon, the relatively liberal governor of Kansas, to oppose Roosevelt. Despite all the complaints leveled at the New Deal, Roosevelt won an even more decisive victory than in 1932. He took 60 percent of the population and carried all states except Maine and Vermont. In this election, a broad new coalition aligned with the Democratic Party emerged, consisting of labor, most farmers, immigrants and urban ethnic groups from East and Southern Europe, African Americans and the South. The Republican Party received the support of business as well as middle-class members of small towns and suburbs. This political alliance, with some variation and shifting, remained intact for several decades.
From 1932 to 1938 there was widespread public debate on the meaning of New Deal policies to the nation's political and economic life. It became obvious that Americans wanted the government to take greater responsibility for the welfare of the nation. Indeed, historians generally credit the New Deal with establishing the foundations of the modern welfare state in the United States. Some New Deal critics argued that the indefinite extension of government functions would eventually undermine the liberties of the people. But President Roosevelt insisted that measures fostering economic well-being would strengthen liberty and democracy.
In a radio address in 1938, Roosevelt reminded the American people that:
Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations, not because the people of those nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemployment and insecurity, of seeing their children hungry while they sat helpless in the face of
government confusion and government weakness through lack of leadership....Finally, in desperation, they chose to sacrifice liberty in the hope of getting something to eat. We in America know that our democratic institutions can be preserved and made to work. But in order to preserve them we need...to prove that the practical operation of democratic government is equal to the task of protecting the security of the people....The people of America are in agreement in defending their liberties at any cost, and the first line of the defense lies in the protection of economic security.
Eve of World War II
Before Roosevelt's second term was well under way, his domestic program was overshadowed by a new danger little noted by average Americans: the expansionist designs of totalitarian regimes in Japan, Italy and Germany. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and crushed Chinese resistance; a year later the Japanese set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. Italy, having succumbed to fascism, enlarged its boundaries in Libya and in 1935 attacked Ethiopia. Germany, where Adolf Hitler had organized the National Socialist Party and seized the reins of government in 1933, reoccupied the Rhineland and undertook large-scale rearmament.
As the real nature of totalitarianism became clear, and as Germany, Italy and Japan continued their aggression, American apprehension fueled isolationist sentiment. In 1938, after Hitler had incorporated Austria into the German Reich, his demands for the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia made war seem possible at any moment in Europe. The United States, disillusioned by the failure of the crusade for democracy in World War I, announced that in no circumstances could any country involved in the conflict look to it for aid. Neutrality legislation, enacted piecemeal from 1935 to 1937, prohibited trade with or credit to any of the warring nations. The objective was to prevent, at almost any cost, the involvement of the United States in a non-American war.
With the Nazi assault on Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of World War II, isolationist sentiment increased, even though Americans were far from neutral in their feelings about world events. Public sentiment clearly favored the victims of Hitler's aggression and supported the Allied powers that stood in opposition to German expansion. Under
the circumstances, however, Roosevelt could only wait until public opinion regarding U.S. involvement was altered by events.
With the fall of France and the air war against Britain in 1940, the debate intensified between those who favored aiding the democracies and the isolationists, organized around the America First Committee, whose support ranged from Midwestern conservatives to left-leaning pacifists. In the end, the interventionist argument won a protracted public debate, aided in large measure by the work of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
The United States joined Canada in a Mutual Board of Defense, and aligned with the Latin American republics in extending collective protection to the nations in the Western Hemisphere. Congress, confronted with the mounting crisis, voted immense sums for rearmament, and in September 1940 passed the first peacetime conscription bill ever enacted in the United States -- albeit by a margin of one vote in the House of Representatives. In early 1941 Congress approved the Lend-Lease Program, which enabled President Roosevelt to transfer arms and equipment to any nation (notably Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China) deemed vital to the defense of the United States. Total Lend-Lease aid by war's end amounted to more than $50,000 million.
The 1940 presidential election campaign demonstrated that the isolationists, while vocal, commanded relatively few followers nationally. Roosevelt's Republican opponent, Wendell Wilkie, lacked a compelling issue since he supported the president's foreign policy, and also agreed with a large part of Roosevelt's domestic program. Thus the November election yielded another majority for Roosevelt. For the first time in U.S. history, a president was elected to a third term.
Japan, Pearl Harbor and War
While most Americans anxiously watched the course of the European war, tension mounted in Asia. Taking advantage of an opportunity to improve its strategic position, Japan boldly announced a "new order" in which it would exercise hegemony over all of the Pacific. Battling for its survival against Nazi Germany, Britain was unable to resist, withdrawing from Shanghai and temporarily closing the Burma Road. In the summer of
1940, Japan won permission from the weak Vichy government in France to use airfields in Indochina. By September the Japanese had joined the Rome-Berlin Axis. As a countermove, the United States imposed an embargo on export of scrap iron to Japan.
It seemed that the Japanese might turn southward toward the oil, tin and rubber of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. In July 1941 the Japanese occupied the remainder of Indochina; the United States, in response, froze Japanese assets.
General Hideki Tojo became prime minister of Japan in October 1941. In mid-November, he sent a special envoy to the United States to meet with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Among other things, Japan demanded that the U.S. release Japanese assets and stop U.S. naval expansion in the Pacific. Hull countered with a proposal for Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina in exchange for the freeing of the frozen assets. The Japanese asked for two weeks to study the proposal, but on December 1 rejected it. On December 6, Franklin Roosevelt appealed directly to the Japanese emperor, Hirohito. On the morning of December 7, however, Japanese carrier-based planes attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in a devastating, surprise attack. Nineteen ships, including five battleships, and about 150 U.S. planes were destroyed; more than 2,300 soldiers, sailors and civilians were killed. Only one fact favored the Americans that day: the U.S. aircraft carriers that would play such a critical role in the ensuing naval war in the Pacific were at sea and not anchored at Pearl Harbor.
As the details of the Japanese raids upon Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Guam blared from American radios, incredulity turned to anger at what President Roosevelt called "a day that will live in infamy." On December 8, Congress declared a state of war with Japan; three days later Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.
The nation rapidly geared itself for mobilization of its people and its entire industrial capacity. On January 6, 1942, President Roosevelt announced staggering production goals: delivery in that year of 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, 20,000 antiaircraft guns and 18 million deadweight tons of merchant shipping. All the nation's activities -- farming, manufacturing, mining, trade, labor, investment, communications, even education and cultural undertakings -- were in some fashion brought under new and enlarged controls.
The nation raised money in enormous sums and created great new industries for the mass production of ships, armored vehicles and planes. Major movements of population took place. Under a series of conscription acts, the United States brought the armed forces up to a total of 15,100,000. By the end of 1943, approximately 65 million men and women were in uniform or in war-related occupations.
The attack on the United States disarmed the appeal of isolationists and permitted quick military mobilization. However, as a result of Pearl Harbor and the fear of Asian espionage, Americans also committed an act of intolerance: the internment of Japanese-Americans. In February 1942, nearly 120,000 Japanese-Americans residing in California were removed from their homes and interned behind barbed wire in 10 wretched temporary camps, later to be moved to "relocation centers" outside isolated Southwestern towns. Nearly 63 percent of these Japanese-Americans were Nisei -- American-born -- and, therefore, U.S. citizens. No evidence of espionage ever surfaced. In fact, Japanese-Americans from Hawaii and the continental United States fought with noble distinction and valor in two infantry units on the Italian front. Others served as interpreters and translators in the Pacific. In 1983 the U.S. government acknowledged the injustice of internment with limited payments to those Japanese-Americans of that era who were still living.
Source
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http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/overview.htm
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Statement of
Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Submitted to the
House Armed Services Committee
July 27, 2010
U.S.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century
Chairman Skelton, Mr. McKeon, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our engagement in the Asia-Pacific. The alliance has provided a basis for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific for a half-century and has – in many ways -- underwritten the ―Asian economic miracle‖ and the spread of democratic governance throughout the region. This year the United States and Japan are celebrating the 50th anniversary of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, a historic milestone that offers both an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the past and, perhaps more importantly, to chart a forward-looking course for this relationship to ensure that it is well positioned to manage issues of consequence both in the region and beyond.
The Obama administration entered office with a deep appreciation of the strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Then-Prime Minister Taro Aso was the first foreign leader to meet with President Obama. Japan was President Obama’s first stop on his first visit to East Asia as President. Secretary Clinton’s maiden voyage as Secretary of State was to Asia, and it was no coincidence that her first stop was in
Japan. As the world’s first and second largest economies the U.S. and Japan have worked closely to contribute to the global economic recovery.
Bilateral Relations
Together, the United States and Japan bring tremendous capability and creativity to bear on the challenges the world faces today. Our economic relationship is strong, mature, and increasingly interdependent, firmly rooted in the shared interest and responsibility of the United States and Japan to promote global growth, open markets, and a vital world trading system. Our bilateral economic relationship is based on enormous flows of trade, investment, and finance. In previous decades our economic relationship was often characterized by conflict over trade issues. Today, even as we continue to address trade irritants such as beef and Japan Post, we are able to
prioritize new modes of cooperation that allow us to pursue common interests – such as
innovation and entrepreneurship, the internet economy and cloud computing – as building blocks to improve opportunities for our trade and economic growth. We have a shared interest in greener, more sustainable growth. Climate change is a trend that obviously presents enormous challenges for both the United States and Japan, but also creates opportunities for us both to leverage our comparative advantage in innovation to develop new, growth-inducing energy technologies. We were also very pleased that our two nations initialed the text of an Open Skies aviation agreement in December of last year. It is a landmark agreement that is a pro-consumer, pro-competitive, pro-growth accord. The agreement will strengthen and expand our already strong trade and tourism links with Japan.
As our security and economic relationship has evolved, so has our cultural relationship matured and grown. We have a longstanding tradition of exchange and cooperation between our two countries, and between the people of our two nations. We have cooperation in the fields of education and science, and through traditional programs such as the Fulbright Exchange and the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching Program). The global challenges we face today require a complex, multi-dimensional approach to public diplomacy. As President Obama said recently, "... cooperation must go beyond
our governments. It must be rooted in our people - in the studies we share, the business that we do, the knowledge that we gain, and even in the sports that we
play." The Secretary echoed the President’s views when she said, ―What we call people-to people diplomacy has taken on greater significance, as our world has grown more
interdependent, and our challenges, more complex. Government alone cannot solve the
problems that we face. We have to tap into the challenge of our people, their creativity and innovation, and their ability to forge lasting relationships that build trust and understanding.‖
The historic elections in late August of 2009 ushered in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). It should come as no surprise that over the past 10 months the relationship has had its shares of ups-and-downs. Some commentators have even suggested that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in a period of ―strategic drift‖ --- nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, public opinion polling shows support in Japan for the U.S.-Japan alliance is the highest it has ever been – over 75 percent. After spending over half of my professional career thinking about the U.S.-Japan alliance I feel confident in saying that our alliance will continue to grow stronger. I would now like to take this opportunity to lay out three elements of our relationship that I believe underscore the bilateral, regional and global depth and breadth of our relationship.
It is now more than 10 months since Japan’s historic change of government in September 2009.The new ruling coalition came to power with a manifesto calling for a review of many of the policies of its LDP predecessors, including aspects of the alliance with the United States, with some envisioning an ―alliance without bases.‖ However, in practice the Japanese government has continued to reaffirm the crucial role of the Alliance in ensuring Japan’s security and maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. This past January, then-Prime Minister Hatoyama, in a statement celebrating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the revised U.S-Japan Security Treaty, said that ―it is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the
U.S.-Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respecting freedom and democracy, and enjoyed economic development…since the end of the last World War to this day.‖ To celebrate this 50th anniversary year, and to deepen and broaden our alliance, we and our Japanese allies are meeting at all levels and across
government bureaucracies to share views and assessments of Asia’s dynamic strategic environment and charting a course to seize opportunities while minimizing potential for conflict.
Over the last fifteen years, the United States and Japan have worked together to update our alliance, through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions, and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope, with cooperation on everything from missile defense to information security. Additionally, Japan provides approximately $1.7 billion annually in host nation support to the U.S. military, a key Japanese contribution to our alliance.
There are more than 48,000 American military personnel deployed in Japan, including our only forward deployed carrier strike group, the 5th Air Force, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force.Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the United States and Japan made a landmark alliance commitment under the 2006 U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap, which was reaffirmed by the 2009 Guam International Agreement, to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will have far-reaching benefits for the Alliance. These changes will help strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for a more sustainable U.S. military presence in the region. The transformation includes the relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa, and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan (e.g., increased interoperability, as well as collaboration on ballistic missile defense). This realignment will strengthen both countries’ ability to meet current responsibilities and create an Alliance that is
more flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security concerns.
It is understood by all that the relocation to Guam of significant elements of the III Marine Expeditionary Force is dependent on tangible progress by the government of Japan towards completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, a linchpin of the Realignment Roadmap. The new Japanese government undertook an extensive review
of existing plans for the Futenma Replacement Facility, carefully examining alternatives with a goal of reconciling operational and security requirements with the recognition that the people of Okinawa, by hosting the majority of U.S. military facilities in Japan, bore a greater responsibility for our joint security than other regions of Japan. This review culminated in the conclusion, as expressed in the May 28 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, that the replacement facility would best be located in Okinawa at Camp Schwab and adjacent waters. Secretaries Clinton and Gates, along with their Japanese counterparts, directed that an experts group undertake a study regarding the replacement facility’s location, configuration, and construction method. The objective is to ensure that the construction of the replacement facility can be completed without significant delay. The Experts Study Group has been meeting steadily since June and we fully expect it to achieve its goals.
Let me also mention briefly another issue that is important to us in the State Department, that is connected with our relationship with Japan and also, because in some cases these families include former or current service members, relevant to this committee. That is the issue of international parental child abduction. Japan remains the only G7 country not to have ratified the Hague Convention; the Department of State consistently urges them to do so at the highest levels. In fact, Secretary Clinton has raised it with her Japanese counterpart, including most recently last week. In recent months, for the first time ever, the GOJ has co-sponsored with the Japanese Bar Association a symposium on the Hague Convention and International Parental
Child Abduction. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also posted for the first time preventative passport regulations to their official website. Where the dialogue was once muted less than a year ago, it is now part of the general discourse. While this issue resolved is by no mean resolved, we believe these GOJ efforts are signs of increased engagement by the Government of Japan.
Regional Engagement
We have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation with Japan on a number of consequential regional issues. Japan’s steadfast support for the Republic of Korea was vital in rallying the international community to offer a united response to the Cheonan sinking. Japan is
a key partner in our efforts to seek the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and in holding North Korea to its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. We also value our close cooperation on the adoption and implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to curb North Korea’s proliferation activities. Japanese insights into North Korean developments are equally valuable.
We and Japan have a mutual desire to engage constructively with a rising China. We share a stake in a successful China that follows international norms and standards. Japan has joined us in encouraging greater transparency from the Chinese military, and joins us as we carefully watch China’s growing maritime strength. Over the past few years Sino-Japanese relations have grown stronger and we look to both Beijing and Tokyo to continue to take steps to enhance mutual confidence and trust.
Southeast Asia is another area where we have longstanding and fruitful cooperation with Japan. It is an area where we and our Japanese allies share significant interests and objectives. We cooperate in encouraging economic and social development throughout the region, from Timor-Leste to Burma. We maintain close contact and coordinate our efforts in order to gain the maximum benefit from a useful division of labor. Japan remains an important partner and advocate for ASEAN. Where there appears to be potential for instability, we seek to harmonize our messages and ensure that we are reinforcing each other effectively.
One of the most significant and consequential developments over the past ten years has been the strengthening of the U.S.-India relationship. Our efforts have been complemented and supported by Japan. Under the leadership of both the LDP and DPJ government, Japanese-Indian relations have strengthened and become more robust. Both nations recently signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, and Delhi continues to look to Tokyo as it charts an Eastward course.
As Japan’s chairmanship of APEC continues and the United States is preparing for its host year in 2011, we have been working to create opportunities to strengthen
economic integration and address trade and investment issues in order to make it cheaper, easier, and faster to trade in the Asia-Pacific region.
We appreciate Japan’s support for U.S. participation and inclusion in the East Asia Summit, a process the Secretary and President plan to engage in 2010 and 2011. Existing organizations such as ASEAN, APEC, and the ASEAN Regional forum and new ones like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus and an expanded East Asia Summit provide excellent platforms for advancing the multitude of shared U.S. and Japanese economic, security, and political interests and values.
Global Cooperation
Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs, and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region.
Our strong relationship with Japan is global in reach. Japan is working with us and others on post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Chile, to eradicate disease and develop environmentally friendly sources of energy. In addition to their work in Haiti, Japan is involved in UN peacekeeping missions in Syria, Nepal, and Sudan, and has made contributions in kind to numerous UN missions.
In Iraq, our Japanese allies have pledged nearly $5 billion in aid to Iraq, focusing on rebuilding the industrial base and energy, transportation, and irrigation infrastructure. By generating economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, these activities complement our own and contribute to our shared goal of ensuring the country’s long-term stability.
Japan is a vital international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration, and development in Afghanistan. Japan has assumed the lion’s share of the cost of salaries for the Afghan police force. With a $5 billion commitment over five years, Japan is the second largest single donor, after the United States, to Afghanistan. Japan is providing expertise as well as funding, and helping the Afghan government develop programs to hasten the reintegration of former Taliban into normal society. In Pakistan, as well, Japan is contributing to the country’s stability by providing over $2 billion of
humanitarian and development assistance. Japan is helping the international community ensure refugees and internally displaced Pakistanis receive the food, shelter, and medical services they need. In a program that complements the American work
Secretary Clinton announced in Islamabad on July 19, Japan is extending the electricity grid to areas of the country that have not had it before and developing the energy sector throughout the country.
As a nation dependent on international trade, Japan values the security of its sea lines of communication. Japan is an active and important member of the international flotilla that is combating piracy off the Horn of Africa to ensure freedom of navigation and safety of mariners. Japan has also signed a bilateral agreement with Djibouti to construct a base to support its counter-piracy efforts, and is the largest single bilateral donor to Djibouti.
The architecture of international cooperation is sturdy, but it also dates in part to the cold war or even earlier. We and Japan are seeking new ways to structure international cooperation.
Japan is one of the United States’ closest partners as we confront the global challenge posed by climate change. Last fall, the President endorsed the U.S.-Japan Clean Energy Action Plan, which will build on our extensive scientific cooperation to help our economies transition to greater reliance on renewable forms of energy and ensure that transition creates economic opportunities here at home. We are both committed to ensuring all countries do their part to address this global threat, assisting those that can benefit from our technical expertise. Japan was a strong partner in developing the Copenhagen Accord, and pledged in Copenhagen to provide as much as $15 billion in financing to assist developing countries in combating climate change, premised on the development of a fair and effective global framework. We continue to
coordinate closely as we look to the next Conference of the Parties in Mexico this winter.
Whatever challenges we may face in the next half century, I am confident that our relationship with Japan will be an important element of our success. Our relationship
continues to develop and evolve, and continues to contribute to peace, prosperity and security throughout the region and the globe. We are under no illusions that there will not be periods of ups-and-downs in the relationship. However, our shared values and strategic interests will enable us to continue to move the relationship forward and ensure that it remains the cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.
Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to testify about the U.S.-Japan relationship and I look forward to answering your questions.
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htm
http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3f (pdf)
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Korea, Republic of (ROK) - History
The Republic of Korea, headed by President Syngman Rhee (Rhee Syngman), was proclaimed on 15 August 1948 in the southern portion of the Korean Peninsula, which had been under US military administration since 8 September 1945. Like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), established in the north on 9 September 1948 with Soviet backing, the ROK claimed to be the legitimate government of all Korea. The ROK was recognized as the legitimate government by the UN General Assembly.
At dawn on 25 June 1950, following a year and a half of sporadic fighting, the well-equipped People's Army of the DPRK struck south across the 38th parallel. Proclaiming that the war was for national liberation and unification of the peninsula, the DPRK forces advanced rapidly; Seoul fell within three days, and the destruction of the ROK seemed imminent. At US urging, the UN Security Council (with the Soviet delegate absent) branded the DPRK an aggressor and called for the withdrawal of the attacking forces. On 27 June, US president Harry S. Truman ordered US air and naval units into combat, and three days later, US ground forces were sent into battle. The United Kingdom took similar action, and a multinational UN Command was created to join with and lead the ROK in its struggle against the invasion. Meanwhile, DPRK troops had pushed into the southeast corner of the peninsula. At that juncture, however, UN lines held firm, and an amphibious landing at Inch'on (15 September 1950) in the ROK under General Douglas MacArthur brought about the complete disintegration of the DPRK army.
MacArthur, commanding the UN forces, made a fateful decision to drive northward. As the UN forces approached the Yalu River, however, China warned that it would not tolerate a unification of the peninsula under US/UN auspices. After several weeks of threats and feints, "volunteers" from the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the fighting en masse, forcing MacArthur into a costly, pell-mell retreat back down the peninsula. Seoul was lost again (4 January 1951) and then regained before the battle line became stabilized very nearly along the 38th parallel. There it remained for two weary years, with bitter fighting but little change, while a cease-fire agreement was negotiated.
On 27 July 1953, an armistice agreement finally was signed at P'anmunjom in the DPRK. The Korean War was ended, but it had brought incalculable destruction and human suffering to all of Korea (some 1,300,000 military casualties, including 415,000 combat deaths, for the ROK alone), and it left the peninsula still more implacably divided. A military demarcation line, which neither side regarded as a permanent border, was established, surrounded by the DMZ. An international conference envisioned in the armistice agreement was not held until mid-1954. This conference and subsequent efforts failed to reach an agreement on unification of the North and
South, and the armistice agreement, supervised by a token UN Command in Seoul and by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, both in P'anmunjom, remains in effect.
In 1954, the United States and ROK signed a mutual defense treaty, under which US troops remained in the country. Financial assistance throughout the 1950s was provided by the US, averaging $270 million annually between 1953 and 1958, and by other nations under UN auspices. Syngman Rhee ran the government until 1960, when his authoritarian rule provoked the "April Revolution," the culmination of a series of increasingly violent student demonstrations that finally brought about his ouster. The Second Korean Republic, which followed Rhee, adopted a parliamentary system to replace the previous presidential system. The new government, however, was short-lived. Premier Chang Myon and his supporters were ousted after only 10 months by a military coup in May 1961, headed by Major-General Park Chung-hee. The military junta dissolved the National Assembly, placed the nation under martial law, established the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) as a means of detecting and suppressing potential enemies, and ruled by decree until late 1963 through the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. General Park created a well-organized political party—the Democratic-Republican Party (DRP)— designed to serve as a vehicle for the transition from military to civilian rule, and in October 1963, under a new constitution, he easily won election as president of the Third Republic.
During the summer of 1965, riots erupted all over the ROK in protest against the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty, which established diplomatic relations and replaced Korean war-reparation claims with Japanese promises to extend economic aid. The riots were met with harsh countermeasures, including another period of martial law and widespread arrests of demonstrators. Further demonstrations erupted in 1966, when the ROK's decision to send 45,000 combat troops to Vietnam became known. Park was elected to a second term in May 1967, defeating his chief opponent, Yun Po-sun, and the DRP won a large majority in the National Assembly. In 1969, Park pushed through the National Assembly a constitutional amendment permitting him to run for a third term. He defeated Kim Dae Jung, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP),
in the elections of April 1971, but Kim's NDP made significant gains in the National Assembly elections that May.
Student demonstrations against the government in the fall of 1971 prompted Park to declare a state of national emergency on 6 December. Three weeks later, in a predawn session held without the knowledge of the opposition, the Assembly granted Park extraordinary governmental powers. These failed to quell mounting opposition and unrest, and in October 1972 martial law was declared. A new constitution, promulgated at the end of the month and ratified by national referendum in November 1972, vastly increased the powers of the presidency in economic as well as political affairs. Under this new document, which inaugurated the Fourth Republic, Park was elected for a six-year term that December, with a decisive legislative majority for his DRP. Soon the economy began to expand at a rapid rate. But Park's regime became increasingly repressive. Typical of its heavy-handed rule was the abduction by KCIA agents of Kim Dae Jung from a Japanese hotel room back to Seoul, an incident that provoked considerable friction between Japanese and Korean officials. On 15 August 1974, a Korean gunman carrying a Japanese passport and sympathetic to the DPRK attempted to assassinate the president but killed Park's wife instead. Park responded by drafting a series of emergency measures; the harshest of these, Emergency Measure No. 9, issued in May 1975, provided for the arrest of anyone criticizing the constitution and banned all political activities by students.
Park was reelected for another six-year term in July 1978, but the NDP, now led by Kim Young Sam, made major gains in the National Assembly. In October 1979, Kim was expelled from the legislature after calling for governmental reform. Riots protesting Kim's ouster were reported in several major cities. On 26 October 1979, in what may have been an attempted coup, Park was assassinated by KCIA Director Kim Jae-gyu, who was later executed. Martial law was again imposed, and a period of relative calm followed as some of the more restrictive emergency decrees were lifted by Park's constitutional successor, the prime minister, Choi Kyu-hah, who promised a new constitution and presidential elections.
In December 1979, Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan led a coup in which he and his military colleagues removed the army chief of staff and took effective control of the government. Demonstrations, led by university students, spread through the spring of 1980 and, by mid-May, the government once more declared martial law (in effect until January 1981), banned demonstrations, and arrested political leaders. In the city of Kwangju, more than 200 civilians were killed in what became known as the Kwangju massacre. Choi Kyu-hah was pressured to resign and Chun Doo Hwan, now retired from the military, was named president in September 1980. Chun Doo Hwan came to power under a new constitution inaugurating the Fifth Republic. A total of 567 political leaders, including Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, were banned from political activity. Kim Dae Jung, arrested several times after his 1973 kidnapping, was originally sentenced to death but allowed to go to the United States in 1982. All existing political parties were dissolved, and all political activity banned until three months before the 1981 elections.
Twelve new parties (reduced to eight) were formed to enter the 1981 elections, in which Chun Doo Hwan was elected to a seven-year presidential term by a new electoral college and his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) secured a majority in the reconstituted National Assembly. Despite harsh controls, opposition to Chun continued. In 1982, 1,200 political prisoners were released, and in early 1983, the ban on political activity was lifted for 250 of the banned politicians. On 9 October 1983, Chun escaped an apparent assassination attempt in Rangoon, Burma, when an explosion took the lives of 17 in his entourage, including 4 ROK cabinet ministers. Chun subsequently blamed the DPRK for the bombing. In 1984, under increasing pressure for political reforms prior to the 1985 parliamentary elections, the government lifted its ban on all but 15 of the 567 politicians banned in 1980. In 1985, the ban was lifted on 14 of the remaining 15. Kim Dae Jung was allowed to return from exile in the United States in 1984 but rearrested. He remained banned from all political activity because of his conviction for sedition in 1980.
Opposition groups quickly formed the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) to challenge the DJP in the 1985 election; the new party became a strong minority voice in the National Assembly. The issue of constitutional reforms, particularly changes in the way in which presidents are elected and the way in which "bonus" seats in the legislature
are distributed, became prominent, especially after Chun reaffirmed a commitment to step down in February 1988 and, in April 1986, dropped his long-standing opposition to any constitutional changes prior to that date. Demonstrations against Chun continued and became violent at Inch'on in May 1986 and at Konkuk University that fall. Opposition groups began collecting signatures on a petition demanding direct (instead of indirect) election of the president. In April 1987, as demonstrations became increasingly violent, Chun banned all further discussion of constitutional reform until after the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. The ban, which could have guaranteed the election of a handpicked DJP successor, set off violent antigovernment demonstrations throughout the nation. In June 1987, the DJP nominated its chairman, Roh Tae Woo, a former general and a close friend of Chun, as its candidate for his successor. When Roh accepted opposition demands for political reforms, Chun announced in July that the upcoming election would be held by direct popular vote. On 8 July, 100,000 people demonstrated in Seoul in the largest protest since 1960 and, on the same day, the government restored political rights to 2,000 people, including the longtime opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung.
In the elections, held on 16 December 1987, Roh Tae Woo, as the DJP candidate, won a plurality of 37%, defeating the two major opposition candidates, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who had been unable to agree on a single opposition candidacy and split 55% of the total vote. Two minor candidates divided the remainder. A reported 89% of all eligible voters participated. The two leading opposition candidates charged massive fraud, and a series of demonstrations were held to protest the results. However, no evidence of extensive fraud was produced, and the demonstrations did not attract wide support. Roh Tae Woo was inaugurated as president in February 1988 when Chun Doo Hwan's term expired.
In the elections for the National Assembly, held on 26 April 1988, President Roh Tae Woo's party, the DJP, won only 34% of the vote. This gave the DJP 125 seats in the assembly, while Kim Dae Jung's Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) gained 70 seats, Kim Young Sam's Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) won 59 seats, 35 seats went to the new Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), and 10 to independent candidates. Thus, for the first time in 36 years, the government did not have a controlling vote in the
National Assembly, which quickly challenged President Roh's choice for head of the Supreme Court and by year's end forced the president to work with the assembly to pass the budget.
In the fall of 1988, the National Assembly audited the government and held public hearings into former President Chun's abuses of power. In November, Chun apologized to the nation in a televised address, gave his personal wealth to the nation, and retired into a Buddhist temple. Following the revision of the constitution in 1987, South Koreans enjoyed greater freedoms of expression and assembly and freedom of the press and, in 1988, several hundred political dissidents were released from prison.
Unrest among students, workers, and farmers continued, however, and beginning in April 1989, the government repressed opposition. In October 1989, the government acknowledged making 1,315 political arrests so far that year. The National Assembly became less of a check on President Roh after two opposition parties (RDP, NDRP), including that of Kim Young Sam, merged with Roh's DJP, forming a new majority party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in January 1990. Kim Dae Jung was then left as the leader of the main opposition party (PDP).
There were continuing demonstrations into 1990 and 1991, calling for the resignation of President Roh and the withdrawal of United States troops. In May 1990, 50,000 demonstrators in Kwangju commemorated the tenth anniversary of the massacre, resulting in clashes with police which lasted several days. The United States agreed to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the ROK in November 1991. And, on the last day of the year, the ROK and the DPRK signed an agreement to ban nuclear weapons from the entire peninsula.
In the presidential election on 19 December 1992, Kim Young Sam, now leader of the majority DLP, won with 41.9% of the vote, while Kim Dae Jung (DP) took 33.8%. Inaugurated in February 1993, Kim Young Sam began a new era as the first president in 30 years who was a civilian, without a power base in the military. President Kim granted amnesty to 41,000 prisoners and instituted a series of purges of high-ranking military officials, including four generals who had roles in the 1979 coup. Among political and economic reforms was a broad anticorruption campaign, resulting in
arrests, dismissals, or reprimands for several thousands of government officials and business people. In March 1994, a former official of the National Security Planning Agency made public President Roh Tae Woo's authorization of a covert program to develop nuclear weapons at the Daeduk Science Town through 1991.
South and North Korea continue to have a rocky relationship. In April of 1996, North Korean troops on three successive days violated the 1954 armistice which had ended the Korean War by entering Panmunjom. The soldiers, who were apparently conducting training exercises, withdrew after a few hours on all three occasions. In September of the same year, a small North Korean submarine was grounded off the Eastern coast of South Korea and 26 crew members fled into the interior of South Korea. The ship appeared to be carrying a team of North Korean spies who intended to infiltrate into South Korea to carry out what remain unknown missions against South Korean targets. Twenty-four of the crewmen were killed, one escaped and one remains at large. In a surprise unusual move, the North Korean government apologized in February of 1997 for the incursion.
Meanwhile recent domestic events inside South Korea have been equally tumultuous. In August of 1996, former President Chun Doo Hwan and his successor, Roh Tae Woo were tried and found guilty of treason and mutiny for the 1980 coup that brought them to power, and the subsequent Kwangju massacre, in which troops killed at least 154 pro-democracy demonstrators. The court gave Chun a death sentence (extremely rare in Korea) and sentenced Roh to 22.5 years in prison. An appellate court later reduced Chun's sentence to life imprisonment and Roh's sentence to 17 years. When Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as president in 1998, both leaders were released from prison under Kim's grant of amnesty.
On 11 April 1996, legislative elections took place amid allegation of corruption that reached to the inner circle of President Kim Young Sam and his New Korea Party. During the pre-election campaigning, Kim promised to launch an anti-corruption effort if his party gained power; in a major upset, the NKP captured 139 of the 299 seats, while the main opposition party (National Congress for New Politics—NCNP) or Kim Dae Jung won only 79 seats. Kim Dae Jung lost his own seat in the legislature. Several important
New Korea Party officials and even Kim Young Sam's son, were implicated on charges of taking or giving millions of dollars in bribes to arrange loans to Hanbo Steel Industry Co., which eventually went bankrupt under $6 billion of debt. Some of those officials were indicted in February of 1997 but Mr. Kim's son, Kim Hyun Chul, was cleared. However, in May of the same year Kim Hyun Chul was arrested on bribery and tax-evasion charges unrelated to the Hanbo scandal.
By 1997, many of the large chaebols (business conglomerates) reported serious problems with debt. A portion of Kia Group, a major manufacturer of automobiles, was nationalized to prevent bankruptcy. Increased domestic economic instability coupled with economic crisis sweeping through Asia, led to a severe decline in the value of the currency. The ensuing financial panic coincided with presidential elections on 18 December 1997, the month that negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began. In the election Kim Dae Jung narrowly defeated the ruling party's candidate Lee Hoe Chang by 40.3% to 38.7%. A third candidate Yi In Che garnered 19.2% of the votes, effectively splitting the pro-government vote. Kim Dae Jung pledged to adhere to IMF conditionality and reform government-business relations in South Korea by increasing transparency. In 1998 and 1999, the government reduced the role of government intervention in the domestic economy despite numerous strikes by workers protesting layoffs.
By mid-2000, Kim Dae Jung managed to steer Korea's economy out of the worst of the crisis. The economy started to grow in 1999 and economic estimates suggested that economic growth would top 10% for 2000. In April 2000, the legislative elections improved the position of Kim's party, renamed the New Millennium Party (NMP) to 115 seats. However, the Grand National Party (GNP), successor to the NKP obtained 133 seats and the United Liberal Democrats, allied to the GNP, won 17. Thus, Kim's objective to continue economic reform was imperiled.
In June 2000, Kim Dae Jung traveled to P'yongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) for an historic meeting with his counterpart, Kim Jong Il. The two agreed to pursue further cooperation in the future. This summit meeting marked the high point of what became known as Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine
policy" of rapprochement toward the North. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his commitment to democracy and human rights in Asia.
Roh Moo Hyun was elected president in the December 2002 election, taking 49% of the vote; he was inaugurated in February 2003. While campaigning, Roh had stated he would continue with Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" toward the North, but prior to his election, it was revealed that North Korea was secretly developing a program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Relations between North Korea and the US were tense in 2002 and 2003, as the US maintained North Korea should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, and the North asserted it had the right to do so to provide for its defense and security. Roh took the position that North Korea's moves to develop nuclear weapons and export missiles could only be countered by dialogue. This put him at odds with some in the Bush Administration who held that the United States would not be "blackmailed" into negotiating with the North. In June 2003, the United States announced it would redeploy some of its 37,000 troops in South Korea to positions south of the DMZ, in an effort to create more agile and mobile forces.
South Korea's economy in 2003 was growing at 6.3%, a rate that was among the highest in the developed world.
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Korea-Republic-of-ROK-HISTORY.html#ixzz0dDuYOg9T
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Fables & Tales
æsop’s fables
The Fox and the Crow
A Fox once saw a Crow fly off with a piece of cheese in its
beak and settle on a branch of a tree. ―That’s for me,‖ said
the Fox, and he walked up to the foot of the tree. ―Good
day, Mistress Crow,‖ he cried. ―How well you are looking
today: how glossy your feathers; how bright your eyes. I
feel sure your voice must surpass that of other birds, just
as your figure does. Let me hear but one song from you
that I may greet you as the Queen of Birds.‖ The Crow
lifted up her head and began to caw her best, but the
moment she opened her mouth the piece of cheese fell to
the ground, only to be snapped up by the Fox. ―That will
do,‖ said he. ―That was all I wanted. In exchange for your
cheese I will give you a piece of advice for the future:
Do not trust flatterers.
http://www.pubwire.com/DownloadDocs/AFABLES.PDF
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Collector’s Items
- Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma (Media Note)
- Derek Mitchell - Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma (September 14, 2011 )
- James Mann’s About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)
- The Depression in the United States (1929)--An Overview
- US.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century - Statement of Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State (July 27, 2010)
- Korea, Republic of (ROK) – History - (Encyclopedia of the Nations)
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SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011
This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/ News,Views & Opinions
Thursday, September 15, 2011 NO 4
QUOTATION
"The talent of insinuation is more useful than that of persuasion, as everybody is open to insinuation, but scarce any to persuasion. "
Philip Dormer Stanhope Chesterfield, 4th Earl
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insinuation?fromRef=true (Quotes)
Collector’s Items
- Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma (Media Note)
- Derek Mitchell - Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma (September 14, 2011 )
- James Mann’s About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)
- The Depression in the United States (1929)--An Overview
- US.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century - Statement of Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State (July 27, 2010)
- Korea, Republic of (ROK) – History - (Encyclopedia of the Nations)
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Home » Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs » Bureau of Public Affairs » Bureau of Public Affairs: Press Relations » Press Releases » Press Releases: 2011 » Press Releases: September 2011 » Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma
Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
September 6, 2011
Ambassador Derek Mitchell, the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, will depart on his first trip to Burma in his position on Wednesday, September 7. During his trip, he looks forward to meeting with a full spectrum of Burmese society, including government officials, members of political parties, local civil society organizations, and others.
His trip is intended to build upon U.S. dialogue and engagement toward shared goals of genuine reform, reconciliation, and development for the Burmese people.
Ambassador Mitchell will attend meetings in Nay Pyi Taw on September 9-10 and will continue consultations in Rangoon September 10-14. The Ambassador plans to consult with officials in Bangkok September 14-15 and Jakarta September 16-17.
PRN: 2011/1416
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/171711.htm
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Derek Mitchell: Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma
By Derek Mitchell
Thursday, 15 September 2011 10:12
Derek Mitchell, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma
Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma
Thursday, 15 September 2011, 2:43 pm Press Release: US State Department
Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma
Remarks Derek Mitchell Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Rangoon, Burma September 14, 2011
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Mingalaba. Good Morning. Let me read a brief prepared statement. I have just completed my first visit to Burma as U.S. Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator. I have spent the past five days in intensive consultations with a full spectrum of interlocutors in Nay Pyi Taw and in Rangoon to discuss the situation here and ways in which the United States can support and promote democracy, human rights, development and national reconciliation in the country in our common interests.
I want to acknowledge first the government’s excellent hospitality, Chargé d’Affaires Michael Thurston and his outstanding team at the U.S. Embassy for a quick turnaround in organizing a visit, and all my interlocutors for their time and candor during our meetings over the past several days.
Being my initial visit, my primary goal was to introduce myself, listen to local perspectives, and establish relationships that I will build on as I proceed to fulfill my mandate and responsibilities for managing U.S. Burma policy.
In Nay Pyi Taw, I met with Union Parliament Speaker Khin Aung Myint, People’s Parliament Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, Labor and Social Welfare Minister Aung Kyi, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Thein Htay, Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, and USDP Secretary General Htay Oo. I also met with a cross section of opposition MPs, including representatives from ethnic minority regions.
I was encouraged by and pleased with the quality and openness of the exchanges, and the constructive and respectful tone of each interaction I had. During these meetings, my government interlocutors repeatedly stated that this country had opened a new chapter to a civilian-led democratic governing structure and expressed that they were sincerely committed to reform in the interest of human rights, democracy, development, and national reconciliation.
I responded that the United States recognized and welcomed recent gestures from Nay Pyi Taw, such as President Thein Sein’s meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission, public emphasis on dialogue with ethnic minority groups in the interest of national reconciliation, and moderate easing of media censorship. Among both the international community and the Burmese
people, it is clear from my visit that there are heightened expectations and hopes that change, real change, may be on the horizon.
At the same time, I was frank about the many questions the United States – and others – continue to have about implementation and follow-through on these stated goals. I noted that many within the international community remain skeptical about the government’s commitment to genuine reform and reconciliation, and I urged authorities to prove the skeptics wrong.
To that end, I raised concerns regarding the detention of approximately 2,000 political prisoners, continued hostilities in ethnic minority areas accompanied by reports of serious human rights violations, including against women and children, and the lack of transparency in the government’s military relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
I offered respectfully that the government should take concrete actions in a timely fashion to demonstrate its sincerity and genuine commitment to reform and national reconciliation, including by releasing all political prisoners unconditionally, engaging in meaningful outreach to the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and engaging in dialogue rather than armed conflict with ethnic minority groups. I affirmed the importance of establishing a legitimate and credible mechanism for investigating reported abuses in ethnic areas as a first step toward building trust and promoting national reconciliation through accountability. I also urged the government to adhere to all of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions related to proliferation.
I want to emphasize that our dialogue on these topics was respectful and open, which I greatly appreciated. I noted that progress on these issues will be essential to progress in the bilateral relationship, and that if the government takes genuine and concrete action, the United States will respond in kind.
Here in Rangoon, I continued the conversation on current conditions and trends in the country with a broad cross section of civil society. I consulted with the business and diplomatic communities, and local and international NGOs, including citizens doing
heroic and courageous work providing free funeral services for the poor and treating those with HIV/AIDS.
And of course I met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the National League for Democracy to discuss their perspectives on recent developments in the country, the future of their party, and U.S. policy approaches. I was reminded consistently during my visit that Daw Suu remains deeply important to the citizens of this country, Burman and ethnic minority alike, and that any credible reform effort must include her participation. It was also clear that she remains fully committed to the cause of peaceful change through dialogue.
Unfortunately, I was only here for a few days and thus was unable to explore the full breadth and diversity of this beautiful country. However, the courage and commitment of those with whom I met give me great hope for the country’s future should genuine reform and reconciliation proceed. I will be following developments closely from afar, and look forward to many return visits here to continue the United State’s principled engagement policy.
Again, I would like to thank the government for hosting me so warmly for my inaugural visit in my new post, and to all my interlocutors for sharing their valuable insights. I consider this a highly productive visit. I will now take a few questions before I have to catch a plane.
QUESTION: Did you get any assurance of the release of political prisoners from the government?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: As I suggested, we had a very candid dialogue on this subject. There were no absolute commitments on anything. But we had a very productive exchange on the subject, so nothing further I can say on that.
QUESTION: And my second question is would it be possible for your government to lift the sanctions if the political prisoners were not released?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: The issue of sanctions, again, that was not a primary point of discussion. There are a lot of issues that we need to deal with in terms of the
relationship, and sanctions are one component, as I said. Most of this is about our engagement, our principled engagement, with the regime. I know yesterday there was a report that came out unfortunately, sad to say, that I think mischaracterized my position on this, referring to a roadmap to lift sanctions. I think it took my words out of context. It mischaracterized what I said in response to a question. I never presented, nor have I developed such a roadmap. The conversation flow and tone were as I just described earlier about the full range of issues being addressed concerning exchange of views, concerning what we would need to see in order to truly develop a productive relationship and to change the parameters of the bilateral relationship.
QUESTION: What is the most important criterion for assessing the situation in this country?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: There's no particular single issue, obviously. I listed the things we needed to see that we thought were elements of demonstrating credible and genuine commitment to reform. So there's no single answer to that, but if we see some of the things that I outlined, I think it would demonstrate the kind of genuine commitment that people are looking for, not just probably -- obviously from the outside, but people within the country. And the issue of skepticism and uncertainty about how far this is going and where it's leading, I think the government recognizes that the skepticism is out there and we'll just see how this proceeds. And as I say, if we see actions that are credible, the United States will respond.
QUESTION: I would like to ask if you've seen any change of attitude from the current government during your visit?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Well this is my first visit, so I can't compare it to any previous visit to say whether they've changed or not. I can answer that question during my second visit, which I hope will be soon. I have to say though, that I know there were concerns about my position, coming in. My position was, as many of you know, was mandated by Congress under the JADE Act. In the United States, the JADE Act is the sanctions act. So there were concerns that I was purely a function of sanctions, that I was simply here to talk sanctions, and not to talk more broadly about the relationship and to get a feel for the place and what's happening here. So my sense was, again, I
was very pleased with the reception I got, very pleased with the nature of the conversations, very pleased with how welcoming they were. And I detected no nervousness about me or my position. And I look forward to continuing those relationships in a very frank and candid manor that befits a healthy relationship.
QUESTION: Yesterday the State Department released an annual religious freedom report, and Burma being designated as one of the eight nations, countries of most particular concern. Did you have a chance to meet the various religious organizations? If so, what is their concern? Do they still have these concerns? How likely is Burma to be out of this list soon?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: I did not meet with representatives of those organizations. So I can't speak for them in terms of how they view the situation in the country. There's a separate section of the State Department that looks at these things independently and I can't comment any further on the context or substance
QUESTION: I need a little clarification. Does it mean that the U.S. will continue to employ the two-track policy, retaining the sanctions and engaging with the government at the same time? So in view of the current developments that you just mentioned, are you going to, is the U.S. going to establish Ambassadorial-level engagement soon? And another one is, does the government give any indication that they're initiating any tri-partite dialogue that involves ethnic minorities?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: On the latter, we didn't discuss that, so I don't know what their intentions are, or the prospects of that. I know there's been discussion of that here. Before I came I read there was some kind of discussion of a potential peace commission through the legislature, but that's in process. But I heard nothing specifically on this during my visit, on a tri-partite process.
Yes, our policy has not changed. My trip is consistent with the policy. That sanctions remain in place is a component of our policy. But really this trip was about going beyond that to engage in a principled fashion, to discuss a broad range of issues, but particularly to talk about the relationship and what would be required to change the parameters of the relationship to date. And to get a feel for what's happening here on
the ground. You can't learn about a country from afar. You have to come. You have to talk to people directly. You have to get a lot of different perspectives. You have to listen. My point in coming here was to listen as well as provide very candidly the U.S. perspective so that people here were not misunderstanding our policy. I'm sure there's not a clear understanding of what does principled engagement mean, what are your intentions, how far can this go, and the same here. So again, I didn't see enough of the country in some fashion. I didn't see everybody that maybe I could see while here. Believe me, I worked very hard. I was having meetings from the first thing in the morning until late at night, trying to meet as many people as I possibly could to get as broad a perspective on what's happening here. And as I said, my sense is people are hopeful about change. People do have high expectations and are hopeful that something real may happen. The question is how far that will go and what the concrete steps will be going forward. So it's a long answer to the question; our policy has not changed.
QUESTION: (Inaudible – repeat of question about reestablishing Ambassador-level engagement from Rangoon.)
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Oh, well the issue is… that's a hypothetical. We've made no decisions on that. Again, no changes to the way we've done things to date along those lines.
QUESTION: (Interpreted from Burmese). Yesterday you met with the Human Rights Commission here. If the commission is formed by former government officials, so do you think they will genuinely investigate the abuses here? What is your comment?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: It was a very good meeting. They gave us an overview of their plans, their thinking. But they're at the very, very early stages of thinking about it themselves. I have some sympathy for them They're trying to get up and running quickly and think things through I have no preconceptions about what they will or will not be able to do. I certainly have an open mind about that and they're struggling themselves, I think, about it. They said they will have to work with Nay Pyi Taw and send things, report up to Nay Pyi Taw. So I'm hopeful. I think it is a positive gesture. It's one of those things that I said to counterparts and put in my statement that is
certainly a positive move to establish a human rights commission. But like everything else, the proof of its legitimacy will be how they proceed to implement that mandate after establishment. So I was grateful for the opportunity to have the conversation. We'll obviously be watching them.
The other thing is we offered that given there is not a lot of expertise in this, and there is some skepticism about whether it will be a real commission looking at abuses, reported abuses, alleged abuses here that it might be useful to have some partnership with international organizations, individuals with experience. And I said that also to the folks in Nay Pyi Taw that we remain open to assisting with helping them do a job like investigating or doing accountability in ethnic minority areas in the interests of national reconciliation. So again our minds are open but are arms are outstretched too to assist as we can in making them a fully credible and productive institution in the interests of national reconciliation, human rights and democracy.
QUESTION: When you go back to the States you'll be reporting to the Congress, right? So if somebody from the Congress asks you what is the most significant outcome of your trip, what would you answer?
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Significant outcome… I think it's the remarkable sense of hope that we see here among people. That they see something happening. There is, something is happening, something may be changing. It may be small gestures now. But again that sense of expectation is very, very important. And as I say, I really hope that I think everybody who follows this country knows that there have been stops and starts, that expectations have been dashed. That things only go so far, and then they stop or they reverse themselves. And I really urged the leadership to prove the skeptics wrong. But it was very encouraging to me that my reception was as warm and welcome as it was. And that the leadership in Nay Pyi Taw were open to having discussions, having exchanges. Again, no commitments made. No outcomes that are tangible. But we were open to have a dialogue with respect, and I was able to say that I and the international community need to see the concrete action and genuine action for us to feel that something is not only hope but real change here over time. So I'll have a very frank exchange with my friends in Congress and they I think, they're just like the rest.
They want the best - everyone in America. I hope it's clear to folks that people in the United States wish this country no ill will at all. We want to do what's best to help this country develop itself. Those four goals that were outlined by the government – democracy, human rights, development, and national reconciliation – we share. If the government is serious and committed to those goals in a credible fashion they will have a partner in the United States and I think Congress and others will be watching very closely to see what this government decides to do in order to move credibly forward toward those goals.
One last question.
QUESTION: You said that this is your very first trip. So when will you be coming again? And also I would like to know your opinions on the rising China influence here.
AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: It was not a topic of conversation, really, with the leadership. I do get a sense, talking to some citizens and others here that there is a palpable sense of Chinese influence, Chinese presence. But we really didn't have much of a discussion of that topic. The leadership here and the citizens here will have to decide how they deal with their neighbor. Obviously whenever you have neighbors, there are challenges, there are opportunities. But there's really nothing more I would say about Chinese influence in that regard.
Thank you all very much. I do have to catch the plane. I appreciate this and I will see you next time I'm sure.
ENDS
http://www.encburma.net/index.php/archives/internationl/70-international/630-derek-mitchell-press-conference-in-rangoon-burma.html
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James Mann’s About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)
About the Author & Prologue
James Mann provides an American perspective to Sino-American relations between the years of the Nixon and Clinton administrations in his book About Face. Mann served as the Los Angeles Times Beijing bureau chief from 1984 to 1987 and more recently has served as a diplomatic correspondent and foreign affairs columnist for the Washington bureau of the same newspaper. Mann is also the author of Beijing Jeep, has served as a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and has won awards for his work.
Mann uses sources from interviews, journal articles, books, and the National Security Archives to support the information in his book. His writing style reflects his personal experience in China, and provides a journalistic viewpoint on the events that shaped Sino-American relations during the timeframe he presents to readers.
Mann begins About Face with a prologue that introduces American diplomat Winston Lord, who is living in China after a decade and a half of being a visiting honored guest in the country. Mann explains how Lord’s previous diplomatic work during the Nixon years was more climactic than his more recent experiences in China. The prologue shows how the conditions in China have changed from the 1970s to the 1990s while giving examples of what Lord was doing
at different times in this period.
Mann uses Lord’s experiences to explain why he chose to write his book. He states that his goal is to ―explore, describe, and interpret American policy toward China over the past quarter-century‖ in the hopes of ―overcoming collective ignorance.‖ The book uses a chronological structure that describes how each administration from Nixon to Clinton came about their decisions on China policy.
The Nixon Years
Chapters one through three describe how U.S. President Richard Nixon sought normalization of relations with China after 20 years of no formal dealings between the two countries. Chapter one, Opening Moves, provides notes written by Nixon prior to meeting with Chinese leaders. The notes show what Nixon thought the Chinese wanted from the U.S., what
the U.S. wanted from China, how to treat Chairman Mao Tsetung, and issues regarding Taiwan and Vietnam.
Chapter one also introduces Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. By the end of chapter one the reader finds out how Nixon and Kissinger worked independently of the State Department and other government agencies to perform their secret China diplomacy. People like CIA operative James R. Lilley, helped to open up covert channels to China’s leaders.
Chapters two and three provide details about Nixon and Kissinger’s first trips to China while explaining how these first meetings would set the precedence for future China visits by American diplomats. Mann points out how Nixon was trying to use his secret trips in order to benefit himself politically. Self-interest aside, Nixon had other ideas about how China could help the U.S. Nixon wanted out of the war in Vietnam and thought the Chinese leadership would help in the process. Nixon did not receive any promises on Vietnam and Mao Tsetung did not
receive any assurances regarding the re-unification of Taiwan.
Nixon and Kissinger did make some promises though. Kissinger told Chou Enlai that the U.S. would tell China about any understandings it had with the Soviet Union that affected China’s interests, and later on promised to prevent Japan from obtaining a nuclear weapon. On Taiwan, the U.S.’s new approach was to recognize that ―Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but China and that Taiwan is part of China‖
By the end of chapter three Mann has explained how the U.S. was no longer fighting Communism in general, but rather the Soviet Union specifically. He shows how the Nixon administration continued its policy of secret diplomacy with China to try to win them over as an ally in the Cold War. Although Nixon sought normalization of relations with China, he could not
achieve this goal during his time as president.
Ford’s China Policy
After Nixon’s resignation over Watergate, Gerald Ford became president, however his administration could not achieve Nixon’s goal of normalization. Chinese leaders were worried that Nixon’s resignation would nullify his secret assurances, but Kissinger remained in office and promised that policy would not change under the new president.
Ford could not follow through with full normalization of relations though because, just like Nixon, he needed the support of the Republican conservative base, who were staunch supporters of Taiwan, to win re-election. Ford appointed George Bush as head of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing. Kissinger felt threatened by this appointment but later came to realize that Bush would follow through on previous policy decisions made under the Nixon administration.
Ford helped to arrange the purchasing of British jet engines by China and continued to
share intelligence with China in the fight against the Soviets.
Carter and the New Chinese Leadership.
Changes in leadership in both China and the United States helped to shape the beginning of a new era for Sino-American relations in the late 1970s. Chou Enlai and Mao Tsetung both passed away in 1976, which led to the arrest of Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. The arrests removed leaders who were opposed to having good relations with the U.S. and paved the way for the return of Deng Xiaoping, who, in the mid-1970s, was known for swapping jokes about
the Soviets with American counterparts.
Chapters four and five discuss the normalization of relations in 1979 under Jimmy Carter. Normalization helped to improve ties between the two countries military and intelligence during this Cold War period. Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, followed in Kissinger’s secretive style of diplomacy and helped influence policy, despite the State Department’s opposing positions. Mann describes how Carter was a human rights advocate, except when it came to China he chose to ignore any abuses, which drew complaints from the
Soviet Union.
Carter wanted to extend MFN benefits to both the Soviet Union and China, but others in the administration did not want the Soviets to obtain the same benefits. Eventually MFN benefits were granted to China under Carter, who also helped to extend Export-Import bank financing and the easing of export controls.
In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which would later prove to draw the Chinese and American intelligence and military communities closer together. Brzezinski pushed for the U.S.-China military alliance; however, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was opposed to the idea. The Soviet invasion allowed Carter and Brzezinski to move forward with their goal of strengthening U.S.-China military relations. After the invasion, Carter immediately postponed ratification of the new SALT treaty, blocked grain sales to the Soviets, and began focusing on security issues in the Persian Gulf. Mann uses a quote from Brzezinski’s book Power and Principle to make the point that Carter used the invasion to strengthen U.S.-China relations.
Brzezinski is quoted as saying: ―that we use the Soviet invasion of a country in a region of strategic sensitivity to Asia as a justification for opening the doors to a U.S.-China defense relationship.‖
The Cold War and Reagan
Ronald Reagan inherited the previous administrations’ Cold War policies when he became president, but he was a strong supporter of Taiwan and an anti-Communist, so his relationship with Chinese leaders was not always friendly at first.
By his second term, Reagan had reversed policy however and continued to provide military cooperation with the Chinese and was willing to exchange intelligence with them to use against the Soviets. Chapters six and seven discuss these issues in more depth while providing information about China’s weapons program. These chapters also explain how Reagan reversed the decision to sell Taiwan FX jet fighters, feeling pressured by China who took advantage of the decision by asking for more concessions. China wanted the U.S. to end arms sales to Taiwan altogether and was threatening to downgrade their relations with the U.S., however Reagan refused to end sales, and relations did not downgrade after China agreed to an official
communiqué in 1982.
Alexander Haig had left the State Department by this time and was working for a private company selling weapons. He influenced China policy by trying to sell his company’s Sikorsky helicopters to Taiwan, while also trying to sell weapons to China. Under Reagan, the arms race between the Soviets and the U.S. intensified. Reagan’s Star War Program pushed other countries to not only modernize their own weapons, but to gain financially by selling weapons to third world countries.
Although China was working with the U.S. to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, they did not feel restricted to just selling weapons to western friendly countries, and by the 1980s were selling billions of dollars worth of weapons to Iraq and Iran, and other anti-western Middle
Eastern countries.
Bush and Tiananmen
President George Bush wanted to return to the style of relations China and the U.S. had under Nixon, but the student protests in Tiananmen and other domestic policy issues would make this impossible. The protests forced Bush to shift policy that would restrict relations between the two countries. Because of the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States’ policy toward China was no longer based on their relationship against the Soviets in the Cold War. Under Bush there was a significant cooling of relations and reports of Chinese arms deals to Middle Eastern countries was worrying Pentagon officials.
Bush was obliged to follow the Taiwan Relations Act, which had passed in 1979, and in 1992, he allowed the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. Bush seemed to support the sale, but at the same time wanted better relations with China, even after the violence during the Tiananmen Square protests, but domestic politics would not allow him to follow through on his wishes. Bush was still concerned about security in the Persian Gulf, which had become a focus under the Carter administration. He sent U.S. troops to Kuwait to push back the Iraqi military who invaded the country in 1990. Both China and the U.S. had supplied arms to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran wars.
Chapters nine through fourteen discuss Bush’s China policy in detail and explain the intricacies of the two countries’ economic relations. Mann states how Bush tended to run China policy from his own desk, leaving other foreign policy experts out of the decision making process.
The events surrounding the Tiananmen Square protests had a significant impact on the future of U.S.-China relations. Immediately following the crackdown on protestors, Chinese activist Fang Lizhi took refuge inside the American embassy to prevent the Chinese government from arresting him for his supposed role in the student protests and his pro-democracy stance.
Bush used Fang as a negotiating tactic with the Chinese, but according to Mann, Bush
was not entirely successful at using Fang to get concessions from the Chinese.
Bill Clinton’s About Face
When President Bill Clinton came to office public anger in the U.S. over China’s crackdown on Tiananmen protestors was still lingering, but Clinton’s focus was not on foreign policy. When Clinton did look at foreign policy, he had a whole host of issues to deal with including violence in Yugoslavia and the Middle East and problems in Haiti.
Clinton’s China policy focused on human rights and the economy, which he tried to tie together to negotiate better terms with the Chinese, but was mostly unsuccessful. Clinton ended up extending MFN with China, despite not getting Chinese leaders to agree to improve their human rights record.
Chapters fourteen through sixteen discuss Clinton’s dealings with China during his presidency, including the issue of Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s president, who brought the attention of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan into the spotlight when he visited the United States in 1995. China questioned the U.S. and their former promises to not have formal relations with Taiwan. Taiwain’s effort to persuade Congress to allow the visit showed how foreign lobbyists could influence the legislative branch of government. Clinton reassured China that Taiwan policy had not changed and went as far as signing the ―three noes‖, which stated the same promises Nixon and Kissinger had agreed to over Taiwan. Also under Clinton, some tension between China and the U.S. almost became hostile when China sent several missiles into the waters around Taiwan. Clinton deployed warships to the area, but problems were resolved peacefully.
Mann shows readers how Clinton’s presidency was surrounded by scandal with allegations of sexual misconduct with Monica Lewinsky and accusations of receiving illegal campaign contributions. About Face also shows how Clinton was influenced by Chinese students who pressed Congress to extend their visas. Students ultimately lost their influence when it came to China’s MFN status, and let the business community dictate economic policy.
Conclusion
Mann argues in his conclusion that there has been a lack of continuity in American policy toward China from Nixon to Clinton. He states that the title, About Face, is about administrative shifts in policy, which sometimes saw a 360 degree turn from their policy at the outset of their first terms.
Mann explains how events during the Cold War shaped much of America’s China policy, and how each U.S. president attempted to keep foreign policy decisions within the executive branch. He says that after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests the American public began to pay more attention to China policy. Mann shows how Congress changed the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches by directly changing China policy after the protests.
About Face shows how American policy toward China can shift according to world events and domestic politics, but how people like Kissinger have still managed to influence multiple administrations, thus providing some continuity in American foreign policy. Mann says policy changed significantly after the fall of the Soviet Union and that the China-U.S. relationship was directly impacted by the crumbling of the Soviet empire. He says policy formed sometimes as a reaction to the Cold War, and that the end of the war created new challenges for the United States and China.
Mann does not attempt to predict what the future of China-U.S. relations will look like, but he does say that history can help us to understand what might happen. Mann’s arranges his sources in note form at the end of the book. Some of his sources include books by Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Baker, and Henry Kissinger. He interviews with officials such as Winston Lord, and documents from the CIA and State Department.
http://www.chinausrelations.com/about-face-summary.html
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The Depression in the United States--An Overview
The Great Depression
In October 1929 the stock market crashed, wiping out 40 percent of the paper values of common stock. Even after the stock market collapse, however, politicians and industry leaders continued to issue optimistic predictions for the nation's economy. But the Depression deepened, confidence evaporated and many lost their life savings. By 1933 the value of stock on the New York Stock Exchange was less than a fifth of what it had been at its peak in 1929. Business houses closed their doors, factories shut down and banks failed. Farm income fell some 50 percent. By 1932 approximately one out of every four Americans was unemployed.
The core of the problem was the immense disparity between the country's productive capacity and the ability of people to consume. Great innovations in productive techniques during and after the war raised the output of industry beyond the purchasing capacity of U.S. farmers and wage earners. The savings of the wealthy and middle class, increasing far beyond the possibilities of sound investment, had been drawn into frantic speculation in stocks or real estate. The stock market collapse, therefore, had been merely the first of several detonations in which a flimsy structure of speculation had been leveled to the ground.
The presidential campaign of 1932 was chiefly a debate over the causes and possible remedies of the Great Depression. Herbert Hoover, unlucky in entering The White House only eight months before the stock market crash, had struggled tirelessly, but ineffectively, to set the wheels of industry in motion again. His Democratic opponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, already popular as the governor of New York during the developing crisis, argued that the Depression stemmed from the U.S. economy's
underlying flaws, which had been aggravated by Republican policies during the 1920s. President Hoover replied that the economy was fundamentally sound, but had been shaken by the repercussions of a worldwide depression -- whose causes could be traced back to the war. Behind this argument lay a clear implication: Hoover had to depend largely on natural processes of recovery, while Roosevelt was prepared to use the federal government's authority for bold experimental remedies.
The election resulted in a smashing victory for Roosevelt, who won 22,800,000 votes to Hoover's 15,700,000. The United States was about to enter a new era of economic and political change.
Roosevelt and the New Deal
In 1933 the new president, Franklin Roosevelt, brought an air of confidence and optimism that quickly rallied the people to the banner of his program, known as the New Deal. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself," the president declared in his inaugural address to the nation.
In a certain sense, it is fair to say that the New Deal merely introduced types of social and economic reform familiar to many Europeans for more than a generation. Moreover, the New Deal represented the culmination of a long-range trend toward abandonment of "laissez-faire" capitalism, going back to the regulation of the railroads in the 1880s, and the flood of state and national reform legislation introduced in the Progressive era of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.
What was truly novel about the New Deal, however, was the speed with which it accomplished what previously had taken generations. In fact, many of the reforms were hastily drawn and weakly administered; some actually contradicted others. And during the entire New Deal era, public criticism and debate were never interrupted or suspended; in fact, the New Deal brought to the individual citizen a sharp revival of interest in government.
When Roosevelt took the presidential oath, the banking and credit system of the nation was in a state of paralysis. With astonishing rapidity the nation's banks were first closed
-- and then reopened only if they were solvent. The administration adopted a policy of moderate currency inflation to start an upward movement in commodity prices and to afford some relief to debtors. New governmental agencies brought generous credit facilities to industry and agriculture. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured savings-bank deposits up to $5,000, and severe regulations were imposed upon the sale of securities on the stock exchange.
Unemployment
By 1933 millions of Americans were out of work. Bread lines were a common sight in most cities. Hundreds of thousands roamed the country in search of food, work and shelter. "Brother, can you spare a dime?" went the refrain of a popular song.
An early step for the unemployed came in the form of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a program enacted by Congress to bring relief to young men between 18 and 25 years of age. Run in semi-military style, the CCC enrolled jobless young men in work camps across the country for about $30 per month. About 2 million young men took part during the decade. They participated in a variety of conservation projects: planting trees to combat soil erosion and maintain national forests; eliminating stream pollution; creating fish, game and bird sanctuaries; and conserving coal, petroleum, shale, gas, sodium and helium deposits.
Work relief came in the form of the Civil Works Administration. Although criticized as "make work," the jobs funded ranged from ditch digging to highway repairs to teaching. Created in November 1933, it was abandoned in the spring of 1934. Roosevelt and his key officials, however, continued to favor unemployment programs based on work relief rather than welfare.
Agriculture
The New Deal years were characterized by a belief that greater regulation would solve many of the country's problems. In 1933, for example, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to provide economic relief to farmers. The AAA had at its core a plan to raise crop prices by paying farmers a subsidy to compensate for voluntary
cutbacks in production. Funds for the payments would be generated by a tax levied on industries that processed crops. By the time the act had become law, however, the growing season was well underway, and the AAA encouraged farmers to plow under their abundant crops. Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace called this activity a "shocking commentary on our civilization." Nevertheless, through the AAA and the Commodity Credit Corporation, a program which extended loans for crops kept in storage and off the market, output dropped.
Between 1932 and 1935, farm income increased by more than 50 percent, but only partly because of federal programs. During the same years that farmers were being encouraged to take land out of production -- displacing tenants and sharecroppers -- a severe drought hit the Great Plains states, significantly reducing farm production. Violent wind and dust storms ravaged the southern Great Plains in what became known as the "Dust Bowl," throughout the 1930s, but particularly from 1935 to 1938. Crops were destroyed, cars and machinery were ruined, people and animals were harmed. Approximately 800,000 people, often called "Okies," left Arkansas, Texas, Missouri and Oklahoma during the 1930s and 1940s. Most headed farther west to the land of myth and promise, California. The migrants were not only farmers, but also professionals, retailers and others whose livelihoods were connected to the health of the farm communities. California was not the place of their dreams, at least initially. Most migrants ended up competing for seasonal jobs picking crops at extremely low wages.
The government provided aid in the form of the Soil Conservation Service, established in 1935. Farm practices that had damaged the soil had intensified the severity of the storms, and the Service taught farmers measures to reduce erosion. In addition, almost 30,000 kilometers of trees were planted to break the force of winds.
Although the AAA had been mostly successful, it was abandoned in 1936, when the tax on food processors was ruled unconstitutional. Six weeks later Congress passed a more effective farm-relief act, which authorized the government to make payments to farmers who reduced plantings of soil-depleting crops -- thereby achieving crop reduction through soil conservation practices.
By 1940 nearly 6 million farmers were receiving federal subsidies under this program. The new act likewise provided loans on surplus crops, insurance for wheat and a system of planned storage to ensure a stable food supply. Soon, prices of agricultural commodities rose, and economic stability for the farmer began to seem possible.
Industry and Labor
The National Recovery Administration (NRA), established in 1933 with the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), attempted to end cut-throat competition by setting codes of fair competitive practice to generate more jobs and thus more buying. Although the NRA was welcomed initially, business complained bitterly of over-regulation as recovery began to take hold. The NRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. By this time other policies were fostering recovery, and the government soon took the position that administered prices in certain lines of business were a severe drain on the national economy and a barrier to recovery.
It was also during the New Deal that organized labor made greater gains than at any previous time in American history. NIRA had guaranteed to labor the right of collective bargaining (bargaining as a unit representing individual workers with industry). Then in 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, which defined unfair labor practices, gave workers the right to bargain through unions of their own choice and prohibited employers from interfering with union activities. It also created the National Labor Relations Board to supervise collective bargaining, administer elections and ensure workers the right to choose the organization that should represent them in dealing with employers.
The great progress made in labor organization brought working people a growing sense of common interests, and labor's power increased not only in industry but also in politics. This power was exercised largely within the framework of the two major parties, however, and the Democratic Party generally received more union support than the Republicans.
The Second New Deal
In its early years, the New Deal sponsored a remarkable series of legislative initiatives and achieved significant increases in production and prices -- but it did not bring an end to the Depression. And as the sense of immediate crisis eased, new demands emerged. Businessmen mourned the end of "laissez-faire" and chafed under the regulations of the NIRA. Vocal attacks also mounted from the political left and right as dreamers, schemers and politicians alike emerged with economic panaceas that drew wide audiences of those dissatisfied with the pace of recovery. They included Francis E. Townsend's plan for generous old-age pensions; the inflationary suggestions of Father Coughlin, the radio priest who blamed international bankers in speeches increasingly peppered with anti-Semitic imagery; and most formidably, the "Every Man a King" plan of Huey P. Long, senator and former governor of Louisiana, the powerful and ruthless spokesman of the displaced who ran the state like a personal fiefdom. (If he had not been assassinated, Long very likely would have launched a presidential challenge to Franklin Roosevelt in 1936.)
In the face of these pressures from left and right, President Roosevelt backed a new set of economic and social measures. Prominent among these were measures to fight poverty, to counter unemployment with work and to provide a social safety net.
The Works Progress Administration (WPA), the principal relief agency of the so-called second New Deal, was an attempt to provide work rather than welfare. Under the WPA, buildings, roads, airports and schools were constructed. Actors, painters, musicians and writers were employed through the Federal Theater Project, the Federal Art Project and the Federal Writers Project. In addition, the National Youth Administration gave part-time employment to students, established training programs and provided aid to unemployed youth. The WPA only included about three million jobless at a time; when it was abandoned in 1943 it had helped a total of 9 million people.
But the New Deal's cornerstone, according to Roosevelt, was the Social Security Act of 1935. Social Security created a system of insurance for the aged, unemployed and disabled based on employer and employee contributions. Many other industrialized nations had already enacted such programs, but calls for such an initiative in the United States by the Progressives in the early 1900s had gone unheeded. Although
conservatives complained that the Social Security system went against American traditions, it was actually relatively conservative. Social Security was funded in large part by taxes on the earnings of current workers, with a single fixed rate for all regardless of income. To Roosevelt, these limitations on the programs were compromises to ensure passage. Although its origins were initially quite modest, Social Security today is one of the largest domestic programs administered by the U.S. government.
A New Coalition
In 1936, the Republican Party nominated Alfred M. Landon, the relatively liberal governor of Kansas, to oppose Roosevelt. Despite all the complaints leveled at the New Deal, Roosevelt won an even more decisive victory than in 1932. He took 60 percent of the population and carried all states except Maine and Vermont. In this election, a broad new coalition aligned with the Democratic Party emerged, consisting of labor, most farmers, immigrants and urban ethnic groups from East and Southern Europe, African Americans and the South. The Republican Party received the support of business as well as middle-class members of small towns and suburbs. This political alliance, with some variation and shifting, remained intact for several decades.
From 1932 to 1938 there was widespread public debate on the meaning of New Deal policies to the nation's political and economic life. It became obvious that Americans wanted the government to take greater responsibility for the welfare of the nation. Indeed, historians generally credit the New Deal with establishing the foundations of the modern welfare state in the United States. Some New Deal critics argued that the indefinite extension of government functions would eventually undermine the liberties of the people. But President Roosevelt insisted that measures fostering economic well-being would strengthen liberty and democracy.
In a radio address in 1938, Roosevelt reminded the American people that:
Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations, not because the people of those nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemployment and insecurity, of seeing their children hungry while they sat helpless in the face of
government confusion and government weakness through lack of leadership....Finally, in desperation, they chose to sacrifice liberty in the hope of getting something to eat. We in America know that our democratic institutions can be preserved and made to work. But in order to preserve them we need...to prove that the practical operation of democratic government is equal to the task of protecting the security of the people....The people of America are in agreement in defending their liberties at any cost, and the first line of the defense lies in the protection of economic security.
Eve of World War II
Before Roosevelt's second term was well under way, his domestic program was overshadowed by a new danger little noted by average Americans: the expansionist designs of totalitarian regimes in Japan, Italy and Germany. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and crushed Chinese resistance; a year later the Japanese set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. Italy, having succumbed to fascism, enlarged its boundaries in Libya and in 1935 attacked Ethiopia. Germany, where Adolf Hitler had organized the National Socialist Party and seized the reins of government in 1933, reoccupied the Rhineland and undertook large-scale rearmament.
As the real nature of totalitarianism became clear, and as Germany, Italy and Japan continued their aggression, American apprehension fueled isolationist sentiment. In 1938, after Hitler had incorporated Austria into the German Reich, his demands for the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia made war seem possible at any moment in Europe. The United States, disillusioned by the failure of the crusade for democracy in World War I, announced that in no circumstances could any country involved in the conflict look to it for aid. Neutrality legislation, enacted piecemeal from 1935 to 1937, prohibited trade with or credit to any of the warring nations. The objective was to prevent, at almost any cost, the involvement of the United States in a non-American war.
With the Nazi assault on Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of World War II, isolationist sentiment increased, even though Americans were far from neutral in their feelings about world events. Public sentiment clearly favored the victims of Hitler's aggression and supported the Allied powers that stood in opposition to German expansion. Under
the circumstances, however, Roosevelt could only wait until public opinion regarding U.S. involvement was altered by events.
With the fall of France and the air war against Britain in 1940, the debate intensified between those who favored aiding the democracies and the isolationists, organized around the America First Committee, whose support ranged from Midwestern conservatives to left-leaning pacifists. In the end, the interventionist argument won a protracted public debate, aided in large measure by the work of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
The United States joined Canada in a Mutual Board of Defense, and aligned with the Latin American republics in extending collective protection to the nations in the Western Hemisphere. Congress, confronted with the mounting crisis, voted immense sums for rearmament, and in September 1940 passed the first peacetime conscription bill ever enacted in the United States -- albeit by a margin of one vote in the House of Representatives. In early 1941 Congress approved the Lend-Lease Program, which enabled President Roosevelt to transfer arms and equipment to any nation (notably Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China) deemed vital to the defense of the United States. Total Lend-Lease aid by war's end amounted to more than $50,000 million.
The 1940 presidential election campaign demonstrated that the isolationists, while vocal, commanded relatively few followers nationally. Roosevelt's Republican opponent, Wendell Wilkie, lacked a compelling issue since he supported the president's foreign policy, and also agreed with a large part of Roosevelt's domestic program. Thus the November election yielded another majority for Roosevelt. For the first time in U.S. history, a president was elected to a third term.
Japan, Pearl Harbor and War
While most Americans anxiously watched the course of the European war, tension mounted in Asia. Taking advantage of an opportunity to improve its strategic position, Japan boldly announced a "new order" in which it would exercise hegemony over all of the Pacific. Battling for its survival against Nazi Germany, Britain was unable to resist, withdrawing from Shanghai and temporarily closing the Burma Road. In the summer of
1940, Japan won permission from the weak Vichy government in France to use airfields in Indochina. By September the Japanese had joined the Rome-Berlin Axis. As a countermove, the United States imposed an embargo on export of scrap iron to Japan.
It seemed that the Japanese might turn southward toward the oil, tin and rubber of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. In July 1941 the Japanese occupied the remainder of Indochina; the United States, in response, froze Japanese assets.
General Hideki Tojo became prime minister of Japan in October 1941. In mid-November, he sent a special envoy to the United States to meet with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Among other things, Japan demanded that the U.S. release Japanese assets and stop U.S. naval expansion in the Pacific. Hull countered with a proposal for Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina in exchange for the freeing of the frozen assets. The Japanese asked for two weeks to study the proposal, but on December 1 rejected it. On December 6, Franklin Roosevelt appealed directly to the Japanese emperor, Hirohito. On the morning of December 7, however, Japanese carrier-based planes attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in a devastating, surprise attack. Nineteen ships, including five battleships, and about 150 U.S. planes were destroyed; more than 2,300 soldiers, sailors and civilians were killed. Only one fact favored the Americans that day: the U.S. aircraft carriers that would play such a critical role in the ensuing naval war in the Pacific were at sea and not anchored at Pearl Harbor.
As the details of the Japanese raids upon Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Guam blared from American radios, incredulity turned to anger at what President Roosevelt called "a day that will live in infamy." On December 8, Congress declared a state of war with Japan; three days later Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.
The nation rapidly geared itself for mobilization of its people and its entire industrial capacity. On January 6, 1942, President Roosevelt announced staggering production goals: delivery in that year of 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, 20,000 antiaircraft guns and 18 million deadweight tons of merchant shipping. All the nation's activities -- farming, manufacturing, mining, trade, labor, investment, communications, even education and cultural undertakings -- were in some fashion brought under new and enlarged controls.
The nation raised money in enormous sums and created great new industries for the mass production of ships, armored vehicles and planes. Major movements of population took place. Under a series of conscription acts, the United States brought the armed forces up to a total of 15,100,000. By the end of 1943, approximately 65 million men and women were in uniform or in war-related occupations.
The attack on the United States disarmed the appeal of isolationists and permitted quick military mobilization. However, as a result of Pearl Harbor and the fear of Asian espionage, Americans also committed an act of intolerance: the internment of Japanese-Americans. In February 1942, nearly 120,000 Japanese-Americans residing in California were removed from their homes and interned behind barbed wire in 10 wretched temporary camps, later to be moved to "relocation centers" outside isolated Southwestern towns. Nearly 63 percent of these Japanese-Americans were Nisei -- American-born -- and, therefore, U.S. citizens. No evidence of espionage ever surfaced. In fact, Japanese-Americans from Hawaii and the continental United States fought with noble distinction and valor in two infantry units on the Italian front. Others served as interpreters and translators in the Pacific. In 1983 the U.S. government acknowledged the injustice of internment with limited payments to those Japanese-Americans of that era who were still living.
Source
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http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/overview.htm
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Statement of
Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Submitted to the
House Armed Services Committee
July 27, 2010
U.S.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century
Chairman Skelton, Mr. McKeon, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our engagement in the Asia-Pacific. The alliance has provided a basis for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific for a half-century and has – in many ways -- underwritten the ―Asian economic miracle‖ and the spread of democratic governance throughout the region. This year the United States and Japan are celebrating the 50th anniversary of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, a historic milestone that offers both an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the past and, perhaps more importantly, to chart a forward-looking course for this relationship to ensure that it is well positioned to manage issues of consequence both in the region and beyond.
The Obama administration entered office with a deep appreciation of the strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Then-Prime Minister Taro Aso was the first foreign leader to meet with President Obama. Japan was President Obama’s first stop on his first visit to East Asia as President. Secretary Clinton’s maiden voyage as Secretary of State was to Asia, and it was no coincidence that her first stop was in
Japan. As the world’s first and second largest economies the U.S. and Japan have worked closely to contribute to the global economic recovery.
Bilateral Relations
Together, the United States and Japan bring tremendous capability and creativity to bear on the challenges the world faces today. Our economic relationship is strong, mature, and increasingly interdependent, firmly rooted in the shared interest and responsibility of the United States and Japan to promote global growth, open markets, and a vital world trading system. Our bilateral economic relationship is based on enormous flows of trade, investment, and finance. In previous decades our economic relationship was often characterized by conflict over trade issues. Today, even as we continue to address trade irritants such as beef and Japan Post, we are able to
prioritize new modes of cooperation that allow us to pursue common interests – such as
innovation and entrepreneurship, the internet economy and cloud computing – as building blocks to improve opportunities for our trade and economic growth. We have a shared interest in greener, more sustainable growth. Climate change is a trend that obviously presents enormous challenges for both the United States and Japan, but also creates opportunities for us both to leverage our comparative advantage in innovation to develop new, growth-inducing energy technologies. We were also very pleased that our two nations initialed the text of an Open Skies aviation agreement in December of last year. It is a landmark agreement that is a pro-consumer, pro-competitive, pro-growth accord. The agreement will strengthen and expand our already strong trade and tourism links with Japan.
As our security and economic relationship has evolved, so has our cultural relationship matured and grown. We have a longstanding tradition of exchange and cooperation between our two countries, and between the people of our two nations. We have cooperation in the fields of education and science, and through traditional programs such as the Fulbright Exchange and the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching Program). The global challenges we face today require a complex, multi-dimensional approach to public diplomacy. As President Obama said recently, "... cooperation must go beyond
our governments. It must be rooted in our people - in the studies we share, the business that we do, the knowledge that we gain, and even in the sports that we
play." The Secretary echoed the President’s views when she said, ―What we call people-to people diplomacy has taken on greater significance, as our world has grown more
interdependent, and our challenges, more complex. Government alone cannot solve the
problems that we face. We have to tap into the challenge of our people, their creativity and innovation, and their ability to forge lasting relationships that build trust and understanding.‖
The historic elections in late August of 2009 ushered in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). It should come as no surprise that over the past 10 months the relationship has had its shares of ups-and-downs. Some commentators have even suggested that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in a period of ―strategic drift‖ --- nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, public opinion polling shows support in Japan for the U.S.-Japan alliance is the highest it has ever been – over 75 percent. After spending over half of my professional career thinking about the U.S.-Japan alliance I feel confident in saying that our alliance will continue to grow stronger. I would now like to take this opportunity to lay out three elements of our relationship that I believe underscore the bilateral, regional and global depth and breadth of our relationship.
It is now more than 10 months since Japan’s historic change of government in September 2009.The new ruling coalition came to power with a manifesto calling for a review of many of the policies of its LDP predecessors, including aspects of the alliance with the United States, with some envisioning an ―alliance without bases.‖ However, in practice the Japanese government has continued to reaffirm the crucial role of the Alliance in ensuring Japan’s security and maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. This past January, then-Prime Minister Hatoyama, in a statement celebrating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the revised U.S-Japan Security Treaty, said that ―it is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the
U.S.-Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respecting freedom and democracy, and enjoyed economic development…since the end of the last World War to this day.‖ To celebrate this 50th anniversary year, and to deepen and broaden our alliance, we and our Japanese allies are meeting at all levels and across
government bureaucracies to share views and assessments of Asia’s dynamic strategic environment and charting a course to seize opportunities while minimizing potential for conflict.
Over the last fifteen years, the United States and Japan have worked together to update our alliance, through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions, and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope, with cooperation on everything from missile defense to information security. Additionally, Japan provides approximately $1.7 billion annually in host nation support to the U.S. military, a key Japanese contribution to our alliance.
There are more than 48,000 American military personnel deployed in Japan, including our only forward deployed carrier strike group, the 5th Air Force, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force.Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the United States and Japan made a landmark alliance commitment under the 2006 U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap, which was reaffirmed by the 2009 Guam International Agreement, to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will have far-reaching benefits for the Alliance. These changes will help strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for a more sustainable U.S. military presence in the region. The transformation includes the relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa, and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan (e.g., increased interoperability, as well as collaboration on ballistic missile defense). This realignment will strengthen both countries’ ability to meet current responsibilities and create an Alliance that is
more flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security concerns.
It is understood by all that the relocation to Guam of significant elements of the III Marine Expeditionary Force is dependent on tangible progress by the government of Japan towards completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, a linchpin of the Realignment Roadmap. The new Japanese government undertook an extensive review
of existing plans for the Futenma Replacement Facility, carefully examining alternatives with a goal of reconciling operational and security requirements with the recognition that the people of Okinawa, by hosting the majority of U.S. military facilities in Japan, bore a greater responsibility for our joint security than other regions of Japan. This review culminated in the conclusion, as expressed in the May 28 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, that the replacement facility would best be located in Okinawa at Camp Schwab and adjacent waters. Secretaries Clinton and Gates, along with their Japanese counterparts, directed that an experts group undertake a study regarding the replacement facility’s location, configuration, and construction method. The objective is to ensure that the construction of the replacement facility can be completed without significant delay. The Experts Study Group has been meeting steadily since June and we fully expect it to achieve its goals.
Let me also mention briefly another issue that is important to us in the State Department, that is connected with our relationship with Japan and also, because in some cases these families include former or current service members, relevant to this committee. That is the issue of international parental child abduction. Japan remains the only G7 country not to have ratified the Hague Convention; the Department of State consistently urges them to do so at the highest levels. In fact, Secretary Clinton has raised it with her Japanese counterpart, including most recently last week. In recent months, for the first time ever, the GOJ has co-sponsored with the Japanese Bar Association a symposium on the Hague Convention and International Parental
Child Abduction. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also posted for the first time preventative passport regulations to their official website. Where the dialogue was once muted less than a year ago, it is now part of the general discourse. While this issue resolved is by no mean resolved, we believe these GOJ efforts are signs of increased engagement by the Government of Japan.
Regional Engagement
We have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation with Japan on a number of consequential regional issues. Japan’s steadfast support for the Republic of Korea was vital in rallying the international community to offer a united response to the Cheonan sinking. Japan is
a key partner in our efforts to seek the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and in holding North Korea to its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. We also value our close cooperation on the adoption and implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to curb North Korea’s proliferation activities. Japanese insights into North Korean developments are equally valuable.
We and Japan have a mutual desire to engage constructively with a rising China. We share a stake in a successful China that follows international norms and standards. Japan has joined us in encouraging greater transparency from the Chinese military, and joins us as we carefully watch China’s growing maritime strength. Over the past few years Sino-Japanese relations have grown stronger and we look to both Beijing and Tokyo to continue to take steps to enhance mutual confidence and trust.
Southeast Asia is another area where we have longstanding and fruitful cooperation with Japan. It is an area where we and our Japanese allies share significant interests and objectives. We cooperate in encouraging economic and social development throughout the region, from Timor-Leste to Burma. We maintain close contact and coordinate our efforts in order to gain the maximum benefit from a useful division of labor. Japan remains an important partner and advocate for ASEAN. Where there appears to be potential for instability, we seek to harmonize our messages and ensure that we are reinforcing each other effectively.
One of the most significant and consequential developments over the past ten years has been the strengthening of the U.S.-India relationship. Our efforts have been complemented and supported by Japan. Under the leadership of both the LDP and DPJ government, Japanese-Indian relations have strengthened and become more robust. Both nations recently signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, and Delhi continues to look to Tokyo as it charts an Eastward course.
As Japan’s chairmanship of APEC continues and the United States is preparing for its host year in 2011, we have been working to create opportunities to strengthen
economic integration and address trade and investment issues in order to make it cheaper, easier, and faster to trade in the Asia-Pacific region.
We appreciate Japan’s support for U.S. participation and inclusion in the East Asia Summit, a process the Secretary and President plan to engage in 2010 and 2011. Existing organizations such as ASEAN, APEC, and the ASEAN Regional forum and new ones like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus and an expanded East Asia Summit provide excellent platforms for advancing the multitude of shared U.S. and Japanese economic, security, and political interests and values.
Global Cooperation
Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs, and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region.
Our strong relationship with Japan is global in reach. Japan is working with us and others on post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Chile, to eradicate disease and develop environmentally friendly sources of energy. In addition to their work in Haiti, Japan is involved in UN peacekeeping missions in Syria, Nepal, and Sudan, and has made contributions in kind to numerous UN missions.
In Iraq, our Japanese allies have pledged nearly $5 billion in aid to Iraq, focusing on rebuilding the industrial base and energy, transportation, and irrigation infrastructure. By generating economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, these activities complement our own and contribute to our shared goal of ensuring the country’s long-term stability.
Japan is a vital international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration, and development in Afghanistan. Japan has assumed the lion’s share of the cost of salaries for the Afghan police force. With a $5 billion commitment over five years, Japan is the second largest single donor, after the United States, to Afghanistan. Japan is providing expertise as well as funding, and helping the Afghan government develop programs to hasten the reintegration of former Taliban into normal society. In Pakistan, as well, Japan is contributing to the country’s stability by providing over $2 billion of
humanitarian and development assistance. Japan is helping the international community ensure refugees and internally displaced Pakistanis receive the food, shelter, and medical services they need. In a program that complements the American work
Secretary Clinton announced in Islamabad on July 19, Japan is extending the electricity grid to areas of the country that have not had it before and developing the energy sector throughout the country.
As a nation dependent on international trade, Japan values the security of its sea lines of communication. Japan is an active and important member of the international flotilla that is combating piracy off the Horn of Africa to ensure freedom of navigation and safety of mariners. Japan has also signed a bilateral agreement with Djibouti to construct a base to support its counter-piracy efforts, and is the largest single bilateral donor to Djibouti.
The architecture of international cooperation is sturdy, but it also dates in part to the cold war or even earlier. We and Japan are seeking new ways to structure international cooperation.
Japan is one of the United States’ closest partners as we confront the global challenge posed by climate change. Last fall, the President endorsed the U.S.-Japan Clean Energy Action Plan, which will build on our extensive scientific cooperation to help our economies transition to greater reliance on renewable forms of energy and ensure that transition creates economic opportunities here at home. We are both committed to ensuring all countries do their part to address this global threat, assisting those that can benefit from our technical expertise. Japan was a strong partner in developing the Copenhagen Accord, and pledged in Copenhagen to provide as much as $15 billion in financing to assist developing countries in combating climate change, premised on the development of a fair and effective global framework. We continue to
coordinate closely as we look to the next Conference of the Parties in Mexico this winter.
Whatever challenges we may face in the next half century, I am confident that our relationship with Japan will be an important element of our success. Our relationship
continues to develop and evolve, and continues to contribute to peace, prosperity and security throughout the region and the globe. We are under no illusions that there will not be periods of ups-and-downs in the relationship. However, our shared values and strategic interests will enable us to continue to move the relationship forward and ensure that it remains the cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.
Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to testify about the U.S.-Japan relationship and I look forward to answering your questions.
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htm
http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e5bc7266-b42d-4ead-9c90-ddc35ea0fd3f (pdf)
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Korea, Republic of (ROK) - History
The Republic of Korea, headed by President Syngman Rhee (Rhee Syngman), was proclaimed on 15 August 1948 in the southern portion of the Korean Peninsula, which had been under US military administration since 8 September 1945. Like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), established in the north on 9 September 1948 with Soviet backing, the ROK claimed to be the legitimate government of all Korea. The ROK was recognized as the legitimate government by the UN General Assembly.
At dawn on 25 June 1950, following a year and a half of sporadic fighting, the well-equipped People's Army of the DPRK struck south across the 38th parallel. Proclaiming that the war was for national liberation and unification of the peninsula, the DPRK forces advanced rapidly; Seoul fell within three days, and the destruction of the ROK seemed imminent. At US urging, the UN Security Council (with the Soviet delegate absent) branded the DPRK an aggressor and called for the withdrawal of the attacking forces. On 27 June, US president Harry S. Truman ordered US air and naval units into combat, and three days later, US ground forces were sent into battle. The United Kingdom took similar action, and a multinational UN Command was created to join with and lead the ROK in its struggle against the invasion. Meanwhile, DPRK troops had pushed into the southeast corner of the peninsula. At that juncture, however, UN lines held firm, and an amphibious landing at Inch'on (15 September 1950) in the ROK under General Douglas MacArthur brought about the complete disintegration of the DPRK army.
MacArthur, commanding the UN forces, made a fateful decision to drive northward. As the UN forces approached the Yalu River, however, China warned that it would not tolerate a unification of the peninsula under US/UN auspices. After several weeks of threats and feints, "volunteers" from the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the fighting en masse, forcing MacArthur into a costly, pell-mell retreat back down the peninsula. Seoul was lost again (4 January 1951) and then regained before the battle line became stabilized very nearly along the 38th parallel. There it remained for two weary years, with bitter fighting but little change, while a cease-fire agreement was negotiated.
On 27 July 1953, an armistice agreement finally was signed at P'anmunjom in the DPRK. The Korean War was ended, but it had brought incalculable destruction and human suffering to all of Korea (some 1,300,000 military casualties, including 415,000 combat deaths, for the ROK alone), and it left the peninsula still more implacably divided. A military demarcation line, which neither side regarded as a permanent border, was established, surrounded by the DMZ. An international conference envisioned in the armistice agreement was not held until mid-1954. This conference and subsequent efforts failed to reach an agreement on unification of the North and
South, and the armistice agreement, supervised by a token UN Command in Seoul and by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, both in P'anmunjom, remains in effect.
In 1954, the United States and ROK signed a mutual defense treaty, under which US troops remained in the country. Financial assistance throughout the 1950s was provided by the US, averaging $270 million annually between 1953 and 1958, and by other nations under UN auspices. Syngman Rhee ran the government until 1960, when his authoritarian rule provoked the "April Revolution," the culmination of a series of increasingly violent student demonstrations that finally brought about his ouster. The Second Korean Republic, which followed Rhee, adopted a parliamentary system to replace the previous presidential system. The new government, however, was short-lived. Premier Chang Myon and his supporters were ousted after only 10 months by a military coup in May 1961, headed by Major-General Park Chung-hee. The military junta dissolved the National Assembly, placed the nation under martial law, established the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) as a means of detecting and suppressing potential enemies, and ruled by decree until late 1963 through the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. General Park created a well-organized political party—the Democratic-Republican Party (DRP)— designed to serve as a vehicle for the transition from military to civilian rule, and in October 1963, under a new constitution, he easily won election as president of the Third Republic.
During the summer of 1965, riots erupted all over the ROK in protest against the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty, which established diplomatic relations and replaced Korean war-reparation claims with Japanese promises to extend economic aid. The riots were met with harsh countermeasures, including another period of martial law and widespread arrests of demonstrators. Further demonstrations erupted in 1966, when the ROK's decision to send 45,000 combat troops to Vietnam became known. Park was elected to a second term in May 1967, defeating his chief opponent, Yun Po-sun, and the DRP won a large majority in the National Assembly. In 1969, Park pushed through the National Assembly a constitutional amendment permitting him to run for a third term. He defeated Kim Dae Jung, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP),
in the elections of April 1971, but Kim's NDP made significant gains in the National Assembly elections that May.
Student demonstrations against the government in the fall of 1971 prompted Park to declare a state of national emergency on 6 December. Three weeks later, in a predawn session held without the knowledge of the opposition, the Assembly granted Park extraordinary governmental powers. These failed to quell mounting opposition and unrest, and in October 1972 martial law was declared. A new constitution, promulgated at the end of the month and ratified by national referendum in November 1972, vastly increased the powers of the presidency in economic as well as political affairs. Under this new document, which inaugurated the Fourth Republic, Park was elected for a six-year term that December, with a decisive legislative majority for his DRP. Soon the economy began to expand at a rapid rate. But Park's regime became increasingly repressive. Typical of its heavy-handed rule was the abduction by KCIA agents of Kim Dae Jung from a Japanese hotel room back to Seoul, an incident that provoked considerable friction between Japanese and Korean officials. On 15 August 1974, a Korean gunman carrying a Japanese passport and sympathetic to the DPRK attempted to assassinate the president but killed Park's wife instead. Park responded by drafting a series of emergency measures; the harshest of these, Emergency Measure No. 9, issued in May 1975, provided for the arrest of anyone criticizing the constitution and banned all political activities by students.
Park was reelected for another six-year term in July 1978, but the NDP, now led by Kim Young Sam, made major gains in the National Assembly. In October 1979, Kim was expelled from the legislature after calling for governmental reform. Riots protesting Kim's ouster were reported in several major cities. On 26 October 1979, in what may have been an attempted coup, Park was assassinated by KCIA Director Kim Jae-gyu, who was later executed. Martial law was again imposed, and a period of relative calm followed as some of the more restrictive emergency decrees were lifted by Park's constitutional successor, the prime minister, Choi Kyu-hah, who promised a new constitution and presidential elections.
In December 1979, Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan led a coup in which he and his military colleagues removed the army chief of staff and took effective control of the government. Demonstrations, led by university students, spread through the spring of 1980 and, by mid-May, the government once more declared martial law (in effect until January 1981), banned demonstrations, and arrested political leaders. In the city of Kwangju, more than 200 civilians were killed in what became known as the Kwangju massacre. Choi Kyu-hah was pressured to resign and Chun Doo Hwan, now retired from the military, was named president in September 1980. Chun Doo Hwan came to power under a new constitution inaugurating the Fifth Republic. A total of 567 political leaders, including Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, were banned from political activity. Kim Dae Jung, arrested several times after his 1973 kidnapping, was originally sentenced to death but allowed to go to the United States in 1982. All existing political parties were dissolved, and all political activity banned until three months before the 1981 elections.
Twelve new parties (reduced to eight) were formed to enter the 1981 elections, in which Chun Doo Hwan was elected to a seven-year presidential term by a new electoral college and his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) secured a majority in the reconstituted National Assembly. Despite harsh controls, opposition to Chun continued. In 1982, 1,200 political prisoners were released, and in early 1983, the ban on political activity was lifted for 250 of the banned politicians. On 9 October 1983, Chun escaped an apparent assassination attempt in Rangoon, Burma, when an explosion took the lives of 17 in his entourage, including 4 ROK cabinet ministers. Chun subsequently blamed the DPRK for the bombing. In 1984, under increasing pressure for political reforms prior to the 1985 parliamentary elections, the government lifted its ban on all but 15 of the 567 politicians banned in 1980. In 1985, the ban was lifted on 14 of the remaining 15. Kim Dae Jung was allowed to return from exile in the United States in 1984 but rearrested. He remained banned from all political activity because of his conviction for sedition in 1980.
Opposition groups quickly formed the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) to challenge the DJP in the 1985 election; the new party became a strong minority voice in the National Assembly. The issue of constitutional reforms, particularly changes in the way in which presidents are elected and the way in which "bonus" seats in the legislature
are distributed, became prominent, especially after Chun reaffirmed a commitment to step down in February 1988 and, in April 1986, dropped his long-standing opposition to any constitutional changes prior to that date. Demonstrations against Chun continued and became violent at Inch'on in May 1986 and at Konkuk University that fall. Opposition groups began collecting signatures on a petition demanding direct (instead of indirect) election of the president. In April 1987, as demonstrations became increasingly violent, Chun banned all further discussion of constitutional reform until after the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. The ban, which could have guaranteed the election of a handpicked DJP successor, set off violent antigovernment demonstrations throughout the nation. In June 1987, the DJP nominated its chairman, Roh Tae Woo, a former general and a close friend of Chun, as its candidate for his successor. When Roh accepted opposition demands for political reforms, Chun announced in July that the upcoming election would be held by direct popular vote. On 8 July, 100,000 people demonstrated in Seoul in the largest protest since 1960 and, on the same day, the government restored political rights to 2,000 people, including the longtime opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung.
In the elections, held on 16 December 1987, Roh Tae Woo, as the DJP candidate, won a plurality of 37%, defeating the two major opposition candidates, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who had been unable to agree on a single opposition candidacy and split 55% of the total vote. Two minor candidates divided the remainder. A reported 89% of all eligible voters participated. The two leading opposition candidates charged massive fraud, and a series of demonstrations were held to protest the results. However, no evidence of extensive fraud was produced, and the demonstrations did not attract wide support. Roh Tae Woo was inaugurated as president in February 1988 when Chun Doo Hwan's term expired.
In the elections for the National Assembly, held on 26 April 1988, President Roh Tae Woo's party, the DJP, won only 34% of the vote. This gave the DJP 125 seats in the assembly, while Kim Dae Jung's Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) gained 70 seats, Kim Young Sam's Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) won 59 seats, 35 seats went to the new Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), and 10 to independent candidates. Thus, for the first time in 36 years, the government did not have a controlling vote in the
National Assembly, which quickly challenged President Roh's choice for head of the Supreme Court and by year's end forced the president to work with the assembly to pass the budget.
In the fall of 1988, the National Assembly audited the government and held public hearings into former President Chun's abuses of power. In November, Chun apologized to the nation in a televised address, gave his personal wealth to the nation, and retired into a Buddhist temple. Following the revision of the constitution in 1987, South Koreans enjoyed greater freedoms of expression and assembly and freedom of the press and, in 1988, several hundred political dissidents were released from prison.
Unrest among students, workers, and farmers continued, however, and beginning in April 1989, the government repressed opposition. In October 1989, the government acknowledged making 1,315 political arrests so far that year. The National Assembly became less of a check on President Roh after two opposition parties (RDP, NDRP), including that of Kim Young Sam, merged with Roh's DJP, forming a new majority party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in January 1990. Kim Dae Jung was then left as the leader of the main opposition party (PDP).
There were continuing demonstrations into 1990 and 1991, calling for the resignation of President Roh and the withdrawal of United States troops. In May 1990, 50,000 demonstrators in Kwangju commemorated the tenth anniversary of the massacre, resulting in clashes with police which lasted several days. The United States agreed to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the ROK in November 1991. And, on the last day of the year, the ROK and the DPRK signed an agreement to ban nuclear weapons from the entire peninsula.
In the presidential election on 19 December 1992, Kim Young Sam, now leader of the majority DLP, won with 41.9% of the vote, while Kim Dae Jung (DP) took 33.8%. Inaugurated in February 1993, Kim Young Sam began a new era as the first president in 30 years who was a civilian, without a power base in the military. President Kim granted amnesty to 41,000 prisoners and instituted a series of purges of high-ranking military officials, including four generals who had roles in the 1979 coup. Among political and economic reforms was a broad anticorruption campaign, resulting in
arrests, dismissals, or reprimands for several thousands of government officials and business people. In March 1994, a former official of the National Security Planning Agency made public President Roh Tae Woo's authorization of a covert program to develop nuclear weapons at the Daeduk Science Town through 1991.
South and North Korea continue to have a rocky relationship. In April of 1996, North Korean troops on three successive days violated the 1954 armistice which had ended the Korean War by entering Panmunjom. The soldiers, who were apparently conducting training exercises, withdrew after a few hours on all three occasions. In September of the same year, a small North Korean submarine was grounded off the Eastern coast of South Korea and 26 crew members fled into the interior of South Korea. The ship appeared to be carrying a team of North Korean spies who intended to infiltrate into South Korea to carry out what remain unknown missions against South Korean targets. Twenty-four of the crewmen were killed, one escaped and one remains at large. In a surprise unusual move, the North Korean government apologized in February of 1997 for the incursion.
Meanwhile recent domestic events inside South Korea have been equally tumultuous. In August of 1996, former President Chun Doo Hwan and his successor, Roh Tae Woo were tried and found guilty of treason and mutiny for the 1980 coup that brought them to power, and the subsequent Kwangju massacre, in which troops killed at least 154 pro-democracy demonstrators. The court gave Chun a death sentence (extremely rare in Korea) and sentenced Roh to 22.5 years in prison. An appellate court later reduced Chun's sentence to life imprisonment and Roh's sentence to 17 years. When Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as president in 1998, both leaders were released from prison under Kim's grant of amnesty.
On 11 April 1996, legislative elections took place amid allegation of corruption that reached to the inner circle of President Kim Young Sam and his New Korea Party. During the pre-election campaigning, Kim promised to launch an anti-corruption effort if his party gained power; in a major upset, the NKP captured 139 of the 299 seats, while the main opposition party (National Congress for New Politics—NCNP) or Kim Dae Jung won only 79 seats. Kim Dae Jung lost his own seat in the legislature. Several important
New Korea Party officials and even Kim Young Sam's son, were implicated on charges of taking or giving millions of dollars in bribes to arrange loans to Hanbo Steel Industry Co., which eventually went bankrupt under $6 billion of debt. Some of those officials were indicted in February of 1997 but Mr. Kim's son, Kim Hyun Chul, was cleared. However, in May of the same year Kim Hyun Chul was arrested on bribery and tax-evasion charges unrelated to the Hanbo scandal.
By 1997, many of the large chaebols (business conglomerates) reported serious problems with debt. A portion of Kia Group, a major manufacturer of automobiles, was nationalized to prevent bankruptcy. Increased domestic economic instability coupled with economic crisis sweeping through Asia, led to a severe decline in the value of the currency. The ensuing financial panic coincided with presidential elections on 18 December 1997, the month that negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began. In the election Kim Dae Jung narrowly defeated the ruling party's candidate Lee Hoe Chang by 40.3% to 38.7%. A third candidate Yi In Che garnered 19.2% of the votes, effectively splitting the pro-government vote. Kim Dae Jung pledged to adhere to IMF conditionality and reform government-business relations in South Korea by increasing transparency. In 1998 and 1999, the government reduced the role of government intervention in the domestic economy despite numerous strikes by workers protesting layoffs.
By mid-2000, Kim Dae Jung managed to steer Korea's economy out of the worst of the crisis. The economy started to grow in 1999 and economic estimates suggested that economic growth would top 10% for 2000. In April 2000, the legislative elections improved the position of Kim's party, renamed the New Millennium Party (NMP) to 115 seats. However, the Grand National Party (GNP), successor to the NKP obtained 133 seats and the United Liberal Democrats, allied to the GNP, won 17. Thus, Kim's objective to continue economic reform was imperiled.
In June 2000, Kim Dae Jung traveled to P'yongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) for an historic meeting with his counterpart, Kim Jong Il. The two agreed to pursue further cooperation in the future. This summit meeting marked the high point of what became known as Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine
policy" of rapprochement toward the North. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his commitment to democracy and human rights in Asia.
Roh Moo Hyun was elected president in the December 2002 election, taking 49% of the vote; he was inaugurated in February 2003. While campaigning, Roh had stated he would continue with Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" toward the North, but prior to his election, it was revealed that North Korea was secretly developing a program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Relations between North Korea and the US were tense in 2002 and 2003, as the US maintained North Korea should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, and the North asserted it had the right to do so to provide for its defense and security. Roh took the position that North Korea's moves to develop nuclear weapons and export missiles could only be countered by dialogue. This put him at odds with some in the Bush Administration who held that the United States would not be "blackmailed" into negotiating with the North. In June 2003, the United States announced it would redeploy some of its 37,000 troops in South Korea to positions south of the DMZ, in an effort to create more agile and mobile forces.
South Korea's economy in 2003 was growing at 6.3%, a rate that was among the highest in the developed world.
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Korea-Republic-of-ROK-HISTORY.html#ixzz0dDuYOg9T
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Fables & Tales
æsop’s fables
The Fox and the Crow
A Fox once saw a Crow fly off with a piece of cheese in its
beak and settle on a branch of a tree. ―That’s for me,‖ said
the Fox, and he walked up to the foot of the tree. ―Good
day, Mistress Crow,‖ he cried. ―How well you are looking
today: how glossy your feathers; how bright your eyes. I
feel sure your voice must surpass that of other birds, just
as your figure does. Let me hear but one song from you
that I may greet you as the Queen of Birds.‖ The Crow
lifted up her head and began to caw her best, but the
moment she opened her mouth the piece of cheese fell to
the ground, only to be snapped up by the Fox. ―That will
do,‖ said he. ―That was all I wanted. In exchange for your
cheese I will give you a piece of advice for the future:
Do not trust flatterers.
http://www.pubwire.com/DownloadDocs/AFABLES.PDF
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Collector’s Items
- Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Trip to Burma (Media Note)
- Derek Mitchell - Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma (September 14, 2011 )
- James Mann’s About Face (Sino-American relations from Nixon to Clinton)
- The Depression in the United States (1929)--An Overview
- US.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century - Statement of Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State (July 27, 2010)
- Korea, Republic of (ROK) – History - (Encyclopedia of the Nations)
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SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA No 4 - Thursday, September 15, 2011
